Bava Kamma

[BUT IF HE SAID 'KONAM…'] BOTH DURING HIS LIFE AND AFTER HIS DEATH,  AND [THE FATHER] DIED, THE SON WILL NOT INHERIT HIM,  [BUT THE PORTION] WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO HIS FATHER'S [OTHER] CHILDREN OR TO HIS [FATHER'S] BROTHERS; IF THE SON HAS NOTHING [FOR A LIVELIHOOD], HE MAY BORROW [FROM OTHERS AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO HIS PORTION IN THE INHERITANCE] AND THE CREDITORS CAN COME AND DEMAND PAYMENT [OUT OF THE ESTATE]. GEMARA. R. Joseph said: [He must pay  the amount due for the robbery] even to the charity  box.  R. Papa added: He must however say, This is due for having robbed my father. But why should he not remit the liability to himself?  Have we not learnt: Where the plaintiff released him from payment of the principal though he did not release him from payment of the Fifth [etc.],  thus proving that this liability is subject to be remitted? — Said R. Johanan: This is no difficulty as that was the view of R. Jose the Galilean, whereas the ruling [here]  presents the view of R. Akiba, as indeed taught: But if the man have no kinsman to restore the trespass unto,  how could there be a man in Israel who had no kinsmen?  Scripture must therefore be speaking of restitution to a proselyte.  Suppose a man robbed a proselyte and when charged denied it on oath and as he then heard that the proselyte had died he accordingly took the amount of money [due] and the trespass offering to Jerusalem, but there [as it happened] came across that proselyte who then converted the sum [due to him] into a loan, if the proselyte were subsequently to die the robber would acquire title to the amount in his possession; these are the words of R. Jose the Galilean. R. Akiba, however, said: There is no remedy for him [to obtain atonement] unless he should divest himself of the amount stolen.  Thus according to R. Jose the Galilean, whether to himself or to others, the plaintiff may  remit the liability,  whereas according to R. Akiba no matter whether to others or to himself, he cannot remit it. Again, according to R. Jose the Galilean, the same law  would apply even where the proselyte did not convert the amount due into a loan, and the reason why it says, 'who then converted the sum [due to him] into a loan' is to let you know how far R. Akiba is prepared to go, since he maintains that even if the proselyte converted the sum due into a loan there is no remedy for the robber [to obtain atonement] unless he divests himself of the proceeds of the robbery. R. Shesheth demurred to this: If so [he said] why did not R. Jose the Galilean tell us his view in a case where the claimant [remits it] to himself, the rule then applying a fortiori to where he remits it to others? And again why did not R. Akiba tell his view that it is impossible to remit, to others, then arguing a fortiori that he cannot remit it to himself? R. Shesheth therefore said that the one ruling as well as the other is in accordance with R. Jose the Galilean, for the statement made by R. Jose the Galilean that it is possible to remit such a liability applies only where others get the benefit,  whereas where he himself would benefit it would not be possible to remit it. Raba, however, said: The one ruling as well as the other [here,] is in accordance with R. Akiba, for when R. Akiba says that it is impossible to remit the liability, he means to himself, whereas to others  it is possible for him to remit it.