Bava Kamma

it is not right to forward [trust] money through a person whose power of attorney is authenticated by a mere figure,  even if witnesses are signed on it [to identify the authentication]. R. Johanan, however, said: If witnesses are signed on it [to identify the authentication] it may be forwarded. But I would fain say: In accordance with the view of Samuel what remedy is available?  — The same as in the case of R. Abba,  to whom money was owing from R. Joseph b. Hama,  and who therefore said to R. Safra:  'When you go there, bring it to me,' and it so happened that when the latter came there, Raba the son [of the debtor] said to him, 'Did the creditor give you a written statement that by your accepting the money he will be deemed to have received it?'  and as he said to him, 'No,' he rejoined, 'If so, go back first and let him give you a written statement that by your acceptance he will be deemed to have received the money.'  But ultimately he said to him, 'Even if he were to write that by your acceptance he will be deemed to have received the money,  it would be of no avail, for before you come back R. Abba might perhaps [in the meantime] have died,  and as the money would then already have been transferred to the heirs the receipt executed by R. Abba would be of no avail.'  'What then,' he asked, 'can be the remedy?' — 'Go back and let him transfer to you the ownership of the money by dint of land,  and when you come back you will give us a written acknowledgment that you have received the money.'  as in the case of R. Papa  to whom twelve thousand zuz were owing from men of Be-Huzae  and who transferred the ownership of them to Samuel b. Abba  by dint of the threshold of his house,  and when the latter came back the former [was so pleased that he] went out to meet him as far as Tauak. IF HE REFUNDED HIM THE PRINCIPAL BUT DID NOT PAY HIM THE FIFTH … HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO AFTER HIM [FOR THAT]. This surely proves that the Fifth is a civil liability,  so that were the robber to die  the heirs would have to pay it. We have also learnt: IF HE REFUNDED TO HIM FOR THE PRINCIPAL AND TOOK AN OATH REGARDING THE FIFTH, HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY HIM A FIFTH ON TOP OF THE FIFTH, similarly proving that the Fifth is a civil liability. It was moreover taught to the same effect: If one man robbed another but took an oath [that he did not do so] and [after admitting his guilt he] died, the heirs would have to pay the principal and the Fifth, though they would be exempt from the trespass offering. Now, since heirs are subject to pay the Fifth which their father would have had to pay, [it surely proves that the Fifth is a civil liability which has to be met by heirs]. But a contradiction could be raised [from the following]: 'I would still say that the case where an heir has not to pay the Fifth for a robbery committed by his father is only where neither he nor his father took an oath.  Whence could it be proved that [the same holds good] where he though not his father, took an oath or his father but not he took an oath or even where both he and his father took oaths? From the significant words, That which he took by robbery or the thing which he hath gotten by oppression  whereas in this case he  has neither taken violently away nor deceived anybody.'  — Said R. Nahman: There is no contradiction, as in one case the father admitted his guilt [before he died],  whereas in the other he  never admitted it. But if no admission was made, why should the heirs have to pay even the principal? If, however, you argue that this will indeed be so [that they will not have to pay it].  since the whole discussion revolves here  around the Fifth, does it not show that the principal will have to be paid? It was moreover taught explicitly: 'I would still say that the case where an heir has to pay the principal for a robbery committed by his father was only where both he and his father took oaths or where his father though not he, or he though not his father took an oath, but whence could it be proved that [the same holds good] where neither he nor his father took an oath? From the significant words: The misappropriated article and the deceitfully gotten article, the lost article and the deposit  as [Yesh Talmud=] this is certainly a definite teaching.'  And when R. Huna was sitting and repeating this teaching, his son Rabbah  said to him: Did the Master mean to say Yesh Talmud [i.e. there is a definite teaching on this subject] or did the Master mean to say Yishtallemu [i.e., it stands to reason that the heirs should have to pay]? He replied to him: I said Yesh Talmud [i.e. there is a definite teaching on the subject] as I maintain that this could be amplified from the [added] Scriptural expressions.  — It must therefore be said that what was meant by the statement 'he made no admission' was that the father made no admission though the son did. But why should the son not become liable to pay even a Fifth for his own oath?  — It may, however, be said that the misappropriated article was no longer extant in this case.  But if the misappropriated article was no longer extant, why should he pay even the principal?  — No; it might have application where real possessions were left.  (But were even real possessions to be left, of what avail would it be since the liability is but an oral liability, and, as known,  a liability by mere word of mouth can be enforced neither on heirs nor on purchasers?  — It may however be said