Bava Kamma

[even] on the evidence of one witness.  This holds good if only one witness was concerned but not where there were two. And even to one witness it applies only if he appeared before judges of Magista,  but not before the Dawar  where the judges similarly impose an oath upon the evidence of a single witness. R. Ashi said: When we were at R. Huna's  we raised the question of a prominent man who would be trusted by them as two. [Shall we say that since] money would be adjudicated on his [sole] evidence, he therefore should not bear testimony in their courts, or perhaps since he is a prominent man he can hardly escape their notice and should consequently deliver his evidence? — This question remained undecided. R. Ashi further said: A son of Israel who sells to a heathen a field bordering on one of a fellow Israelite deserves to have a Shamta pronounced against him. For what reason? If because of the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbour to the boundary,  did the Master not state  that where he buys from a heathen or sells to a heathen the right of [pre-emption enjoyed by] the nearest neighbour to the boundary does not apply?  — It must therefore be because the neighbour might say to the vendor: 'You have placed a lion at my border.'  He therefore deserves to have a Shamta pronounced against him unless he accepts upon himself the responsibility for any consequent mishap that might result [from the sale]. MISHNAH. IF CUSTOMS-COLLECTORS TOOK AWAY A MAN'S ASS AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER ASS, OR IF BRIGANDS TOOK AWAY HIS GARMENT AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER GARMENT, IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM, FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY GIVEN UP HOPE OF RECOVERING IT.  IF ONE RESCUED [ARTICLES] FROM A RIVER OR FROM A MARAUDING BAND OR FROM HIGHWAYMEN, IF THE OWNERS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF THEM, THEY WILL BELONG TO HIM.  SO ALSO REGARDING SWARMS OF BEES, IF THE OWNERS HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF RECOVERING THEM, THEY WOULD BELONG TO HIM. R. JOHANAN B. BEROKA SAID: EVEN A WOMAN OR A MINOR  IS TRUSTED WHEN STATING THAT THIS SWARM STARTED FROM HERE;  THE OWNER [OF BEES] IS ALLOWED TO WALK INTO THE FIELD OF HIS NEIGHBOUR FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESCUING HIS SWARM, THOUGH IF HE CAUSES DAMAGE HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE HE DOES. HE MAY, HOWEVER, NOT CUT OFF HIS NEIGHBOUR'S BOUGH [UPON WHICH HIS BEES HAVE SETTLED] EDEN THOUGH WITH THE INTENTION OF PAYING HIM ITS VALUE: R. ISHMAEL THE SON OF R. JOHANAN B. BEROKA, HOWEVER, SAID THAT HE MAY EVEN CUT OFF HIS NEIGHBOUR'S BOUGH IF HE MEANS TO REPAY HIM THE VALUE. GEMARA. A Tanna taught: If he was given [anything by customs-collectors] he would have to restore it to the original proprietors. This view thus maintains that Renunciation by itself does not transfer ownership  and consequently the misappropriated article has at the very outset come into his possession unlawfully;  Some, however, read: 'If he cares to give up [the article given him by the customs-collector], he should restore it to the original proprietors',  the reason being that Renunciation by itself transfers ownership,  so that it is only when [he  made up his mind] saying: 'I do not like to benefit from money which is not [really] mine';  he must restore it to the original proprietors. IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY ABANDONED IT.  Said R. Ashi:  This Mishnaic ruling applies only where the robber was a heathen,  but in the case of a robber who was an Israelite this would not be so, as the proprietor surely thinks: [If not to-day to-morrow] I will take him to law.  R. Joseph demurred to this, saying: On the contrary, the reverse is more likely. In the case of heathens who usually administer law forcibly  the owner need not give up hope,  whereas in the case of an Israelite where the judges merely issue an order to make restoration [without however employing corporal punishment]  the owner has surely abandoned any hope of recovery. If therefore a [contrary] statement was ever made it was made only regarding the concluding clause [as follows:] IF ONE RESCUED [ARTICLES] FROM [A RIVER OR FROM] HEATHENS  OR FROM ROBBERS, IF THE OWNERS HAVE ABANDONED THEM THEY WILL BELONG TO HIM, Implying that as a rule this would not be so. This implication could, however, not be maintained in the case of heathens who usually administer the law forcibly,  whereas in the case of a robber who was an Israelite, since the judges will merely issue an order to make restoration [without however employing corporal punishment] the owner has surely abandoned any hope of recovery. We learnt elsewhere: In the case of skins belonging to a lay owner, mere mental determination  [on the part of the owner] will render them capable of becoming defiled,  whereas in the case of those belonging to a tanner no mental determination  would render them capable of becoming defiled.  Regarding those in possession of a thief mental determination  will render them capable of becoming defiled,  whereas those in the possession of a robber no mental determination  will render them capable of becoming defiled.  R. Simeon however, says that the rulings are to be reversed: Regarding those in the possession of a robber mental determination  will render them capable of becoming defiled,  whereas those in the possession of a thief no mental determinations will render them capable of becoming defiled, as in the last case the owners do not usually abandon hope of finding the thief.  Said 'Ulla: This difference of opinion  exists only in average cases, but where Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place opinion is unanimous that Renunciation transfers ownership. Rabbah,  however, said: Even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is also a difference of opinion. Abaye said to Rabbah:  You should not contest the statement of 'Ulla, for in our Mishnah  we learnt in accordance with him: … as the owners do not usually abandon hope of finding the thief. The reason is that usually the owners do not abandon hope of tracing the thief, but where they definitely abandoned hope of doing so, the skins would have become his. He rejoined:  We interpret the text in our Mishnah, [to mean]  'For there is no Renunciation of them on the part of the owners.' We have learnt: IF CUSTOMS-COLLECTORS TOOK AWAY A MAN'S ASS AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER ASS OR IF BRIGANDS TOOK AWAY HIS GARMENT AND GAVE HIM INSTEAD ANOTHER GARMENT, IT WOULD BELONG TO HIM, FOR THE OWNERS HAVE SURELY ABANDONED HOPE OF RECOVERING IT. Now whose view is represented here? If we say, that of the Rabbis,  the ruling in the case of robbers  raises a difficulty.  Again, if that of R. Simeon, the ruling in the case of thieves  raises a difficulty!  The problem, it is true, is easily solved if we accept the view of 'Ulla who stated that where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place ownership is transferred; the Mishnaic ruling here would then similarly apply to the case where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place and would thus be unanimous. But on the view of Rabbah who stated that even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is still a difference of opinion,  with whose view would the Mishnaic ruling accord? It could neither be with that of the Rabbis nor with that of R. Simeon! — We speak here of an armed highwayman,  and the ruling will be in accordance with R. Simeon. But if so, is this case not identical with [that of a customs-collector acting openly like a] 'robber'?  — Yes, but two kinds of robbers  are spoken of. Come and hear: If a thief,  a robber, or an annas  consecrates a misappropriated article, it is duly consecrated; if he sets aside the portion for the priest's gift,  it is genuine terumah; or again if he sets aside the portion for the Levite's gift,  the tithe is valid.  Now, whose view does this teaching follow? If [we say] that of the Rabbis, the case of robbers creates a difficulty,  if that of R. Simeon, the case of the thief creates a difficulty?  The problem, it is true, is easily solved if we accept the view of 'Ulla who stated that where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place ownership is transferred; the Mishnaic ruling here would then similarly apply to the case where Renunciation was definitely known to have taken place, and would thus be unanimous. But if we adopt the view of Rabbah who stated that even where the Renunciation is definitely known to have taken place there is still a difference of opinion,  with whose view would the Mishnaic ruling accord? It could be neither in accordance with the Rabbis nor in accordance with R. Simeon? — Here too an armed highwayman is meant, and the ruling will be in accordance with R. Simeon. But if so, is this case not identical with that of 'robber'? — Yes, two kinds of robbers are spoken of. Or if you wish I may alternatively say that this teaching is in accordance with Rabbi, as taught: 'Rabbi says: A thief is in this respect [subject to the same law] as a robber',