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יבמות 110
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
Does not [this refer to a case] where he did not cohabit [with her]? — No; where he did cohabit with her. If, however, he cohabited [with her] what is Samuel's reason? — He holds the view that one Who performs cohabitation does so in reliance on his first betrothal. But surely they once disputed this point! For it was stated: If a man betrothed a woman conditionally, and unconditionally, Rab ruled: She requires from him a letter of divorce; and Samuel ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from him. 'Rab ruled: She requires from him a letter of divorce', because as soon as he marries her he undoubtedly dispenses with his condition. 'And Samuel ruled: She requires no letter of divorce from him', because one who performs cohabitation does so in reliance on his first betrothal! — [Both disputes were] necessary. For if the former only had been stated, it might have been assumed that Rab adheres to his opinion there only because no condition was attached [to the betrothal] but in the latter case, where a condition was attached to it, he agrees with Samuel. And if the latter case only had been stated, it might have been assumed that there only does Samuel maintain his view but in the former he agrees with Rab. [Hence both were] required. Did Rab, however, state that only where [the husband] cohabited with her does she require a letter of divorce but that if he did not cohabit with her none is required? Surely it once happened at Naresh that a man betrothed a girl while she was a minor, and, when she attained her majority and he placed her upon the bridal chair, another man came and snatched her away from him; and, though Rab's disciples, R. Beruna and R. Hananel, were present on the occasion, they did not require the girl to obtain a letter of divorce from the second man! — R. Papa replied: At Naresh they married first and then placed [the bride] upon the bridal chair. R. Ashi replied: He acted improperly they, therefore, treated him also improperly, and deprived him of the right of valid betrothal. Said Rabina to R. Ashi: [Your explanation is] satisfactory where the man betrothed [her] with money; what [however, can be said where] he betrothed her by cohabitation? — The Rabbis have declared his cohabitation to be an act of mere fornication. Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: The halachah is in agreement with R. Eliezer; and so did R. Eleazar state: The halachah is in agreement with R. Eliezer. MISHNAH. IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO TWO ORPHANS WHO WERE MINORS AND DIED, COHABITATION OR HALIZAH WITH ONE OF THEM EXEMPTS HER RIVAL. AND THE SAME LAW IS APPLICABLE TO TWO DEAF WOMEN. [IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO] A MINOR AND TO A DEAF WOMAN, COHABITATION WITH ONE OF THEM DOES NOT EXEMPT HER RIVAL. [IF ONE WAS] POSSESSED OF HER FACULTIES AND THE OTHER WAS DEAF, COHABITATION WITH THE FORMER EXEMPTS THE LATTER, BUT COHABITATION WITH THE LATTER DOES NOT EXEMPT THE FORMER. [IF ONE WAS] OF AGE AND THE OTHER A MINOR, COHABITATION WITH THE FORMER EXEMPTS THE LATTER, BUT COHABITATION WITH THE LATTER DOES NOT EXEMPT THE FORMER. GEMARA. Is, however, a deaf woman permitted to perform halizah? Surely, we learned: If a deaf levir submitted to halizah or a deaf sister-in-law performed halizah, or if halizah was performed on a minor, the halizah is invalid! — R. Giddal replied in the name of Rab: [This applies] to COHABITATION. Raba replied: It may be said to apply even to halizah; one referring to a woman who was originally deaf, and the other referring to a woman who was possessed of hearing and became deaf afterwards. The 'woman who was originally deaf', leaves as she entered, but the 'woman who was possessed of hearing and became deaf afterwards' cannot do so, since her inability to recite [the prescribed formulae] acts as an obstacle. Abaye raised an objection against him: Is, however, one who was originally deaf permitted to perform halizah? Surely, we learned: If two brothers, one of whom was in possession of his faculties and the other deaf, were [respectively] married to two strangers, one of whom was in the possession of her faculties and the other deaf, and the deaf [brother] who was the husband of the deaf woman died, what should [his brother who was] in possession of his faculties, the husband of the woman in possession of her faculties, do? He marries her and if he wishes to send her away, he may do so. If the [brother] who was in possession of his faculties, the husband of the woman who was in possession of her faculties, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf woman do? He marries [the widow] and may never divorce her. Does not this apply to a woman who was originally deaf? And yet it was stated that he may only marry
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but not submit to halizah! — No, this refers to a woman who was capable of hearing and became deaf afterwards. Come and hear: If two brothers of sound senses were married to two strangers one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the deaf woman, died, what should the [brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, do? He marries [the deaf widow], and if he wishes to divorce her he may do so. If [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was of sound senses, died, what should the [brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of the woman who was deaf, do? He may either submit to halizah or contract levirate marriage. Are we not to assume that as the man was originally of sound senses so was she originally deaf, and nevertheless it was stated that he may only marry her but may not submit to her halizah! — Is this an argument? Each one may bear its own meaning. An objection was raised against him: If two brothers, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, were married to two sisters, one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, and the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, died, what should [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, do? — [Nothing, since] the widow is released by virtue of her being [the levir's] wife's sister. If [the brother who was] of sound senses, the husband of [the sister who was] of sound senses, died, what should the deaf brother, the husband of the deaf sister, do? He releases his wife by means of a letter of divorce, while his brother's wife is for ever forbidden [to marry again]! And should you reply that here also [it is a case of a man] who was of sound senses and who became afterwards deaf, is [such a man, it may be retorted], in a position to divorce [his wife]? Surely, we learned: If she became deaf, he may divorce her; if she became insane, he may not divorce her. If he became deaf or insane he may never divorce her. Consequently it must be a case of a man who was originally deaf. And since [the man spoken of] is one who was originally deaf, the woman [spoken of in the same context must] also be one who was originally deaf; and, as the sisters were such as were originally deaf, the strangers also [must be such as were] originally deaf; but in the case of the strangers we learned that [the levir] may only marry but may not submit to halizah! The other remained silent. When he visited R. Joseph, the latter said to him: Why did you raise your objections against him from [teachings] which he could parry by replying that the sisters [spoken of are such as were] originally deaf, and that the strangers [are such as were originally] of sound senses who became deaf afterwards? You should rather have raised your objection against him from the following: If two deaf brothers were married to two sisters who were of sound senses, or to two deaf sisters or to two sisters one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf; and so also if two deaf sisters were married to two brothers who were of sound senses, or to two deaf brothers, or to two brothers one of whom was of sound senses and the other deaf, behold these women are exempt from levirate marriage and from halizah. If [however the women] were strangers [the respective levirs] must marry them, and if they wish to divorce them, they may do so. Now, how [is this ruling] to be understood? If it be suggested [that it refers to brothers who were first] of sound senses and who became deaf afterwards, could they [it may be asked] divorce [their wives]? Surely, we learned: If he became deaf or insane he may never divorce her! This ruling must consequently refer to [brothers who were] originally deaf; and since they [are such as were] originally deaf, the women [referred to must] also be [such as were] originally deaf; and it was nevertheless taught: 'If [the women, however], Were strangers [the respective levirs] must marry them', they may thus only marry them but may not submit to their halizah. This, then, presents a refutation of Rabbah! — This is indeed a refutation. A MINOR AND A DEAF WOMAN etc. R. Nahman related: I once found R. Adda b. Ahabah and his son-in-law R. Hana sitting in the market place of Pumbeditha and bandying arguments and [in the course of these they] stated: The ruling, [IF A MAN WAS MARRIED TO] A MINOR AND TO A DEAF WOMAN, COHABITATION WITH ONE OF THEM DOES NOT EXEMPT HER RIVAL applies only to a case where [the widows] became subject to him through a brother of his who was of sound senses, since it is not known to us whether he was more pleased with the minor or whether he was more pleased with the deaf woman; 'whether he was more pleased with the minor' because she would [in due course] reach the age of intelligence or 'whether he was more pleased with the deaf woman' because she was fully grown and in a marriageable condition; if [the widows], however, became subject to him through a deaf brother of his, there is no doubt that he was more pleased with the deaf woman, because she was of matrimonial age and of his kind. But I told them: Even if [the widows] became subject to him through a deaf brother of his [the question of his preference still remains] a matter of doubt. How do they obtain redress? — R. Hisda replied in the name of Rab: [The levir] marries the deaf widow and then releases her by a letter of divorce, while the minor waits until she is of age, when she performs halizah. From this, said R. Hisda, it may be inferred that Rab is of the opinion that a deaf wife is partially acquired, [while concerning] a minor [it is a matter of doubt whether] she is [properly] acquired, or not acquired [at all]; for were it to be suggested that concerning a deaf wife [it is uncertain whether] she is acquired or not acquired [at all and that] a minor is partially acquired, [the question would arise] why [should the levir] marry [the deaf widow] and release her by a letter of divorce?
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