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זבחים 107
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
Raba said, It is as R. Jonah[‘s exegesis]. For R. Jonah said: ‘There’ is inferred from ‘there’: as in the one case, [Scripture] did not prescribe a penalty without formally prohibiting, so in the other case [Scripture] did not punish without formally prohibiting. We have [now] found the case of those which should be burnt within, which were offered up without; how do we know the case of those which should be burnt without, which were offered up without? — Said R. Kahana: Scripture saith, And thou shalt say unto them [which means,] thou shalt say concerning those just mentioned. To this Raba demurred: Is it then written, ‘concerning them’: Surely ‘unto them’ is written? Rather, it is as the School of R. Ishmael taught: ‘And thou shalt say unto them’ combines the sections. R. Johanan said: ‘Bringing’ is inferred from ‘bringing’: as there it refers to those [sacrifices] which must be burnt without, so here too it refers to those which must be burnt without. To this R. Bibi demurred: When we learnt, There are thirty-six offences in the Torah which entail kareth: surely there are thirty seven, for there are offering up [a sacrifice which should be burnt within] and offering up [a sacrifice which should be burnt without]? That is indeed a difficulty. Now, when we learnt: He who sprinkles some of the blood without, is culpable: how do we know it? — It is inferred from what was taught: Blood shall be imputed [unto that man]: that is to include one who sprinkles [without]: these are the words of R. Ishmael. R. Akiba said: Or sacrifice includes sprinkling. And how does R. Ishmael employ this [phrase] ‘or sacrifice’? — To divide. And whence does R. Akiba know to divide? — He infers it from, and bringeth it not [unto the door of the tent of meeting]. And R. Ishmael? — He requires that [‘it’] [for teaching:] One is culpable for [offering up] the whole [animal], but not for [offering up] an incomplete one. And R. Akiba? — He infers it from [the phrase] ‘to sacrifice it’. And R. Ishmael? — One [‘it’] is in respect of those [sacrifices] which which should be burnt within, which were made incomplete and offered up without; the other is in respect of those which should be burnt without, which one made incomplete and offered up without. And it was taught even so: R. Ishmael said: You might think that if one made incomplete and offered up without what should be burnt within, he is culpable; therefore it says, ‘to sacrifice it’: one is culpable for [offering up] a whole [animal], but not for [offering up] an incomplete one. And R. Akiba? — He holds that if one made incomplete and offered up without what should be burnt within, he is culpable. And R. Akiba: How does he employ this [phrase], ‘blood shall be imputed’? — It includes the shechitah of a bird. And R. Ishmael? — He deduces it from, or that killeth. And R. Akiba? — He can answer you: He requires that [to teach]: One is culpable for slaughtering [shechitah], but not for nipping [melikah]. And R. Ishmael? — He infers it from, This is the thing [which the Lord hath commanded]. For it was taught: [What man soever . . .] that killeth [an ox etc.]: I know it only of slaughtering an animal; how do I know [that] if one slaughters a bird [he is culpable]? Because it says, or that killeth. You might think that I also include one who performs melikah, and that is indeed logical: if one is culpable for shechitah [of a bird], though this is not its correct rite within; is it not logical that one is culpable for melikah [without], seeing that that is its correct rite within? Therefore it states. ‘This is the thing [etc.]’. And R. Akiba? — He can answer you: that is required for a gezerah shawah. Now, as to what we learnt: He who takes the fistful, and he who receives the blood [of a sacrifice slaughtered without] is not liable: how do we know it? But whence would you infer that he is culpable? — From shechitah. As for shechitah, the reason may be because it invalidates a Passover-offering [when it is done] on behalf of such who cannot eat it! — Then infer it from sprinkling: as for sprinkling. the reason may be because a lay-Israelite is liable to death on its account!34
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— Infer it from both combined. But if so, let it not be stated in connection with sprinkling, which may be inferred from both [shechitah and offering up] combined. [Thus: when you say,] let it be inferred from shechitah, [you can argue], as for shechitah, the reason is because it is invalid in the case of the Passover-offering [when done] on behalf of such who cannot eat. Let it be inferred from offering up: As for offering up, the reason is because it applies to a meal-offering [too]. Then infer it from both combined? Rather, for that reason a text is written [to include sprinkling] to intimate that you may not infer from both combined. R. Abbahu said: If one slaughtered [a sacrifice] and sprinkled [its blood without]: according to R. Ishmael he is liable to one [sin-offering], [whereas] according to R. Akiba he is liable to two. Abaye said: Even on R. Akiba's view, he is liable to one only, because Scripture saith, There thou shalt offer up thy burnt-offerings, and there thou shalt do all that I command thee: Scripture thus ranked them as one ‘doing’ [rite]. If one sprinkled and offered up [without], according to R. Ishmael he is liable to two [sin-offerings], [whereas] according to R. Akiba he is liable to one only. Abaye said: Even on R. Akiba's view he is liable to two, that being the reason that Scripture divided them, [vis.] ‘There thou shalt offer-up . . . and there thou shalt do’. If one slaughtered, sprinkled, and offered up all agree that he is liable to two. Our Rabbis taught: [Or that killeth it] without the camp: You might think [that that means] without the three camps; therefore it states, . . . or goat, in the camp.’ If [you thus stress] ‘in the camp’, you might think that [even] one who slaughters a burnt-offering in the south is culpable; therefore it is stated, or that killeth it without the camp: as ‘without the camp’ is distinguished in that it is not eligible for the slaughtering of most sacred sacrifices or for the slaughtering of any sacrifice, so ‘in the camp’ means in a place which is not eligible for the slaughtering of any sacrifice: hence the south [side of the Temple court] is excluded, for though it is not fit for the slaughtering of most sacred sacrifices, it is eligible for the slaughtering of lesser sacrifices. ‘Ulla said: One who slaughters on the roof of the Hekal is culpable, since it is not eligible for the slaughtering of any sacrifice. To this Raba demurred: If so, let Scripture write, ‘in the camp or . . . without the camp’, and ‘unto the door of the tent of meeting’ will not be necessary; what is the purpose of ‘[and hath not brought it] unto the door of the tent of meeting’: surely it is to exclude the roof? Now according to Raba, if that is so, let [Scripture] write, ‘unto the door of the tent of meeting’ [only]: what is the purpose of ‘in the camp’ and ‘without the camp’? Surely that is to include the roof? — Said R. Mari: No: it includes [the case where] the whole of [the animal] is within, but its throat is without. If its throat is without, it is obvious [that one is culpable]; [for] to what does the Divine Law object? to slaughtering without; and this is slaughtering without! — Rather, it includes [the case where] the whole of the animal is without, while its throat is within. It was stated: One who offers up nowadays. R. Johanan maintained: He is culpable; Resh Lakish said: He is not liable. R. Johanan maintained, He is culpable: The first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and for the future. Resh Lakish said, He is not liable: the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce, but did not hallow it for the future. Shall we say that they differ in the same controversy as that of R. Eliezer and R. Joshua? For we learnt: R. Eliezer said: [I have heard that] when they were building the Temple. they made curtains for the Temple and curtains for the courts; but that they built the Temple [walls] on the outside [of these curtains]. whereas they built the courts on the inside [of these curtains]. R. Joshua said: I have heard that they offered [sacrifices] though there was no Temple; and they ate most sacred sacrifices though there were no curtains, and lesser sacrifices and second tithe though there was no wall, because the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and hallowed it for the future. Hence it follows that R. Eliezer holds that it did not hallow it [for the future]. Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Whence [does this follow]? Perhaps all agree that the first sanctity hallowed it for the nonce and hallowed it for the future, and one master reported what he had heard, while the other master reported what he had heard. And should you say. What was the purpose of curtains, according to R. Eliezer? Simply for privacy. It was stated: If one offers up [a limb] less than an olive [in size], but the bone makes it up to an olive, R. Johanan maintained: He is culpable; Resh Lakish said: He is not culpable. R. Johanan maintained, He is culpable: that which is attached to what ascends [the altar] is as what is ascends [in its own right]. Resh Lakish said, He is not liable: that which is attached to what ascends is not as what ascends. Raba asked: What if one offers up
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