יבמות 11 — parallel

11:1

— This is rather a difficulty. R. Ashi holds the same opinion as Resh Lakish and explains it in accordance with the ruling of R. Simeon. Rabina holds the same opinion as R. Johanan and explains it in accordance with the ruling of the Rabbis. 'R. Ashi holds the same opinion as Resh Lakish and explains it in accordance with the ruling of R. Simeon', thus: If [a levir] who submitted to halizah from his sister-in-law had subsequently betrothed her, she requires halizah from the brothers. Who are these brothers? Those born [subsequently]. According to whose view? According to that of R. Simeon. If one of the previously born brothers, however, betrothed her, she has no claim upon him. According to whose view? According to that of Resh Lakish. 'Rabina holds the same opinion as R. Johanan and explains it in accordance with the ruling of the Rabbis', thus: If [a levir] who submitted to halizah from his sister-in-law had subsequently betrothed her, she requires halizah from the brothers. Who are these brothers? Those born [prior to the halizah]. According to whom? According to R. Johanan. If one of the subsequently born brothers, however, betrothed her, she has no claim upon him. According to whose view? According to that of the Rabbis. It has been stated: In the case where [the Ievir] had intercourse with his sister-in-law and one of the other brothers had intercourse with her rival, there is a difference of opinion between R. Aha and Rabina. One said: [It involves a transgression subject] to kareth and the other said: [The transgression] of a positive precept. He who said, '[A transgression subject] to kareth' follows Resh Lakish; and he who said, '[The transgression] of a positive precept' follows R. Johanan. Rab Judah said in the name of Rab: The rival of a sotah is for bidden. What is the reason? — Because uncleanness is ascribed to her as to the cases of incest. R. Hisda raised an objection: R. Simeon said, the intercourse or halizah of the brother of the first husband exempts her rival! — Rab can answer you, 'I speak of a sotah that is Biblically forbidden, and you talk of a sotah that is only Rabbinically forbidden'. But as to him who raised this objection, what did he imagine? — He thought that Rabbinical provisions were given the same force as Biblical laws. R. Ashi raised an objection: If she entered with the man into a private place and remained with him for a period sufficient for the consummation of defilement, she is forbidden to her house, she may not eat of terumah, and if he died she must undergo the ceremony of halizah

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11:2

though she may not marry the levir! — Rab can answer you. 'I speak of a definite sotah, and you speak of a doubtful one'. But why should a definite sotah be different? Obviously because in relation to her the expression of 'uncleanness' is used; is not, however, the expression of 'uncleanness' also used in relation to a doubtful sotah! For it was taught: R. Jose b. Kipper said in the name of R. Eleazar, The remarriage by a husband of his divorced wife is forbidden after marriage and permitted after betrothal, because it is stated in the Scriptures. After that she is defiled. The Sages, however, say, the one as well as the other is forbidden, and the expression 'After that she is defiled' implies the inclusion of a sotah who secluded herself with a man! — The underlying meaning of 'secluded herself' is 'sexual intercourse'. Why then did he say 'secluded herself'? — In order to employ a euphemism. But in relation to sexual intercourse, [surely,] uncleanness was actually mentioned in the Scriptures. She being defiled secretly! — To subject the offence to a negative precept. And R. Jose b. Kipper? — He does not hold the view that a negative precept is applicable to a sotah, even in the case where she had actually committed adultery. What is the reason? — [Because in reference to the remarriage of a divorced wife] Scripture uses the expression of becoming as well as that of matrimony. Rab Judah inquired of R. Shesheth: What is the law in regard to the rival of a woman whom her former husband remarried after her second marriage and died? According to the view of R. Jose b. Kipper the question does not arise. For R. Jose b. Kipper having stated that 'uncleanness' is mentioned in the case of him who remarried his divorced wife, it follows that her rival is subject to the very same restrictions. And if [objection be raised] from the Scriptural text, She is an abomination, [it may be replied that the implication is] that she is an abomination and not her children, her rival, however, being an abomination. The question, however, arises on the view of the Rabbis: Does the Scriptural text, despite the fact that the Rabbis had applied the expression 'uncleanness' to the sotah, also bear its ordinary meaning, or since it was once torn away [from its ordinary meaning] it must in all respects so remain? Others say: According to the Rabbis no question arises, for since the text has once been torn away [from its ordinary meaning] it must in all respects so remain. The question, however, arises according to the view of R. Jose b. Kipper: What is the law? [Is it assumed that] although R. Jose b. Kipper stated that the expression of 'uncleanness' refers to the remarriage of a divorced wife, the All Merciful has written 'She is an abomination' to indicate that 'she' is an abomination but not her rival, or is the implication, perhaps, that 'she' is an abomination, but her children are not; a rival, however, being an abomination? — The other replied: You have learnt it, 'If one of them was a permitted wife and the other a forbidden one; if he submit to halizah he must submit to that of the forbidden one; and if he marries he marries the permitted one.' Now what is meant by 'permitted' and 'forbidden'? If it be suggested that 'permitted' means permitted for all the world, and 'forbidden' means forbidden for all the world, what practical difference, in view of the fact that she is In either case suitable for him, could this make to him? Consequently 'permitted' must mean permitted to him, and 'forbidden', forbidden to him; and this may happen where he remarried his divorced wife; and yet it was taught, 'and if he marries he marries the permitted one'! — No; 'permitted' may still mean permitted to all the world and 'forbidden', forbidden for all the world; and as to your question, 'what practical difference, in view of the fact that she is in either case suitable for him, could this make', one must take into account the moral lesson of R. Joseph. For R. Joseph stated: Here Rabbi taught that a man shall not pour the water out of his cistern so long as others may require it. Come and hear: 'Where a man remarried his divorced wife after she had been married, she and her rival are to perform the halizah.' Is it possible to say 'she and her rival'? Consequently it must mean, 'Either she or her rival.' Did you not, however, have recourse to an interpretation? [You might as well] interpret thus: She is to perform halizah, while her rival may either perform halizah or be married by the levir. R. Hiyya b. Abba said: R. Johanan inquired as to what is the law in regard to a rival of a divorced woman whom her former husband remarried after her second marriage. Said R. Ammi to him: Enquire rather regarding herself! — Concerning herself I have no question since her case may be inferred a minori ad majus: If she is forbidden to him to whom she was originally permitted, how much more so to the man to whom she was originally forbidden! The question, however, remains concerning her rival: Is the inference a minori ad majus strong enough to exclude a rival or not? R. Nahman b. Isaac taught as follows: R. Hiyya b. Abba said, R. Johanan enquired as to what is the law in regard to a divorced woman whom her husband remarried after her second marriage. Said R. Ammi to him: Enquire rather regarding her rival! — Concerning her rival I have no question, for an inference a minori ad majus is not strong enough to exclude a rival; the question, how ever, remains regarding herself. Is the inference a minori ad majus strong enough [to be acted upon] where a precept is involved or not?

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