Parallel
סנהדרין 62
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
R. Zakkai recited to R. Johanan: If one sacrificed, offered incense, made libations, and prostrated himself [before an idol] in one state of unawareness, he is bound to bring only one sacrifice. Thereupon R. Johanan retorted: 'Go, teach this outside'. [But] R. Abba said, This teaching of R. Zakkai is the subject of a dispute between R. Jose and R. Nathan. For it has been taught: The prohibition of kindling [on the Sabbath] was singled out [from the general prohibition of work] to teach that it is merely the object of a negative precept — This is R. Jose's view. R. Nathan maintained, it was particularly specified to indicate 'separation'. Now, on the view that kindling was specified to teach that it is merely the object of a negative precept, prostration too was singled out for that purpose. Whilst if kindling was singled out to indicate 'separation', prostration was likewise singled out for the same reason. R. Joseph objected: Perhaps R. Jose maintains that kindling was singled out to teach that it is the object of a negative precept, only because he derives 'separation' of different acts of labour from the phrase 'of one of them'. For it has been taught: R. Jose said, [If a soul shall sin through ignorance against any of the commandments of the Lord, concerning things which ought not to be done,] and shall do of one of them: this teaches that sometimes one sacrifice is incurred for 'all of them' [transgressions], whilst at others for each one [of the transgressions] a separate sacrifice must be brought. Whereon, R. Jonathan remarked, What is the reason of R. Jose [i.e., how does he deduce this from the verse]? — Because It is written, and shall do of one of them. This teaches that liability is incurred for one complete act of violation [i.e., 'one']; and for one which is but a part of one [i.e., 'of one']; and for transgressing actions forbidden in themselves [i.e., 'them'], and for actions [the prohibited nature of which is derived] from others [i.e., 'of them']; further, that one transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices [i.e. 'one' = 'them']. whilst many offences may involve but one sacrifice [i.e., 'them' = 'one']. Thus: 'one complete act of violation,' — the writing [on the Sabbath] of Simeon; 'one which is but a part of one,' — the writing of Shem as part of Simeon; 'actions forbidden in themselves' [i.e., 'them'] — the principal acts of labour forbidden on the Sabbath; 'actions [the prohibited nature of which is derived] from others [i.e., "of them"]' — the derivatives; 'One transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices [i.e., "one" = "them"]' — e.g., if one knew that it was the Sabbath [and that some work is forbidden on the Sabbath] — but was unaware that these particular acts are forbidden; 'many offences may involve but one sacrifice [i.e., "them" = "one"]' — e.g., if he was unaware that it was the Sabbath, but knew that his actions are forbidden on the Sabbath. But here [in idol worship]. since separation of actions is not derived from elsewhere, may we not say that all agree [even R. Jose] that prostration was singled out to indicate 'separation'? [But is this so?] May not 'separation' of acts in the case of idolatry too be deduced from 'of one of them'? Thus, 'one complete act of idolatry' — sacrificing [to idols]; a part of one [i.e., 'of one'] — the cutting of one organ. 'Actions forbidden in themselves' [i.e., 'them'] — principal acts; i.e., sacrificing, burning incense, making libations, and prostration; 'actions derived from others' [i.e., 'of them'] the derivatives of these — e.g., if he broke a stick before it; 'one transgression may involve liability for a number of sacrifices,' [i.e., 'one'='them']. e.g., when one knows that it is an idol [and that idolatry is forbidden], but is unaware that the particular acts in question constitute idol-worship; many offences may involve but one sacrifice, [i.e., 'them' = 'one']; if he is unaware that it is an idol, but knows that these acts are forbidden in idol worship? — Now, how is the unawareness of the idolatrous nature of a thing possible? If one [saw an idolatrous shrine,] thought it to be a synagogue, and bowed down to it? Surely his heart was to heaven! But it must mean that he saw a royal statue and bowed down to it. Now, if he accepted it as a god, he is a deliberate sinner; whilst if not, he has committed no idolatry at all. Hence it must surely mean that he worshipped it idolatrously through love or fear. Now, this interpretation [of the phrase 'of one of them'] is possible on Abaye's view that a penalty is incurred for this. But on Raba's view that there is no liability, what can you say? Hence you will have to explain it that his inadvertency arose through his declaring that idolatry is permissible. But on that assumption you may solve the problem which Raba propounded to R. Nahman, viz., 'What if one forgot both? [Now on that assumption] you may deduce that he is liable only for one sacrifice? — That causes no difficulty: then solve it! But canst thou apply this verse to idolatry? In this chapter, for the sin of an anointed High priest a bullock is prescribed; of a chief, a he-goat; and of a private individual, a she-goat or a lamb; whilst with respect to idolatry we have learnt: They agree that his sacrifice is a she-goat, as that of a private individual. There is nothing more to be said about the matter. When R. Samuel b. Judah came, he said:
—
The Master said: 'The Sabbath is more stringent than other precepts, in that if one did two acts of work etc.' How so? Shall we say that he reaped and ground [corn]? Then an analagous violation of other precepts would be the partaking of forbidden fat and blood — but in both cases, two penalties are incurred! But how is it possible in the case of other precepts that only one liability is incurred? E.g., if one ate forbidden fat twice; then by analogy, the Sabbath was desecrated by reaping twice — but in each case, only one liability is incurred! Therefore R. Johanan said to him? 'Go, teach it outside!' But what is the difficulty? Perhaps it can be explained after all as referring to reaping and grinding. whilst 'this is not so in the case of other precepts' refers to idolatry, and in accordance with the dictum of R. Ammi, who said: If one sacrificed, burnt incense, and made libations [to an idol] in one state of unawareness, only one penalty is incurred [though a number of services were performed]! — This cannot be explained as referring to idolatry, because the second clause states: 'Other precepts are more stringent than the Sabbath, for in their case, if an injunction was unwittingly and unintentionally violated, atonement must be made.' Now, how is an unwitting and unintentional transgression of idolatry possible? If one thought it [sc. an idolatrous shrine] to be a synagogue, and bowed down to it — but his heart was to heaven! But it must mean that he saw a royal statue, and bowed down to it; now, if he accepted it as a god, he is a deliberate sinner; whilst if he did not accept it as a god, he has not committed idolatry at all. Hence it must mean that he worshipped it idolatrously through love or fear. Now this agrees with Abaye's view that a penalty is incurred; but on Raba's view that there is no liability, what can you say? You will therefore explain that his inadvertency arose through his declaring that idolatry is permissible. Then 'this is not so in the case of the Sabbath' will mean that there is no liability at all. But this cannot be so, for when Raba propounded to R. Nahman, 'What if one is unaware of both [i.e. that it is the Sabbath, and that labour on the Sabbath is forbidden],' his problem was whether one sacrifice is incurred or two [one for each act of work]; but none maintain that he is entirely exempt? What difficulty is this! Perhaps after all, it ought be said, the first clause [dealing with the greater severity of the Sabbath] refers to idolatry, whilst the second treats of other precepts; the unwitting and unintentional transgression of which consisted of thinking that [melted forbidden fat] was spittle, which he swallowed. [For this, liability is incurred,] which is not so with regard to the Sabbath, there being no liability [in an analogous case, e.g.,] if one intended lifting something detached from the soil, but accidently tore out a plant from the earth, he is exempt from a penalty. Now, this is in accordance with R. Nahman's dictum in Samuel's name, viz., He who violates the injunction of forbidden fat or consanguineous relationship whilst intending to do something else is liable to a penalty, since he derived pleasure thereby. But he who mistakenly did a forbidden act on the Sabbath whilst intending to do another is free from penalty — because the Torah prohibited only a calculated action. But R. Johanan [who said, 'Go, teach it outside'.] was consistent with his attitude [elsewhere], that two clauses of a Mishnah must not be interpreted as referring each to different circumstances — for R. Johanan said: He who will explain to me the Mishnah of 'a barrel' to agree with one Tanna entirely, I shall carry his clothes for him to the baths. To revert to the main text:
—