Shevuot — Daf 25b

דרבי יהודה בן בתירא ורבנן קמיפלגי דתנן נשבע לבטל את המצוה ולא ביטל פטור לקיים את המצוה ולא קיים פטור שהיה בדין שיהא חייב כדברי ר' יהודה בן בתירא דאמר רבי יהודה בן בתירא ומה אם הרשות שאינו מושבע עליה מהר סיני הרי הוא חייב עליה מצוה שמושבע עליה מהר סיני אינו דין שיהא חייב עליה

אמרו לו לא אם אמרת בשבועת הרשות שכן עשה בה לאו כהן תאמר בשבועת מצוה שכן לא עשה בה לאו כהן

נימא רב דאמר כר' יהודה בן בתירא ושמואל דאמר כרבנן

אליבא דרבי יהודה בן בתירא כולי עלמא לא פליגי השתא לאו והן לא בעי להבא ולשעבר בעי

כי פליגי אליבא דרבנן שמואל כרבנן ורב כי לא מחייבי רבנן בלאו והן דכתיב (ויקרא ה, ד) להרע או להיטיב בהדיא אבל להבא ולשעבר דמריבויא דקראי אתו מחייבי

מתיב רב המנונא לא אכלתי היום ולא הנחתי תפילין היום משביעך אני ואמר אמן חייב בשלמא לא אכלתי איתיה בלא אוכל אלא לא הנחתי מי איתיה בלא אניח

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה לצדדין קתני לא אכלתי לקרבן לא הנחתי למלקות

מתיב רבא איזו היא שבועת שוא נשבע לשנות את הידוע לאדם ואמר על עמוד של אבן (שהוא במקום פלוני) שהוא של זהב ואמר עולא והוא שניכר לג' בני אדם טעמא דניכר הא לא ניכר עובר משום שבועת ביטוי ואמאי הא אינו ביהא של זהב

הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה ניכר עובר משום שבועת שוא לא ניכר עובר משום שבועת שקר

אמר אביי ומודה רב באומר לחבירו שבועה שאני יודע לך עדות ואשתכח דלא ידע ליה דפטור הואיל וליתיה בכלל שאיני יודע לך עדות

ידעתי ולא ידעתי מחלוקת העדתי ולא העדתי מחלוקת

בשלמא לשמואל דאמר מילתא דליתיה בלהבא לא מחייב עליה לשעבר להכי אפקה רחמנא לשבועת עדות מכלל שבועת ביטוי אלא לרב למאי הלכתא אפקה רחמנא

אמרוה רבנן קמיה דאביי לאיחיובי עליה תרתי

אמר להו תרתי לא מציתו אמריתו דתניא (ויקרא ה, ד) לאחת מאלה לאחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו שתים

ולאביי למאי הלכתא אפקיה רחמנא

לכדתניא בכולן נאמר ונעלם וכאן לא נאמר ונעלם לחייב על המזיד כשוגג

אמרו ליה רבנן לאביי אימא במזיד מיחייב חדא בשוגג מיחייב תרתי

אמר להו לאו היינו דאמרי לאחת אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו שתים ואי במזיד מי איכא תרתי

רבא אמר משום דהוה דבר שבכלל ויצא לידון בדבר החדש אין לך בו אלא חידושו בלבד

מכלל דאביי סבר איתה לשבועה בעולם

והאמר אביי מודה רב באומר לחבירו שבועה שאני יודע לך עדות ואשתכח דלא ידע ליה דפטור הואיל וליתיה באיני יודע לך עדות

הדר ביה אביי מההיא ואיבעית אימא

R. Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis disagree? For we learnt: If he swore to annul a precept, and did not annul it, he is exempt; to fulfil a precept, and did not fulfil it, he is exempt; though logically he should be liable [in the second case] as is the opinion of R. Judah b. Bathyra, [for] R. Judah b. Bathyra said: If, for an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable;1 for a precept, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable! — They replied to him: No! If you say that for an oath on an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has made negative equal to positive;2 but how can you say that for an oath [to fulfil] a precept [he is liable], since [Scripture] in that case, has not made negative equal to positive?3 — Now, shall we say that Rab agrees with R. Judah b. Bathyra,4 and Samuel agrees with the Rabbis?5 — [No!] With reference to R. Judah b. Bathyra's view they do not disagree; since even negative and positive he does not require, will he require future and past?6 But they disagree as to the view of the Rabbis: Samuel agrees with the Rabbis, and Rab [says], the Rabbis do not make him liable [unless it is applicable] in both negative and positive [forms], for it is written distinctly: to do evil, or to do good; but for future and past, which is deduced [merely] from the amplification of the verse,7 they make him liable [even if the oath is not applicable in both future and past].8 R. Hamnuna raised an objection: [We learnt: If a man says,] ‘I did not eat today’, or, ‘I did not put of tefillin today.’ ‘I adjure you;’ and he said, ‘Amen!’ he is liable.9 Granted, ‘I did not eat’ is applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not eat’; but ‘I did not put on [tefillin]’- is this applicable [in the future]: ‘I shall not put on tefillin]’?10 — He himself put the question, and he himself answered it: The Mishnah means it disjunctively:11 ‘I did not eat’, [he is liable] for an offering: ‘I did not put on [tefillin’, he is liable] for stripes.12 Raba raised an objection [We learnt:] What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to man, saying of a pillar of stone that it was of gold.13 And Ulla said: Provided that it was already known to three men [that it was of stone].14 Now, the reason [that he is liable for a vain oath] is because it is known [to three men that it is of stone], but if it were not known [to three men], he would be transgressing an oath of utterance.15 Why? It is not [applicable in the future: ‘I swear] it will be of gold!’16 He himself put the question — and he himself answered it: If it is known, he transgresses a vain oath; if it is not known, he transgresses a false oath. 17 Abaye said: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively]. ‘I do not know any testimony for you.18 [If a man says,] ‘I did know [testimony for you]’, or, ‘I did not know;’ [in this there is] disagreement [between Rab and Samuel].19 ‘I bore witness [for you],’ or, ‘I did not bear witness’: [ in this there is also] disagreement [between them].20 Granted, according to Samuel who says that in a case which is not applicable in the future he is not liable for the past, therefore the Divine Law removed the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance;21 but, according to Rab, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove it?22 — The Rabbis said to Abaye: In order to make him liable for it twice.23 He [however] replied to them: You cannot say [he is liable] twice, for it has been taught: [When he shall be guilty] in one of these things24 — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two. Well then, according to Abaye, for what purpose did the Divine Law remove [the oath of testimony from the category of the oath of utterance in Rab's view]?25 — [For this purpose:] It has been taught: In all of them it is said, and it was hidden [from him];26 but here,27 it is not said, and it was hidden; in order to make him liable28 for wilful29 as for unwitting [transgression]. The Rabbis said to Abaye: Say that for wilful transgression he is liable one;30 for unwitting, two.31 — He replied to them: Is that not what I said: [it is written,] in one [of these things]24 — for one you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two; and if [it refers to] wilful transgression, are there, then, two? 32 Raba said: Because it was a matter included in a generalisation, and it was singled out [from the generalisation] in order to introduce an anomaly; therefore, you cannot add anything to this anomaly.33 — This would imply that Abaye holds that the oath [of utterance] is still in existence.34 But did not Abaye say: Rab admits that he who says to his neighbour, ‘I swear that I know some testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did not know, is exempt, because it is not applicable [negatively], ‘I do not know any testimony for you’!35 — Abaye withdrew from that [statement].36 Or, if you will, you may say, require also that it should be applicable in both past and future forms. negatively, so they hold that it should be possible for it to be applied also for past and future; and when it is inapplicable in the future (e.g., ‘I swear So-and-so will throw a pebble’), it cannot be applied in the past (‘I swear So-and-so has thrown’). future, for he does not even require it to be applicable both positively and negatively, though Scripture states, to do evil or to do good, which implies negative and positive. He therefore certainly does not require the oath to be applicable in both past and future, for this proviso is not definitely stated in the Scriptures. swear So-and-so has thrown a pebble in the sea,’ though it is inapplicable in the future. replied, ‘Amen;’ but he had eaten, or had put on tefillin, he is liable for breaking his oath; for ‘Amen’ in response to an adjuration is equivalent to uttering an oath; Mishnah infra 29b. if an oath is not applicable in the future he is not liable for it even in the past; then why is he liable for ‘I have not put on tefillin’? because it is inapplicable in the future. universally known); and is therefore not a vain oath (the falsity if which is evident to all immediately). oath must be applicable both for positive and negative and (according to Samuel) also for past and future. applicable for negative and positive. If he swears, ‘I did not know any testimony for you,’ and it was found that he did know, he is not liable for huyc ,guca, but for ,usgv ,guca, for refusing to bear witness for his neighbour; and for this he is liable only if he swears falsely before the Beth din; infra 30a. exempt; because it is not applicable in the future: ‘I swear I shall know (or, shall not know) testimony for you,’ for it is outside his control; v. Maharsha, a.l. precept, for which he is exempt. future (and yet imposes liability), could not be deduced from the oath of utterance (ibid. 4), which does not impose liability in the past in a case where the future is inapplicable. applicable in the future. the oath of testimony and oath of utterance. wilful transgression of the oath of testimony. are possible), and not to wilful transgression, for here, two are not possible, and there is no need for Scripture's limitation. of these things that he is liable for only one offering; without this phrase we know it, for the oath of testimony was included in the oath of utterance (for it is also an utterance); but Scripture singled it out from this generalisation in order to teach us that he is liable to bring an offering even for wilful transgression; therefore, since this is exceptional, we cannot make it more exceptional still by declaring him liable to bring two offerings in certain circumstances. things) to deduce that only one offering is brought. According to him, therefore, in a case where the oath of testimony would not apply (e.g., an ineligible witness), he would be liable on account of the oath of utterance. is inapplicable negatively. But if Abaye holds that the oath of testimony is also an oath of utterance, it is possible to find a case where it is applicable negatively, e.g., one who is ineligible as a witness. In such a case, if he says: ‘I swear I know some testimony for you’, he should be liable on account of the oath of utterance, for it is applicable negatively: ‘I swear I do not know any testimony for you;’ and if he does know, he should bring an offering for transgressing the oath of utterance (for the oath of testimony does not apply at all, since he is ineligible as a witness).