Bava Batra

that in the view of R. Akiba the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally  and in the view of the Rabbis  he interprets them strictly?  And further that, wherever we find it stated that 'R. Akiba decides according to his usual maxim that the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally,'  it is in the strength of this passage [that we assign this maxim to him]? — Is this assumption justified? perhaps [the reason for their dispute is this]; R. Akiba holds that a man does not like others to walk over ground which he has paid for, and the Rabbis hold that a man does not care to receive money on condition that he has to fly through the air [to get to where he wants].  Can we then [base this assumption] on the next clause: IF HE SELLS THESE TO ANOTHER, R. AKIBA SAYS THAT THE PURCHASER NEED NOT BUY A RIGHT OF WAY TO THEM, BUT THE SAGES SAY THAT HE MUST BUY IT?  — No, for perhaps the reason of their difference is this, that according to R. Akiba's view we have to consult the wishes of the purchaser, and according to the view of the Rabbis we have to consult the wishes of the vendor. Can we [base it] on this: '[The vendor does not sell with the field] either a pit or a wine-press or a dovecote, whether they are In use or not in use,  and he must buy a right of way [to them]. This is the ruling of R. Akiba, but the Sages say that he need not buy a right of way [to them]' — 9 Now why  should it repeat here [the rulings of R. Akiba and the Sages]? Surely it must be to show us that [in general] R. Akiba holds that the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally and the Rabbis that he interprets them strictly?  — No. Perhaps the Mishnah [desires to] tell us by this that [the difference between R. Akiba and the Sages is as stated above] both in regard to a house and a field, both being necessary. For if it had stated [the difference only] in the case of a house, [I might have thought that there R. Akiba says that the vendor has to buy a right of way] because the purchaser desires privacy,  but in the case of a field [where this reason does not apply] I might say he need not. And if the difference had been stated only in regard to a field, I might have thought that there [R. Akiba says that the vendor has to buy a right of way] because [the purchaser objects to his land being] trodden down,  but in the case of a house [where this reason does not apply I might say] he need not. May we then [base the assumption] on the succeeding clause: 'If he sells them [the pit etc. in a field] to another, R. Akiba says that the purchaser does not need to buy a right of way, while the Sages say that he must.' Now why is [their difference stated] again? It is exactly the same here as in the previous case.  We must therefore say that this shows that in the view of R. Akiba the vendor interprets the terms of sale liberally, and in the view of the Rabbis he interprets them strictly. It has been stated: R. Huna said in the name of Rab: