Bava Kamma

Wood as a rule is meant for heating. R. Kahana said: Whether [or not] we say in regard to the Sabbatical Year that wood is meant as a rule for heating was a matter of difference between the following Tannaim, as taught: The produce of the Sabbatical Year should be handed over neither for the purpose of steeping nor for the purpose of washing with them. R. Jose, however, says that the products of the Sabbatical Year may be put into steep and into the wash.  Now, what was the reason of the Rabbis?  Because Scripture said, 'for food' implying not for the purpose of steeping, 'for food' and not for the purpose of washing. But R. Jose said that Scripture stated 'for you',  implying, for all your needs. But also according to the Rabbis was it not stated: 'for you'? — 'for you'  should be analogous to 'for food', referring thus to any uses by which a benefit is derived from the products at the very time of their consumption, excluding thus the purposes of steeping and washing where the benefit is derived from the products after their consumption.  But what does R. Jose make of 'for food'?  — He might say to you that that was solely necessary for the ruling [of the Baraitha], as taught: 'for food', but not for a plaster. You say 'for food', but not for a plaster; why perhaps not otherwise, 'for food' but not for the purpose of washing? When it says 'for you'  the purpose of washing is indicated; what then do I make of 'for food' [if not] 'for food', but not for a plaster. But what reason had you for including the purpose of washing and excluding the purpose of a plaster? — I include the purpose of washing as this is a requirement shared alike by all people,  but exclude the purpose of plaster which is a requirement not shared alike by all people.  Now, whose view would be followed in that statement which was taught: '"for food" but not for a plaster. "for food" but not for perfume, "for food" but not to make it into an emetic'? — It must be in accordance with R. Jose, for if in accordance with the Rabbis, the purpose of washing and steeping [should also be excluded]. R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS: IF THE INCREASE IN VALUE etc. (Mnemonic: SaBaN)  R. Joseph was once sitting behind R. Abba in the presence of R. Huna, who was sitting and stating that the halachah was in accordance with R. Joshua b. Karhah and again that the halachah was in accordance with R. Judah. R. Joseph thereupon turned his face towards him  and said: I understand his mentioning R. Joshua b. Karhah, as it was necessary to state that the halachah is in accordance with him, since you might have been inclined to think that the principle that where an individual differs from the majority the halachah is in accordance with the majority  [applies also] here; it was therefore made known to us that [in this] case the halachah is in accordance with the individual. (What statement of R. Joshua b. Karhah is referred to? — That which was taught: 'R. Joshua b. Karhah says that a debt [recorded] in an instrument should not be collected from them,  whereas debts [contracted by mere word] of mouth may be collected from them because this is no more than rescuing one's money from the hands of the debtors.')  But why was it necessary to state that the halachah was in accordance with R. Judah? For his view was in the first instance stated as a point at issue [between the authorities] and subsequently as an anonymous ruling; and it is an established rule that if a view is first dealt with as a point at issue and then stated anonymously, the halachah is in accordance with the anonymous statement!  The point at issue in this case was in Baba Kamma [IF WOOL WAS HANDED OVER TO A DYER] TO DYE IT RED BUT HE DYED IT BLACK, OR TO DYE IT BLACK BUT HE DYED IT RED, R. MEIR SAYS THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY [THE OWNER] FOR THE VALUE OF HIS WOOL. BUT R. JUDAH SAYS: IF THE INCREASE IN VALUE EXCEEDS THE OUTLAY, THE OWNER WOULD REPAY TO THE DYER HIS OUTLAY, WHILE IF THE OUTLAY EXCEEDED THE INCREASE IN VALUE HE WOULD HAVE TO PAY HIM NO MORE THAN THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE, whereas the anonymous statement was made in Baba Mezi'a where we have learnt: 'Whichever party departs from the terms of the agreement is at a disadvantage, so also whichever party retracts from the agreement has the inferior claim'!  — R. Huna considered that it was necessary for him to state so, since otherwise you might have thought that there was no precise order for [the teaching of] the Mishnah  so that this [ruling of R. Judah] might perhaps have been in the first instance anonymous but subsequently a point at issue.  [What does] R. Joseph [say to this]? — [He says] that if so, wherever a ruling is first a point at issue and then stated anonymously,  it might be questioned that as no precise order may have been kept in [the teaching of] the Mishnah it might have been anonymous in the first instance and a point at issue later on!  To this R. Huna would answer that we never say that there was no precise order in [the teaching of] the Mishnah in one and the same tractate, whereas in the case of two tractates we might indeed say so. R. Joseph however considered the whole of Nezikin  to form only one tractate. If you like, again, I may say that it is because this ruling was stated among fixed laws: 'Whichever party departs from the terms of the agreement is at a disadvantage, and so also whichever party retracts from the argument has an inferior claim.' Our Rabbis taught: 'Where money was given to an agent