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יבמות 31
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
— Since she is required to perform halizah it is sufficiently known that it is a mere restriction. If so, let him, in the case of divorce also, state it, and require her to perform halizah, and it will be sufficiently known that it Was a mere restriction! — Were you to say that she was to perform halizah it might also be assumed that she may be taken in levirate marriage. But here also, were you to say that she is to perform halizah, she might also be taken in levirate marriage! -Well, let her be taken in levirate marriage and it will not matter at all since thereby she only retains her former status. Abaye raised the following objection against him: If the house collapsed upon him and upon his brother's daughter. and it is not known which of them had died first, her rival must perform halizah but may not contract the levirate marriage. But why? Here also it may be said, 'This woman finds herself in the status of permissibility to all, would you forbid her [marriage on the basis] of a doubt? You must not forbid her [on the basis] of a doubt'! And should you suggest that here also the prohibition is due to a restriction, [it may be retorted that] it is a restriction which may result in a relaxation, for should you say that she is to perform the halizah she might also be taken in levirate marriage! — In respect of divorce which is of frequent occurrence the Rabbis enacted a preventive measure; in respect of the collapse of a house which is not of frequent occurrence the Rabbis did not enact any preventive measure. Or else: In the case of divorce, where the forbidden relative is demonstrably alive, were her rival to be required to perform halizah, it might have been thought that the Rabbis had ascertained that the letter of divorce was a valid document, and the rival might, therefore, be taken in levirate marriage. In the case of a house that has collapsed. however, could the Rabbis have ascertained [who was first killed] in the ruin! Have we not learned a similar law in the case of divorce? Surely we learned: If she stood in a public domain, and he threw it to her, she is divorced if it fell nearer to her; but if nearer to him she is not divorced. If it was equidistant, she is divorced and not divorced. And when it was asked, 'What is the practical effect of this', [the reply was] that if he was a priest she is forbidden to him; and if she is a forbidden relative, her rival must perform the halizah. We do not say, however, that were you to rule that she must perform halizah she might also be taken in levirate marriage! -Concerning this statement, surely, it was said: Both Rabbah and R. Joseph maintain that here we are dealing with two groups of witnesses, one of which declare that it was nearer to her and the other declares that it was nearer to him, which creates a doubt involving a Pentateuchal [prohibition] — Our Mishnah, however, speaks of one group. where the doubt involved is only Rabbinical. Whence is it proved that our Mishnah speaks of one group? — On analogy with betrothal: As in betrothal only one group is involved so also in divorce one group only could be involved. Whence is it known that in betrothal itself only one group is involved? Is it not possible that it involves two groups of witnesses! — If two groups of witnesses had been involved, she would have been allowed to contract the levirate marriage, and no wrong would have been done. Witnesses stand and declare that it was nearer to her, and you say that she may be taken in levirate marriage and no wrong will be done! Furthermore, even where two groups of witnesses are involved the doubt is only Rabbinical, since it might be said 'Put one pair against the other and let the woman retain her original status'! This indeed is similar to [the incident with] the estate of a certain lunatic. For a certain lunatic once sold some property. and a pair of witnesses came and declared that he had effected the sale while in a sound state of mind, and another pair came and declared that the sale was effected while he was in a state of lunacy. And R. Ashi said: Put two against two
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and let the land remain in the possession of the lunatic! — Rather, said Abaye. Its friend telleth concerning it: that which was taught in connection with betrothal is also to be applied to divorce, and what was taught in connection with divorce is also to be applied to betrothal. Said Raba to him: If its friend telleth concerning it' what was the object of stating THIS IS? -Rather, said Raba, whatever is applicable to betrothal is also to be applied to divorce, but certain points are applicable to divorce, which cannot be applied to betrothal. And THIS IS which was mentioned in the case of divorce is not to be taken literally. as THIS IS was used in connection with betrothal only because it was also used in connection with divorce. What was THIS IS mentioned in connection with betrothal meant to exclude? — To exclude the question of date which is inapplicable to betrothal. And wherefore was no date ordained to be entered in [documents of] betrothal? This may well be satisfactorily explained according to him who holds [that the date is required In a letter of divorce] on account of the usufruct, since a betrothed woman has no [need to reclaim] usufruct — According to him, however, who holds [that it was ordained] on account of one's sister's daughter. the insertion of a date should have been ordained [in the case of betrothal also]! — Since some men betroth with money and others betroth with a document the Rabbis did not ordain the inclusion of a date. Said R. Aha son of R. Joseph to R. Ashi: What about the case of a slave of whom some acquire possession by means of money and others by means of a deed, yet the inclusion of a date has nevertheless been ordained by the Rabbis! — In that case acquisition is generally by means of a deed; here, it is generally by means of money. If you prefer I might say: Because it is impossible. For how should one proceed? Were it to be left with her, she might erase it. Were it to be left with him, it might happen that the betrothed might be his sister's daughter and he would shield her. Were it to be left with the witnesses-well, if they remember they could come and tender their evidence; and if they do not, they may sometimes consult the document and then come and tender evidence, while the All Merciful said, 'out of their mouth' but not out of their writing. If so, let the same argument be applied to divorce also! — There, it comes to save her, here, it comes to condemn her. MISHNAH. IN THE CASE WHERE THREE BROTHERS WERE MARRIED TO THREE WOMEN WHO WERE STRANGERS [TO ONE ANOTHER]. AND ONE OF THEM HAVING DIED THE SECOND BROTHER ADDRESSED TO HER A MA'AMAR AND DIED, BEHOLD, THESE MUST PERFORM HALIZAH BUT MAY NOT BE TAKEN IN LEVIRATE MARRIAGE; FOR IT IS SAID. AND ONE OF THEM DIED [ETC.] HER HUSBAND'S BROTHER SHALL GO IN UNTO HER. ONLY SHE WHO IS BOUND TO ONE LEVIR BUT NOT SHE WHO IS BOUND TO TWO LEVIRS. R. SIMEON SAID: HE MAY TAKE IN LEVIRATE MARRIAGE WHICHEVER OF THESE HE WISHES AND THEN PARTICIPATE IN THE HALIZAH WITH THE OTHER. GEMARA. If, however, the levirate bond with two levirs is Pentateuchal, even halizah should not be required! — But it is only Rabbinical, a preventive measure having been enacted against the possible assumption that two sisters-in-law coming from the same house may both be taken in levirate marriage. Then let one be taken in levirate marriage and the other be required to perform halizah! — A preventive measure has been enacted against the possible assumption that one house was partially built
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