Bava Kamma

but in the case in hand, could the plaintiff say, 'The flesh did the damage and the emurim did no damage'? Raba said: In the case of a thanksgiving-offering that did damage,  payment will be made  out of the flesh but no payment could be made out of its bread.  'Bread'! Is this not obvious?  — He wanted to lead up to the concluding clause: The plaintiff partakes of the flesh,  while he, for whose atonement the offering is dedicated,  has to bring the bread. Is not this also obvious? — You might have thought that since the bread is but an accessory to the sacrifice,  the defendant may be entitled to say to the plaintiff. 'If you will partake of the flesh, why should I bring the bread?' It is therefore made known to us [that this is not the case, but] that the bread is an obligation upon the original owner of the sacrifice. THE [DAMAGED] PROPERTY SHOULD BELONG TO PERSONS WHO ARE UNDER [THE JURISDICTION OF] THE LAW. What [person] is thereby meant to be excepted? If a heathen,  is not this explicitly stated further on: 'An ox of an Israelite that gored an ox of a heathen is not subject to the general law of liability for damage'?  — That which has first been taught by implication is subsequently explained explicitly. THE PROPERTY SHOULD BE OWNED. What is thereby excepted? — Rab Judah said: It excepts the case [of alternative defendants] when the one pleads. 'It was your ox that did the damage,' and the other pleads. 'It was your ox that did the damage.' But is not this explicitly stated further on: If two oxen pursue another ox, and one of the defendants pleads. 'It was your ox that did the damage,' and the other defendant pleads, 'It was your ox that did the damage,' no liability could be attached to either of them?  — What is first taught by implication is subsequently explained explicitly. In a Baraitha it has been taught: The exception refers to ownerless property.  But in what circumstances? It can hardly be where an owned ox gored an ownerless ox, for who is there to institute an action? If on the other hand an ownerless ox gored an owned ox, why not go and take possession of the ownerless doer of the damage? — Somebody else has meanwhile stepped in and already acquired title to it.  Rabina said: It excepts an ox which gored and subsequently became consecrated or an ox which gored and afterwards became ownerless.  It has also been taught thus: Moreover said R. Judah:  Even if after having gored, the ox was consecrated by the owner, or after having gored it was declared by him ownerless, he is exempt, as it is said, And it hath been testified to his owner and he hath not kept it in, but it hath killed a man or a woman; the ox shall be stoned.  That is so only where conditions are the same at the time of both the manslaughter and the appearance before the Court.  Does not the final verdict also need to comply with this same condition? Surely the very verse, The ox shall be stoned, circumscribes also the final verdict! — Read therefore: That is so only when conditions are the same at the time of the manslaughter and the appearance before the Court and the final verdict. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PREMISES OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT: Because he may argue against the plaintiff, 'What was your ox doing on my premises?' OR PREMISES OWNED [JOINTLY] BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. R. Hisda said on behalf of Abimi: [Where damage is done] in jointly owned courts, there is liability for Tooth and Foot,  and the [Mishnah] text is to be read thus: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PREMISES OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT, where there is exemption. but in the case of PREMISES OWNED [JOINTLY] BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, WHENEVER DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED,  THE OFFENDER IS LIABLE. R. Eleazar [on the other hand] said: There is no liability there for Tooth and Foot,  and the text is to be understood thus: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PREMISES OWNED BY THE DEFENDANT OR [OF] PREMISES OWNED [JOINTLY] BY PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, where there is also exemption. But WHENEVER DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED [otherwise] THE OFFENDER IS LIABLE etc. introduces Horn.  This would be in conformity with Samuel,  but according to Rab, who affirmed that ox in the Mishnaic text was intended to include all kinds of damage done by ox,  what was meant to be introduced by the clause, THE OFFENDER IS LIABLE? — To introduce that which our Rabbis have taught: WHENEVER DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED THE OFFENDER IS LIABLE introduces liability in the case of a paid bailee and a borrower, an unpaid bailee and a hirer, where the animal in their charge did damage, Tam paying half-damages and Mu'ad paying full damages. If, however, a wall  broke open at night, or robbers took it by force and it went out and did damage, there is exemption. The Master said: 'WHENEVER DAMAGE HAS OCCURRED, THE OFFENDER IS LIABLE introduces liability in the case of an unpaid bailee and a borrower, a paid bailee and a hirer'. Under what circumstances? If the ox of the lender damaged the ox of the borrower, why should not the former say to the latter: 'If my ox had damaged somebody else's, you would surely have had to compensate;  now that my ox has damaged your own ox, how can you claim compensation from me?' Again, if the ox of the borrower damaged the ox of the lender, why should not the latter say to the former: 'If my ox had been damaged by somebody else's, you would surely have had to compensate me for the full value of the ox,  now that the damage resulted from your ox, how can you offer me half damages?  — It must therefore still be that the ox of the lender damaged the ox of the borrower, but we deal with a case where he [the borrower] has taken upon himself responsibility for the safety of the ox