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יבמות 117
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
THAT ON HER EVIDENCE, THE BROTHERS MAY NOT ENTER INTO THEIR INHERITANCE. SAID BETH SHAMMAI TO THEM: DO WE NOT LEARN THIS FROM HER KETHUBAH SCROLL WHEREIN [HER HUSBAND] PRESCRIBES FOR HER, 'IF THOU BE MARRIED TO ANOTHER MAN, THOU WILT RECEIVE WHAT IS PRESCRIBED FOR THEE'! THEREUPON BETH HILLEL WITHDREW THIS OPINION, THENCEFORTH TO RULE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VIEW OF BETH SHAMMAI. GEMARA. R. Hisda stated: If she is taken in levirate marriage the levir enters into the inheritance on her evidence. If they made an exposition on the kethubah, shall we not make an exposition on the Torah? The All Merciful said, Shall succeed in the name of his brother, and he has surely succeeded. R. Nahman ruled: If [a woman] came before Beth din and stated, 'My husband is dead; permit me to marry again'. permission must be granted her to marry again. and she is given her kethubah. [If she demanded]. 'Give me my kethubah', she must not be permitted even to marry. What is the reason? Because she came with her mind intent on the kethubuh. The question was raised: What is the ruling [where she said], 'Permit me to marry and give me my kethubah'? Has she come with her mind intent on the kethubah, since she specified her kethubah or [is it assumed that] a person [naturally] lays before the Beth din all the claims he has! And should you find [a reason for deciding in her favour because] a person submits whatever claim he has to the Beth din, [the question still remains as to] what [is the law where she stated]. 'Give me my kethubah and permit me to marry'? [Is it assumed that] in this case she has undoubtedly come with her mind bent on the kethubah. or is it possible [that she mentioned her kethubah] because she did not know by what means she becomes permitted [to marry again]. — This is undecided. MISHNAH. ALL ARE REGARDED AS TRUSTWORTHY TO GIVE EVIDENCE FOR HER EXCEPTING HER MOTHER-IN-LAW. THE DAUGHTER OF HER MOTHER-IN-LAW, HER RIVAL, HER SISTER-IN-LAW AND HER HUSBAND'S DAUGHTER. WHEREIN LIES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN [THE ADMISSIBILITY OF] A LETTER OF DIVORCE AND [THAT OF THE EVIDENCE OF] DEATH? IN THAT THE WRITTEN DOCUMENT PROVIDES THE PROOF. GEMARA. The question was raised: What [is the law in regard to the eligibility of] the daughter of her father-in-law? Is the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-in-law because there is a mother who hates her she also hates her; here, however, there is no mother who hates her? Or is it possible that the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-inlaw is because she believes that the other squanders the savings of her mother; there, then, she also believes that she squanders the savings of her father-in-law? Come and hear: 'All are regarded as trustworthy to give evidence for her excepting five women'; but if that were so [the number should] be six! — It is possible that the reason [for the ineligibility] of the daughter of her mother-in-law is because she believes that the other squanders the savings of her mother [and, therefore] there is no difference between the daughter of her mother-in-law and the daughter of her father-in-law. But, surely. it was taught. 'Excepting seven women'! — This is the view of R. Judah. For it was taught: R. Judah adds also a father's wife and a daughter-In-law. They said to him: A father's wife is, in fact, included in the expression 'a husband's daughter', and a daughter-in-law is obviously included in the expression 'her mother-in-law'. And R. Judah? - Because one can well understand why a mother-in-law should hate her daughter-in-law, since the former believes that the latter squanders her Savings, but why should a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law! Similarly one may well understand why a husband's daughter hates her father's wife, since the former believes that she is squandering her mother's savings, but why should a father's wife hate her husband's daughter! Why, then, does he add the two? — But [this is the true explanation]: Why does a daughter-in-law hate her mother-in-law? Because the latter reports to her son all that she does. [Similarly] a father's wife also hates her husband's daughter because the latter reports to her father all that she does. And the Rabbis? — As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man. And R. Judah? — The text applies to [the study of] the words of the Torah. R. Aha b. 'Awya said: In the West they asked: What is the ruling in respect of a potential mother-in-law? Does it occur to her that [this woman's] husband might die [without issue] and she would thereby be subject to the levir, and therefore. she hates her; or does it not?
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Come and hear: If a woman stated. 'My husband died first and my father-in-law died after him'. she may marry again and she also receives her kethubah. but her mother-in-law is forbidden. Now, why is her mother-in-law forbidden? Is it not because it is assumed that neither her husband died nor did her father-in-law die and that by her statement she intended to damage the position of her mother-in-law. hoping that [as a result] she would not in the future come to torment her! — There it may be different because she has experienced her annoyance. MISHNAH. IF ONE WITNESS STATED, ['THE HUSBAND IS] DEAD', AND THEREUPON HIS WIFE MARRIED AGAIN, AND ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD'. SHE NEED NOT BE DIVORCED. IF ONE WITNESS SAID. 'HE IS DEAD AND TWO WITNESSES SAID. 'HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MUST, EVEN IF SHE MARRIED AGAIN, BE DIVORCED. IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE IS DEAD', AND ONE WITNESS STATED, HE IS NOT DEAD', SHE MAY, EVEN IF SHE HAD NOT YET DONE SO, MARRY AGAIN. GEMARA. The reason then is because [the woman] MARRIED AGAIN; had she, however, not married would she not have been permitted to marry? But Surely. 'Ulla stated: Wherever the Torah declared one witness credible, he is regarded as two witnesses, and the evidence of one man against that of two men has no Validity! — It is this that was meant: IF ONE WITNESS STATED ['THE HUSBAND IS] DEAD' and after his wife had been permitted to marry again ANOTHER CAME AND STATED 'HE IS NOT DEAD', she is not to be deprived of her former status of permissibility. IF ONE WITNESS SAID, 'HE IS DEAD', Is this not obvious? For the evidence of one man against that Of two men has no validity! — [This ruling' is] required only in the case of ineligible witnesses [this being] in accordance with the view of R. Nehemiah. For it was taught: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible, the majority of statements is to be followed, and [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is given the same validity as that of two men against one man'. And if you prefer I might reply: Wherever one eligible witness came first, even a hundred women are regarded as one witness. But [here it is such a case] as, for example, where a woman witness came in the first instance; and [the statement] of R. Nehemiah is to be explained thus: R. Nehemiah stated, 'Wherever the Torah declares one witness credible, the majority of statements is to be followed, and [the evidence of] two women against one woman is given the same validity as that of two men against one man; but [the evidence of] two women against that of one man is regarded as half and half. IF TWO WITNESSES STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' etc. What does this teach us? [A ruling] in respect of ineligible witnesses, [the principle being the same] as that of R. Nehemiah who follows the majority of statements. But is not this exactly the same [as the previous clause]! — It might have been assumed that the majority is followed only when the law is thereby made more stringent, but not [where it leads] to a relaxation of the law; hence we were taught [the final clause], MISHNAH. IF ONE WIFE SAID ['HER HUSBAND IS] DEAD' AND THE OTHER WIFE SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS DEAD' MAY MARRY AGAIN AND SHE ALSO RECEIVES HER KETHUBAH, WHILE THE ONE WHO SAID, 'HE IS NOT DEAD, MAY NEITHER MARRY AGAIN NOR IS SHE TO RECEIVE HER KETHUBAH. IF ONE WIFE STATED, 'HE IS DEAD' AND THE OTHER STATED. 'HE WAS KILLED', R. MEIR RULED: SINCE THEY CONTRADICT ONE ANOTHER THEY MAY NOT MARRY AGAIN. R. JUDAH AND R. SIMEON RULED: SINCE BOTH ADMIT THAT HE IS NOT ALIVE, BOTH MAY MARRY AGAIN. IF ONE WITNESS STATED, 'HE IS DEAD', AND ANOTHER WITNESS STATED. 'HE IS NOT DEAD',
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