Bava Kamma

Whence is this ruling  deduced? Hezekiah said, and thus taught a Tanna of the School of Hezekiah: Scripture states, Wound instead of a wound  — to impose the liability [for Depreciation] in the case of inadvertence as in that of willfulness, in the case of compulsion as in that of willingness. [But] was not that [verse] required to prescribe [indemnity for] Pain even in the case where Depreciation is independently paid? — If that is all,  Scripture should have stated, 'Wound for a wound',  why state, [wound] instead of a wound,  unless to indicate that both inferences be made from it? Rabbah said: In the case of a stone lying in a person's bosom without his having knowledge of it, so that when he rose it fell down — regarding damage, there will be liability for Depreciation  but exemption regarding the [additional] Four Items;  concerning Sabbath  [there will similarly be exemption] as it is [only] work that has been [deliberately] purposed that is forbidden by the Law;  in a case of manslaughter  there is exemption from fleeing [to a city of refuge];  regarding [the release of] a slave,  there exists a difference of opinion between R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and the Rabbis, as it was taught:  If the master was a physician and the slave requested him to attend to his eye and it was accidentally blinded, or [the slave requested the master] to scrape his tooth and it was accidentally knocked out, he may now laugh at the master, for he has already obtained his liberty. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, however, says: [Scripture states] and [he] destroy it,  to make the freedom conditional upon the master intending to ruin the eye of the slave. If the person, however, had at some time been aware of the stone in his bosom but subsequently forgot all about it, so that when he rose it fell down, — in the case of damage there is liability for Depreciation;  but though the exemption regarding the [additional] Four Items still holds good,  in the case of manslaughter  he will have to flee [to a city of refuge], for Scripture says, at unawares,  implying the existence of some [previous] knowledge [as to the dangerous weapon] and in the case before us such knowledge did at a time exist: concerning Sabbath,  however, there is still exemption; regarding [the release of] a slave the difference of opinion between R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and the Rabbis  still applies. Where he intended to throw the stone to a distance of two cubits, but it fell at a distance of four,  if it caused damage, there is liability for Depreciation; regarding the [additional] Four Items there is still exemption;  so also concerning Sabbath,  for work [deliberately] planned is required [to make it an offence];  in the case of manslaughter,  And if a man lie not in wait,  is stated by Divine law, excluding a case where there was mention to throw a stone to a distance of two cubits but which fell at a distance of four.  Regarding [the release of] a slave, the difference of opinion between R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and the Rabbis  still applies. Where the intention was to throw the stone to a distance of four  cubits but it fell eight cubits away, — if it caused damage there will be liability for Depreciation; regarding the [additional] Four Items there is still exemption;  concerning Sabbath, if there was express intention that the stone should fall anywhere, there is liability for an offence,  but in the absence of such express intention no offence was committed;  in the case of manslaughter,  And if a man lie not in wait,  excludes a case where there was intention to throw a stone to a distance of four cubits, but which fell at a distance of eight. Regarding [the release of] a slave the difference of opinion between R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and the Rabbis  still applies. Rabbah again said: In the case of one throwing a utensil  from the top of a roof and another one coming and breaking it with a stick [before it fell upon the ground where it would in any case have been broken], the latter is under no liability to pay; the reason being that it was only a utensil which was already certain to be broken that was broken by him. Rabbah further said: In the case of a man throwing a utensil  from the top of the roof while there were underneath mattresses and cushions which were meanwhile removed by another person, or even if he [who had thrown it] removed them himself, there is exemption; the reason being that at the time of the throwing [of the utensil] his agency had been void of any harmful effect. Rabbah again said: In the case of one throwing a child from the top of the roof and somebody else meanwhile appearing and catching it on the edge of his sword, there is a difference of opinion between R. Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis.  For it was taught: In the case of ten persons beating one [to death] with ten sticks, whether simultaneously or consecutively, none of them