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יבמות 119
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
MISHNAH. A WOMAN WHOSE HUSBAND AND RIVAL WENT TO A COUNTRY BEYOND THE SEA, AND TO WHOM PEOPLE CAME AND SAID, 'YOUR HUSBAND IS DEAD', MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE UNTIL SHE HAS ASCERTAINED WHETHER HER RIVAL IS PREGNANT. IF SHE HAD A MOTHER-IN-LAW SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON]; BUT IF SHE DEPARTED WHILE PREGNANT [SUCH POSSIBILITY] MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. R. JOSHUA RULED; SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [SUCH A POSSIBILITY]. GEMARA. What is implied by 'HER RIVAL'? — It is this that we are told: {The possibility of a birth in respect] of that rival need be apprehended; in respect of another rival, however, it need not be apprehended. MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE etc. It is quite proper that she shall not contract levirate marriage since it is possible that [her rival] is pregnant and that she would in consequence cause an infringement [of the prohibition against marriage] of a brother's wife, which is Pentateuchal; but why should she not marry [a stranger]? The majority of women should be taken as a criterion and the majority of women conceive and bear children! Must it then be assumed that [the ruling is that of] R. Meir who takes a minority also into consideration? — It may even be said [to represent the view of] the Rabbis; for the Rabbis follow the majority principle only where the majority is actually present as, for instance, in the case of 'nine shops' and 'Sanhedrin', but in respect of a majority that is not actually present the Rabbis were not guided by the majority principle. Behold the case of a minor boy and a minor girl, where the majority is one that is not actually present and the Rabbis nevertheless follow the majority principle; for it was taught: A minor, whether male or female, may neither perform nor submit to halizah, nor may he contract levirate marriage; so R. Meir. They said to R. Meir: You spoke well [when you ruled] that 'He may neither perform nor submit to halizah', since in the Pentateuchal section man was written, and we draw a comparison between 'woman' and man. What, however, is the reason why he may not contract levirate marriage? He replied: Because a minor male might be found to be a saris; a minor female might be found to be incapable of procreation; and thus the law of incest would be violated. The Rabbis, however, maintain, 'Follow the majority of male minors'; and the majority of male minors are not sarisin; 'Follow the majority of female minors' and the majority of female minors are not incapable of procreation! — But, clearly, [it must be admitted], our Mishnah represents the view of R. Meir. How have you explained it? That it is in agreement with the view of R. Meir? Read, then, the final clause: IF SHE HAD A MOTHER-IN-LAW SHE NEED NOT APPREHEND [THE POSSIBILITY OF THE BIRTH OF ANOTHER SON]; but why? One should be guided by the majority of women, and the majority of women conceive and bear while a minority miscarry, and, since all those who bear [produce] a half of males and a half of females, the minority of those who miscarry should be added to the half [of those who bear] females, and so the males would constitute a minority which should be taken into consideration! — It is possible that since the woman was confirmed in her status of permissibility to strangers [the possibility of the birth of a levir] was not taken by him into consideration. In the first clause, then, where she was confirmed in the status of eligibility for the levirate marriage, let her contract the levirate marriage! — R. Nahman replied in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha: In the first clause where a prohibition which is subject to the penalty of kareth [is involved, the possibility of the birth of a son] had to be provided against; in the final clause, however, where a prohibitory law [only is involved] no [such possibility] was taken into consideration. Said Raba: Consider: The one [prohibition] is Pentateuchal and the other also is Pentateuchal; what matters it, then, whether the prohibition is one involving kareth or whether it is only a mere prohibitory law? — Rather, said Raba;
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in the first clause the woman's confirmed status [would subject her] to the levirate marriage while the majority principle [would enable her] to marry any stranger; and, though 'confirmed status' is not as important a factor as a majority, the minority of women who miscarry must be added to the 'confirmed status' so that the factors on either side are equally balanced; hence she MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE. In the final clause, however, the woman's confirmed status as well as the majority principle [points] to [the permissibility of marriage with] any stranger, so that [viable] males constitute a minority of a minority; and a minority of a minority is not taken into consideration even by R. Meir. MUST NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR CONTRACT LEVIRATE MARRIAGE etc. For ever? — Ze'iri replied: [She waits] on account of herself three months and on account of her associate nine, and then she may, at all events, perform halizah. R. Hanina said: On account of herself [she must wait] three months, but on account of her associate for ever. But let her perform halizah at all events! — Both Abaye b. Abin and R. Hanina b. Abin replied: This is a preventive measure against the possibility that the child might be viable as a result of which you would have to subject her to the necessity of a public announcement in respect of the priesthood. Well, let her be subjected to the necessity! — It may happen that someone would be present at the halizah and not at the announcement, and he would form the opinion that a haluzah was permitted to a priest. We learned: [If a woman states], 'A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea' and she also asserts, 'My son died and afterwards my husband died', she is believed. [If she states, however], 'My husband died and afterwards my son died', she is not believed, but note is taken of her assertion and she must, therefore, perform halizah but may not contract levirate marriage. Let it, however, be apprehended that witnesses might come and confirm her statement and that, as a result, you would subject her to the necessity of an announcement in respect of the priesthood! — R. Papa replied: [This refers to] a woman divorced. R. Hiyya son of R. Huna replied: [It refers to one] who stated 'I and he were hidden in a cave'. MISHNAH. [IN THE CASE OF] TWO SISTERS-IN-LAW ONE OF WHOM STATED, 'MY HUSBAND IS DEAD', AND THE OTHER ALSO STATED, 'MY HUSBAND IS DEAD', THE FORMER IS FORBIDDEN ON ACCOUNT OF THE HUSBAND OF THE LATTER, AND THE LATTER IS FORBIDDEN ON ACCOUNT OF THE HUSBAND OF THE FORMER. IF THE ONE HAD WITNESSES AND THE OTHER HAD NO WITNESSES, SHE WHO HAD THE WITNESSES IS FORBIDDEN, WHILE SHE WHO HAD NO WITNESSES IS PERMITTED. IF THE ONE HAD CHILDREN AND THE OTHER HAD NO CHILDREN, SHE WHO HAD CHILDREN IS PERMITTED AND SHE WHO HAD NO CHILDREN IS FORBIDDEN. IF THEY CONTRACTED LEVIRATE MARRIAGES, AND THE LEVIRS DIED, THEY ARE FORBIDDEN [TO MARRY AGAIN]. R. ELEAZAR RULED: SINCE THEY WERE ONCE PERMITTED TO MARRY THE LEVIRS THEY ARE PERMITTED TO MARRY ANY MAN. GEMARA. A Tanna taught: If the one had witnesses and also children, and the other had neither witnesses nor children, both are permitted [to marry again]. IF THEY CONTRACTED LEVIRATE MARRIAGES, AND THE LEVIRS DIED, THEY ARE FORBIDDEN [TO MARRY AGAIN]. R. ELEAZAR RULED: SINCE THEY WERE ONCE PERMITTED TO THE LEVIRS THEY ARE PERMITTED TO MARRY ANY MAN. Raba inquired: What is R. Eleazar's reason? Is it because he is of the opinion that a rival is eligible to tender evidence in favour of her associate or is it because [he holds that] she would not cause injury to herself? What practical difference is there [between the two assumptions]?
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