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יבמות 67
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
manumission cancel a mortgage. Rab Judah stated: If a wife brought to her husband two articles worth a thousand zuz, and their value increased to two thousand, she receives one in settlement of her kethubah; and for the other she pays its price and receives it, since it represents assets of her paternal property. What are we taught by this statement! That assets of her paternal property belong to her? This, surely, has already been stated by Rab Judah! — It might have been assumed that that statement applied only where she came to claim [paternal property] as part of her kethubah, but not where she desired to take it in return for payment of its value, hence we were taught [that she may also pay its price and receive it]. MISHNAH. IF THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WAS MARRIED TO A PRIEST WHO DIED AND LEFT HER PREGNANT, HER SLAVES MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH IN VIRTUE OF THE SHARE OF THE EMBRYO, SINCE AN EMBRYO MAY DEPRIVE [ITS MOTHER] OF THE PRIVILEGE [OF EATING TERUMAH] BUT HAS NO POWER TO BESTOW IT UPON HER; SO R. JOSE. THEY SAID TO HIM: SINCE YOU HAVE TESTIFIED TO US IN RESPECT OF THE DAUGHTER OF AN ISRAELITE WHO WAS MARRIED TO A PRIEST, THE SLAVES OF THE DAUGHTER OF A PRIEST, WHO A MARRIED TO A PRIEST WHO DIED AND LEFT HER WITH CHILD, SHOULD ALSO BE FORBIDDEN TO EAT TERUMAH ON ACCOUNT OF THE SHARE OF THE EMBRYO! GEMARA. A question was raised: Is R. Jose's reason because he is of the opinion that an embryo in the womb of a lay woman is regarded as a nonpriest, or is his reason because only the born may bestow the right of eating but the unborn may not? — In what respect could this difference matter? — In respect of an embryo in the womb of a priest's daughter. Now, what is the reason? Rabbah replied: R. Jose's reason is this. He is of the opinion that an embryo in the womb of a lay woman is regarded as a non-priest. R. Joseph replied: The born may bestow the privilege of eating while the unborn may not. An objection was raised: They said to R. Jose: Since you have testified to us in respect of the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a priest, what is the law in respect of the daughter of a priest who was married to a priest? 'The first', he replied, 'I heard; but the other I have not heard'. Now, if you agree [that R. Jose's reason is because] an embryo in the womb of a lay woman is regarded as a non-priest, it was correct for him to say, 'The first I heard, but the other I did not'. If you maintain, however, [that R. Jose's reason is because] the born may bestow the right of eating and the unborn may not, what [could he have meant by] 'The first I have heard but the other I have not heard', when the principle is the same! — This is indeed a difficulty. Said Rab Judah in the name of Samuel: This is the opinion of R. Jose; but the Sages said: If he has children, they may eat [terumah] by virtue of his children; if he has no children, they may eat by virtue of his brothers, and if he has no brothers they may eat by virtue of the entire family. 'This', would imply that he himself does not share the view; but, surely, Samuel said to R. Hana of Bagdad, 'Go bring me a group of ten men that I may tell you in their presence that if title is conferred upon an embryo [through the agency of a third party], it does acquire ownership'! The fact is that 'this' here denotes that he also holds the same opinion. What, then, does he teach us? That the Rabbis disagree with R. Jose! But do they, in fact, disagree? Surely R. Zakkai stated: This evidence was submitted by R. Jose in the name of Shemaiah and Abtalion and they agreed with him! — R. Ashi replied: Does it read, 'and they accepted'? It was only said, 'and they agreed', [which may only mean] that his view is logical. Our Rabbis taught: If he left children, both these and the others may eat terumah. If he left his widow with child, neither these nor the others may eat it. If he left children and also left his widow with child, the melog slaves may eat as she may eat; but the zon barzel slaves may not eat, on account of the share of the embryo which may deprive [its mother] of the privilege [of eating terumah] but has no power to bestow it; so R. Jose. R. Ishmael son of R. Jose stated in the name of his father: A daughter may bestow the right of eating; a son may not. R. Simeon b. Yohai said: [If the children are] males, all [the slaves] may eat. [If however they are] females, [the slaves] are not permitted to eat, since it is possible that the embryo might be a male; and daughters, where there is a son, have no share at all. What need was there to point to the possibility that the embryo might be a male when this might be equally deduced [from the fact] that [even when the embryo is] a female it deprives them of the privilege! — He meant to say: There is one reason and also an additional one. 'There is the one reason' that a female embryo also deprives [the slaves] of the privilege; and, furthermore, 'it is possible that the embryo might be a male and daughters, where there is a son, have no share at all'. '[If the children are] males, [the slaves] may eat'. But, surely, there is an embryo in existence! — He is of the opinion
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that no provision need be made against the less usual cases. Or if you prefer I might say that he is of the opinion that provision in fact must be made against the less usual cases also, [but here] a special arrangement might be made in accordance with a ruling of R. Nahman in the name of Samuel. For R. Nahman stated in the name of Samuel: Where orphans wish to divide the property of their [deceased] father, Beth din appoint a guardian for [every one of] them, and [each guardian] chooses for his ward a suitable portion. As soon, however, as they reach their majority they are entitled to enter a protest. In his own name, however, R. Nahman stated: Even when they reach majority they are not entitled to protest, for otherwise what validity is there in the authority of a Beth din! Must it be assumed that R. Nahman's ruling is a matter of dispute between Tannaim! — No; all accept R. Nahman's [arrange. ment], but the dispute here centres on the question whether provision was to be made against the less usual cases. 'R. Ishmael], son of R. Jose, stated in the name of his father: A daughter may bestow the right of eating; a son may not. Wherein lies the difference [between the son and the daughter]? If a son may not bestow the right of eating on account of the share of the embryo, a daughter also should not be entitled to bestow the right of eating on account of the share of the embryo! — Abaye replied: Here we are dealing with a small estate and in a case where there is a son as well as a daughter, [so that the slaves may eat the terumah] whatever be the assumption [as to the sex of the embryo]. If the embryo is a son then he is not better than the one who is already born. And if it is a daughter, then why does a daughter eat at all? Surely by virtue of an ordinance of the Rabbis. But so long as she has not seen the light no provision for her has been made by the Rabbis. If you take it to refer to a small estate, [how will you] explain the final clause, 'since it is possible that the embryo might be a male, and daughters, where there is a son, have no share at all'? On the contrary; a small estate belongs to the daughters! — The final clause refers to a large estate. But does a small estate belong to the daughters? Surely, R. Assi stated in the name of R. Johanan: Where male orphans forestalled [the ruling of Beth din] and sold a small estate, their sale is valid! — But the fact is that by the mention of daughter 'the mother' is to be understood. If so, this is exactly the same statement as that of R. Jose! — The entire statement was made by R. Ishmael son of R. Jose. MISHNAH. AN EMBRYO, A LEVIR, BETROTHAL, A DEAF-MUTE, AND A BOY WHO IS NINE YEARS AND ONE DAY OLD, DEPRIVE [A WOMAN] OF THE RIGHT [OF EATING TERUMAH], BUT CANNOT BESTOW THE PRIVILEGE UPON HER, [EVEN WHEN] IT IS A MATTER OF DOUBT WHETHER THE BOY IS NINE YEARS AND ONE DAY OLD OR NOT, OR WHETHER HE HAS PRODUCED TWO HAIRS OR NOT. IF A HOUSE COLLAPSED UPON A MAN AND UPON HIS BROTHER'S DAUGHTER, AND IT IS NOT KNOWN WHICH OF THEM DIED FIRST, HER RIVAL MUST PERFORM HALIZAH BUT MAY NOT CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. GEMARA. AN EMBRYO, for if [its mother] is the daughter of a priest [who was married] to an Israelite [the embryo] deprives her of the privilege, [for it is written]. As in her youth, which excludes one who is with child. And if she is the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, the embryo does not bestow the privilege upon her, because the living child does bestow the privileged but not the unborn. A LEVIR, for if [his yebamah] is the daughter of a priest who was married to an Israelite, [the Ievir] deprives her of the privileged [for it is written], And is returned unto her father's house, which excludes one who is awaiting the decision of the levir; and if she is the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest [the levir] does not bestow the privilege upon her, because the All Merciful said, The purchase of his money. while she is the purchase of his brother. BETROTHAL, for if [the woman] is the daughter of a priest [who was betrothed] to an Israelite, [betrothal] deprives her of the privilege,
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