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יבמות 40
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
for originally its status in relation to him was one of permissibility; then it was forbidden, and again permitted; consequently one might assume that it reverts to its first status of permissibility, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place, it is a commandment'. Now, according to Raba who said that it represents the view of the Rabbis, one could well explain that what is meant here is this: It shall be eaten without leaven in a holy place is a commandment, for at first its status in relation to him was one of permissibility since, if he desired, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it; then it was forbidden, and again permitted; consequently it might be assumed that it reverts to its first status of permissibility so that, if he wished, he could eat it and, if he preferred, he could abstain from eating it. — [You say,] 'If he preferred he could abstain from eating it'? Surely it is written in the Scriptures, And they shall eat those things wherewith atonement was made which teaches that the priests must eat them, and that the owner attains thereby atonement! Say rather: [it might be assumed that] if he wished, he may eat it himself and, if he preferred, another priest may eat it, hence it was specifically stated, It shall be eaten' without leaven in a holy place, it is a commandment. According to R. Isaac b. Abdimi, however, who said that it [represents the view of] Abba Saul, what two alternatives exist here? And were you to suggest that if he wished he could eat it to appease his appetite and, if he preferred, he could devour it gluttonously can eating gluttonous]y [it may be retorted] be described as proper eating? Surely Resh Lakish said, 'He who eats gluttonously on the Day of Atonement is exempt [from kareth], since [Scripture has stated], Shall not be afflicted'! [Were you to suggest], however, that if he wished he could eat it unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it leavened, surely [it might be retorted] it is written in Scripture, It shall not be baked with leaven their portion from which Resh Lakish inferred that even their portion must not be baked with leaven! Again [Were you, to suggest,] that if he wished he could eat it unleavened and, if he preferred, he could eat it as a dumpling, how [it could be retorted] is one to imagine [such a dumpling]? If it is unleavened, well, then it is unleavened; and if it is not unleavened, the All Merciful, surely, has said without leaven! — No; it may indeed be assumed to be unleavened; but the object of the exposition of the Scriptural text was to forbid it. In respect of what practical issue, then, has it been stated that a dumpling may be regarded as unleavened bread? — [The statement was made] to indicate that a man may perform with it his duty on the Passover. Though he made it first into a dumpling, it is nevertheless designated the 'bread of affliction', since he subsequently baked it in an oven. Consequently a man may perform with it his duty on the Passover. MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS IN RESPECT OF INHERITANCE. IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER WAS LIVING, THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER. HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE GAINS POSSESSION OF HIS BROTHER'S ESTATE. R. JUDAH SAID: IN EITHER CASE, IF THE FATHER WAS LIVING THE ESTATE BELONGS TO THE FATHER. GEMARA. Is not this obvious? — It might have been presumed that halizah takes the place of the levirate marriage and he receives, therefore, all the estate, hence it was taught [that he does not]. If so, why was it stated that HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF THE OTHER BROTHERS when it should have been stated, he is to be regarded only as one of the brothers! — In truth [this is the purpose of our Mishnah]: It might have been assumed that because he deprived her [of levirate marriage] he shall be penalized, hence we were taught [that he does receive a share]. IF, HOWEVER, THE FATHER WAS LIVING, [THE ESTATE BELONGS TO HIM], for a Master said that a father takes precedence over all his lineal descendants. HE WHO MARRIES HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE etc. What is the reason? — The All Merciful said, Shall succeed in the name of his brother, and behold he has succeeded. R. JUDAH SAID etc. Said 'Ulla: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, and R. Isaac Nappaha likewise said: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. 'Ulla, furthermore, (others say, R. Isaac Nappaha) said: What is R. Judah's reason? — Because it is written in Scripture, And it shall be, that the firstborn that he beareth, [he is] like the firstborn; as the firstborn has nothing while his father is alive, so has this one also nothing while his father is alive. If [one were to suggest that] as the firstborn receives a double portion after his father's death so shall this one also receive a double portion after his father's death, [it might be retorted]: Is it written, 'Shall succeed in the name of his father'? It is written, surely, Shall succeed in the name of his brother, not 'in the name of his father'. Might it be suggested that, where the father is not alive to receive the inheritance, the law of the levirate marriage should be carried out, but where the father is alive [and the levir] does not receive the inheritance the law of the levirate marriage shall not be carried out? — Has the All Merciful in any way made the levirate marriage dependent on the inheritance? The levir must contract the levirate marriage in any case, and if any inheritance is available he receives it; if not, he does not receive it. The Bible teacher, R. Hanina, once sat before R. Jannai, and as he sat there he stated: The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other called out to him: Go out, read Biblical verses outside; the halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. A tanna recited in the presence of R. Nahman: The halachah is not in agreement with R. Judah. The other said to him: In agreement with whom, then? In agreement with the Rabbis? This is surely obvious, [since in a dispute between] one individual and a majority the halachah is in agreement with the majority! — 'Shall I', the first asked him, 'reject it'? 'No', the other replied, 'you were taught [that] the halachah is [in agreement with R. Judah] which, presenting to you a difficulty, you reversed; and in so far as you reversed it your wording is well justified. MISHNAH. IF A LEVIR PARTICIPATED IN HALIZAH WITH HIS DECEASED BROTHER'S WIFE HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER RELATIVES AND SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS RELATIVES:
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HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER MOTHER, HER MOTHER'S MOTHER AND HER FATHER S MOTHER; HER DAUGHTER, HER DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER AND HER SON'S DAUGHTER; AND ALSO HER SISTER WHILE SHE IS ALIVE. THE OTHER BROTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE PERMITTED. SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS FATHER AND HIS FATHER'S FATHER; HIS SON AND HIS SON'S SON; HIS BROTHER AND HIS BROTHER'S SON. A MAN IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE RELATIVE OF THE RIVAL OF HIS HALUZAH BUT IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY THE RIVAL OF THE RELATIVE OF HIS HALUZAH. GEMARA. The question was raised: Were relatives of the second degree forbidden in the case of a haluzah as a preventive measure, or not? Did the Rabbis forbid marriage with relatives of the second degree, as a preventive measure, only in respect of a relative who is pentateuchally forbidden, but in respect of a haluzah the Rabbis did not forbid relatives of the second degree as a preventive measure, or is there perhaps no difference? — Come and hear: HE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HER MOTHER AND HER MOTHER'S MOTHER, but 'her mother's mother's mother' is not mentioned! [No.] It is possible that the reason why this relative was omitted is because it was desired to state in the final clause, THE OTHER BROTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE PERMITTED, and, were 'her mother's mother's mother' also mentioned it might have been presumed that the brothers are permitted [to marry] her mother's mother's mother only but not her mother's mother or her mother. Then let 'her mother's mother's mother' be mentioned, and let it also be stated: The brothers are permitted to marry all of them! — This is a difficulty. Come and hear: SHE IS FORBIDDEN TO MARRY HIS FATHER AND HIS FATHER'S FATHER. 'His father's father,' at any rate, was mentioned. Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah, through whom she is the daughter-in-law of his son? — No; this is due to the deceased through whom she is the daughter-in-law of his son. Come and hear: AND HIS SON'S SON, Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is the wife of his father's father? — No; it is due to the deceased through whom she is his father's father's brother's wife. But, surely, Amemar permitted the marriage of one's father's father's brother's wife! — Amemar interprets that to refer to the son of the grandfather. If so, [HIS SON, AND SON'S SON] are the same as HIS BROTHER AND HIS BROTHER'S SON! — Both his paternal brother and his maternal brother were specified. Come and hear what R. Hiyya taught: Four [categories of relatives are forbidden] Pentateuchally and four Rabbinically. His father and his son, his brother and his brother's son are Pentateuchally forbidden; his father's father and his mother's father, his son's son and his daughter's son are forbidden Rabbinically. 'His father's father', at any rate, is mentioned here. Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his son's daughter-in-law? — No; it is due to the deceased whose son's daughter-in-law she is. Come and hear: 'His mother's father'. Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his daughter's daughter-in-law? — No; it is due to the deceased through whom she is his daughter's daughter-in-law. Come and hear: 'And his son's son'. Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his father's father's wife? — No; it is due to the deceased through whom she is his father's father's brother's wife. But, surely, Amemar permitted the marriage of one's father's father's brother's wife! — Amemar explains that to be due to the levir who participated in the halizah, but is of the opinion that relatives of the second degree were forbidden as a preventive measure even in respect of a haluzah. Come and hear: 'And the son of his daughter'. Is not this due to the levir who participated in the halizah through whom she is his mother's father's wife? — No; it is due to the deceased through whom she is his mother's father's brother's wife. But, surely, no prohibition as a preventive measure was made in respect of the second degrees of incest! Consequently it must be due to the levir who participated in the halizah, and thus it may be inferred that relatives of the second degree were forbidden as a preventive measure even in the case of a haluzah. This proves it. A MAN IS PERMITTED etc. R. Tobi b. Kisna said in the name of Samuel: Where a man had intercourse with the rival of his haluzah the child [born from such a union] is a bastard. What is the reason? — Because she remains under her original prohibition. Said R. Joseph: We also have learned [to the same effect]: A MAN IS PERMITTED TO MARRY THE RELATIVE OF THE RIVAL OF HIS HALUZAH. Now, if you grant that the rival is excluded one can well understand why the man is permitted to marry her sister. If it be maintained, however, that the rival has the same status as the haluzah, why [should her sister] be permitted [to him]? May it be suggested that this furnishes an objection against R. Johanan who stated: Neither he nor the other brothers are subject to kareth either for [the betrothal of] a haluzah or for [the betrothal of] her rival? — R. Johanan can answer you: Do you understand it! Is the sister of a haluzah Pentateuchally forbidden? Surely Resh Lakish said: Here it was taught by Rabbi that the prohibition to marry the sister of a divorced wife is Pentateuchal and that that of the sister of a haluzah is Rabbinical! Why is there a difference [in the law] between the one and the other?
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