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זבחים 30
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
— Even so: the first clause treats of two services, while the second clause can refer to either one service or two services. We learnt: SAID R. JUDAH: THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH. As for R. Johanan. it is well: hence he teaches, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE. But according to Ilfa, what is the implication of THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE? — That is indeed a difficulty. We learnt elsewhere: [If one declares.] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a substitute for a burnt-offering [only]: this is R. Meir's view. Said R. Jose: If such was his original intention, since it is impossible to pronounce both designations simultaneously, his declarations are valid. But if, having declared, ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering,’ he declared as an afterthought, ‘This be a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ it is a burnt-offering. It was asked: What if [one declares,] ‘This [animal] be a substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offerings,’ [or] ‘[This animal be a substitute for] half [a burnt-offering] and half [a peace-offering]’? Said Abaye: Here R. Meir certainly agrees [with R. Jose]. Raba said: There is still the controversy. Raba said to Abaye: According to you who maintain that here R. Meir certainly agrees, Yet lo! slaughtering is analogous to half and half, yet they disagree? — Said he to him: Do you think that shechitah counts only at the end? [No:] Shechitah counts from the beginning until the end , and our Mishnah means that he declared [that he cut] one organ [intending to eat the flesh] after time and the second organ [intending to eat it] without bounds. Yet surely kemizah is analogous to halves, yet they disagree? — There too it means that he burnt a fistful of the meal-offering [with the intention of eating] after time and a fistful of the frankincense [intending to eat] without bounds. Yet they disagree in respect of the fistful of a sinner's meal-offering, where there is no frankincense? — They do not disagree there. R. Ashi said: If you should say that they do disagree, they disagree in the steps. R. Shimi b. Ashi recited [the passage] as Abaye; R. Huna b. Nathan recited [it] as Raba. When R. Dimi came, he said: R. Meir stated [his ruling] in accordance with the thesis of R. Judah, who maintained: Regard the first expression. For we learnt: R. JUDAH SAID, THIS IS THE GENERAL RULE: IF THE INTENTION OF TIME PRECEDED THE INTENTION OF PLACE, IT IS PIGGUL, AND INVOLVES KARETH.
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Said Abaye to him: Yet surely Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in R. Johanan's name: When you bring R. Meir and R. Jose together, [you find that] they do not disagree. But do they not disagree? Surely they do disagree? — They disagree in what they disagree, he answered him, and they do not disagree in what they do not disagree. For R. Isaac b. Joseph said in R. Johanan's name: All agree that if he declared ‘Let this [sanctity] fall upon the animal and after that let that [sanctity] fall upon it,’ [the latter] does not fall upon it. ‘Let this [sanctity] not fall upon it unless the other falls upon it [too],’ all agree that [the latter] does not fall upon it. They disagree only where he declares, ‘[Let this animal be] a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering.’ R. Meir holds: Since he should have said, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering.’ but said [instead], ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering,’ you may infer that he has indeed retracted. And R. Jose? — Had he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering,’ I might have interpreted it, Half as a substitute for a burnt-offering and half as a substitute for a peace-offering; therefore he declared, ‘A substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offerings,’ to intimate that the whole should be a burnt-offering and the whole should be a peace-offerings! — Said he [R. Dimi] to him [Abaye]: He [Rabbah b. Bar Hanah] said that they do not disagree, but I maintain that they do disagree. ‘Ulla-others state, R. Oshaia — said: Perhaps our Babylonian colleagues know whether we learnt, ‘As much as an olive . . . as much as an olive’; or did we learn, ‘As much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive’? [The point of the question is this:] Did we learn, ‘As much as an olive . . . as much as an olive,’ but [if he declared,] ‘. . . As much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive,’ all agree that it constitutes a mingling of intentions. Or perhaps we learnt’. . . as much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive,’ and this, in R. Judah's opinion, constitutes a detailed enumeration, and all the more [if he declared]’. . . as much as an olive . . . as much as an olive?’ — Come and hear, for Levi asked Rabbi: What if he intended eating as much as an olive on the morrow [after time] without bounds? Said he to him: That is indeed a question: it constitutes a mingling of intentions. Thereupon R. Simeon b. Rabbi observed, is this not [taught in] our Mishnah: [IF HE INTENDED] TO EAT AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW; [OR] AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW, AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT;’ [OR] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT, HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW; [OR] HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE ON THE MORROW. HALF AS MUCH AS AN OLIVE WITHOUT: IT IS INVALID, AND DOES NOT INVOLVE KARETH. Hence it follows that the other case constitutes a mingling of intentions. Nevertheless he asked me a profound question, he replied, though you say that it is [implied in] our Mishnah. Since I taught you both [cases], you find no difficulty. But him I taught only one, while he heard that the Rabbis read both versions [in the Mishnah]. Hence his doubt: was my teaching exact, whereas their [additional case] constitutes a mingling of intentions; or perhaps their [version] is exact, whilst I had simply omitted [one case when I taught him], and just as I had omitted this instance, so had they omitted the other instance. Now, which [case] did he teach him? If we say [that] he taught him: ‘. . . as much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive,’ [surely] that is not an omission! Hence he taught him, ‘As much as an olive . . . as much as an olive.’ Then let him ask about ‘as much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive’? — He reasoned: I will ask him one case from which I may infer both. For if I ask about ‘as much as an olive . . . and as much as an olive,’ it is well if he answers me that it is a comprehensive statement, then all the more is it so [in the case of] ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’; but if he answers me that it is a detailed enumeration, then I will still have the question about ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’. If so,[the same objection can be urged] now too: it is well if he answered him that ‘as much as an olive on the morrow without’ constitutes a detailed enumeration, then all the more is it so in the case of ‘as much as an olive and as much as an olive’. But if he answered him that it is a comprehensive statement, he would still have the question: [what about] ‘as much as an olive and as much as an olive’ ? — If so, he [Rabbi] would have shewn asperity:
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