Bava Kamma

the 'hopping' only caused pebbles to fly, so that the point at issue is the same as that between Symmachus and the Rabbis. Come and hear: 'In the case of poultry picking at a cord attached to a pail so that the cord was snapped asunder and the bucket  broken, the payment must be in full.' Could it not be proved from this [Baraitha] that it is the original cause of the damage that has to be followed? — You may, however, interpret [the liability of full payment] to refer to the damage done to the cord.  But behold, is not [the damage of] the cord unusual [with poultry  and only half damages ought to be paid]? — It was smeared with dough.  But, does it not say 'and the bucket [was] broken'?  This Baraitha must therefore be in accordance with Symmachus, who maintains that also in the case of Pebbles full payment must be made. But if it is in accordance with Symmachus, read the concluding clause: Were a fragment of the broken bucket to fly and fall upon another utensil, breaking it, the payment for the former [i.e., the bucket] must be in full, but for the latter only half damages will be paid. Now does Symmachus ever recognise half damages [in the case of Pebbles]? If you, however, submit that there is a difference according to Symmachus between damage occasioned by direct force  and that caused by indirect force,  what about the question raised by R. Ashi:  Is damage occasioned by indirect force according to Symmachus subject to the same law  applicable to direct force, or not subject to the law of direct force?  Why is it not evident to him that it is not subject to the law of direct force? Hence the above Baraitha is accordingly more likely to be in accordance with the Rabbis, and proves thus that it is the original cause that has to be followed [as the determining factor]!  R. Bibi b. Abaye, however, said: The bucket [that was broken] was [not rolled but] continuously pushed by the poultry [from one place to another, so that it was broken by actual bodily touch]. Raba [again] queried: Will the half damages in the case of 'Pebbles' be paid out of the body [of the tort-feasant animal]  or will it be paid out of the best of the defendant's estate?  Will it be paid out of the body [of the tort-feasant animal] on account of the fact that nowhere is the payment of half damages made out of the best of the defendant's estate, or shall it nevertheless perhaps be paid out of the best of the defendant's estate since there is no case of habitual damage being compensated out of the body [of the tort-feasant animal]? — Come and hear: 'Hopping [with poultry] is not Mu'ad. Some, however, say: It is Mu'ad.' Could 'hopping' be said [in any way not to be habitual with poultry]? Does it not therefore mean: 'Hopping and making [pebbles] fly,' so that the point at issue is as follows: The former view maintaining that it is not [treated as] Mu'ad, requires payment to be made out of the body [of the tort-feasant poultry]  whereas the latter view maintaining that it is [treated as] Mu'ad, will require the payment [of the half damages for Pebbles] to be made out of the best of the defendant's estate?  — No, the point at issue is that between Symmachus and the Rabbis. Come and hear: In the case of a dog taking hold of a cake [with live coals sticking to it] and going [with it] to a stack of grain where he consumed the cake and set the stack on fire, full payment must be made for the cake,  whereas for the stack only half damages will be paid.  Now, what is the reason [that only half damages will be paid for the stack] if not on account of the fact that the damage of the stack is subject to the law of Pebbles?  It has, moreover, been taught in connection with this [Mishnah] that the half damages will be collected out of the body [of the tort-feasant dog]. [Does not this ruling offer a solution to the problem raised by Raba?] — But do you really think [the law of 'Pebbles' to be at the basis of this ruling]?  According to R. Eleazar [who maintains  that the payment even for the stack will be in full and out of the body of the tort-feasant dog], do we find anywhere full payment being collected out of the body [of tort-feasant animals]? Must not this ruling  therefore be explained to refer to a case where the dog acted in an unusual manner in handling the coal,  R. Eleazar being of the same opinion as R. Tarfon, who maintains  that [even] for the unusual damage by Horn, if done in the plaintiff's premises, the payment will be in full?  — This explanation, however, is not essential. For that which compels you to make R. Eleazar maintain the same opinion as R. Tarfon, is only his requiring full payment [out of the body of the dog]. It may therefore be suggested on the other hand that R. Eleazar holds the view expressed by Symmachus, that in the case of Pebbles full damages will be paid; and that he further adopts the view of R. Judah who said  that [in the case of Mu'ad, half of the payment, i.e.] the part of Tam, remains unaffected [i.e., is always subject to the law of Tam]; the statement that payment is made out of the body [of the dog] will therefore refer only to [one half] the part for which even Tam would be liable. But R. Samia the son of R. Ashi said lo Rabina: I submit that the view you have quoted in the name of R. Judah is confined to cases of Tam turned into Mu'ad [i.e. Horn],  whereas in cases which are Mu'ad ab initio