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זבחים 5
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
I do not know to what this refers, therefore the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’ etc. While if the Divine Law wrote ‘this is the law’ [only], I would say that they become invalid; therefore the Divine Law wrote, ‘that which is gone out of thy lips’ etc. Resh Lakish lay face downward in the Beth Hamidrash, and raised a difficulty: If they are valid, let them be accepted; while if they are not accepted, for what purpose do they come? — Said R. Eleazar to him: We find that those [sacrifices] which come after the death [of their owners] are valid, yet they are not accepted. For we learnt: If a woman brought her sin-offering [after childbirth] and then died, her heirs must bring her burnt-offering; [if she brought] her burnt-offering, her heirs do not bring her sin-offering. I agree in the case of a burnt-offering, he replied, since it comes after death; but in the case of a guilt-offering which does not come after death, whence do we know [that it is valid]? — He replied, Lo, [support to] your contention is [available] close at hand: R. ELIEZER SAYS, ALSO THE GUILT-OFFERING [IS INVALID]. Thereupon he exclaimed: Is this he who is spoken of as a great man? I speak to you of an explicit Mishnah, and you answer me with R. Eliezer's view! Rather, said Resh Lakish: I will find a solution myself: ‘That which is gone out of thy lips etc:’ is this a freewill-offering — surely it is a vow, etc. as above. R. Zera and R. Isaac b. Abba were sitting, and Abaye sat with them. They sat and debated: Resh Lakish had a difficulty about the guilt-offering, which does not come after death, and he adduced an exegesis on ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’. Yet say, That which may come as a vow or as a freewill-offering must be brought but do not propitiate, but a guilt-offering is not to be brought at all? Said Abaye to them: Resh Lakish solved [the difficulty] from the following text: And he shall kill it for a sin-offering: only it [when slaughtered] in its own name is valid and [when slaughtered] not it its own name is invalid; but other sacrifices [slaughtered] not in their own name are valid. You might think then that they are ‘accepted’. Therefore it states, ‘that which goeth out of thy lips’. Then say, That which comes as a vow or a freewill-offering must be brought but is not ‘accepted’, whereas a guilt-offering is even ‘accepted’ too? — Said Abaye: You cannot maintain that a guilt-offering is [in such circumstances] accepted, [as the reverse follows] from a burnt-offering, a fortiori: if a burnt-offering, whose purpose is not to make atonement, is not ‘accepted, then how much more is a guilt-offering , whose purpose is to make atonement, not ‘accepted’. As for a burnt-offering [you might argue] ‘ the reason [that it is not ‘accepted’] is because it is altogether burnt! Then let peace-offerings prove it. As for peace-offerings, [you might argue] [they are not ‘accepted’ ] because they require libations and the waving of the breast and shoulder, Then let a burnt-offering prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the characteristic of the former is not that of the latter and the characteristic of the latter is not that of the former. The factor common to both is that they are holy [sacrifices] ‘ and if slaughtered not in their own names they are valid, yet not ‘accepted’, so also do I adduce the guilt-offering which is holy, hence if one slaughters it not in its name it is valid and not accepted. [No: ] The factor common to both [it may be argued] is that they are [also] brought as public offerings! — Then let the thanksgiving-offering prove it,
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As for the thanksgiving-offering [it is not ‘accepted’] because it requires loaves [as an accompaniment]! Then let the burnt-offering and peace-offerings prove it. And thus the argument revolves: the characteristic of the one is not that of the other, and that of the other is not that of the first. The factor common to all is that they are holy [sacrifices], and if one slaughters them not in their own name, they are valid and are not accepted; so also do I adduce the guilt-offering which is holy, and hence if one slaughters it not in its name it is valid and is not accepted. [No] the factor common to them all [it may be asked] is that they come as a vow or as a freewill-offering! — Rather said Raba: [Scripture saith,] ‘This is the law etc.,’ thus Scripture assimilated it [the guilt-offering] to peace-offerings. As the peace-offerings are holy [sacrifices], and if slaughtered not in their own name are valid and are not accepted, so do I adduce the guilt-offering too which is holy etc. What reason do you see to assimilate it to peace-offerings: assimilate it to the sin-offering? — Surely the Divine Law expressed a limitation [in the word] ‘it’. [Mnemonic: Hagesh Basar] R. Huna and R. Nahman were sitting, and R. Shesheth sat with them. They sat and said: Now Resh Lakish had experienced a difficulty, what about the guilt-offering which does not come after death? But R. Eleazar could have answered him that the guilt-offering too comes after death? — Said R. Shesheth to them: In what way is a guilt-offering brought? As a remainder! Then the remainder of a sin-offering too is indeed offered. [This, however, is no argument;] in the case of a sin-offering though the remainder thereof is offered, yet the Divine Law expressed a limitation in the word ‘it’ [hu]! — But in connection with the guilt-offering too hu [it] is written? — That is written after the burning of the emurim, as it was taught: But in the case of a guilt-offering, ‘it is’ [hu] is stated only after the burning of the emurim, and in fact if the emurim are not burnt at all it [the offering] is valid. Then what is the purpose of ‘it’? — For R. Huna's teaching in Rab's name. For R. Huna said in the name of Rab: If a guilt-offering was transferred to pasture and one then slaughtered it without a defined purpose, it is valid. Thus, if it was transferred, it is so, but if it was not transferred, it is not so. What is the reason? Scripture says, ‘it is’, intimating, it must be in its essential form. R. Nahman and R. Shesheth sat, and R. Adda b. Mattenah sat with them. Now they sat and debated: Now as to what R. Eleazar said: ‘We find in the case of sacrifices that come after the death [of their owners] that they are valid, yet are not accepted’, let Resh Lakish say to him, Let these too come and be accepted? — Said R. Adda b. Mattenah to them: As for [the offering of] a woman after confinement,if she gave birth, did her children give birth? To this R. Assi demurred: Yet who is to say if she had been guilty of [the neglect of] many affirmative precepts she would not be atoned for? And since she would be forgiven if she had been guilty of neglecting affirmative precepts, then her heirs too may thus be atoned for! — Are we then to say that they [the heirs] acquire it? But surely R. Johanan said: If one leaves a meal-offering to his two sons and dies, it is offered, and the law of partnership does not apply to it. If however you think that they acquire a title to it, surely the Divine Law saith, And when a soul [bringeth a meal-offering]! Will you then say that they do not acquire it? Surely R. Johanan said: If one leaves an animal [dedicated for a sacrifice] to his two sons, and dies,it is offered, but they cannot effect substitution with it. Now it is well if you say that they acquire it; for that reason they cannot effect substitution with it, because they become partners,
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