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פסחים 62
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
differ in this verse: And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him: ‘for him’, but not for his companion. Rabbah holds, His companion must be like himself: just as he is capable of atonement, so must his companion be capable of atonement, thus excluding this uncircumcised person, who is not capable of atonement. But R. Hisda holds, This uncircumcised person too, since he is subject to the obligation, he is [also] subject to atonement, since if he wishes he can make himself fit. Yet does R. Hisda accept [the argument of] ‘since’? Surely it was stated, If one bakes [food] on a Festival for [use on] a weekday. — R. Hisda said: He is flagellated; Rabbah said: He is not flagellated. ‘Rabbah said, He is not flagellated’: We say, Since if guests visited him, it would be fit for him, [on the Festival itself]. it is fit for him now too. ‘R. Hisda said, He is flagellated’: We do not say, ‘since’. As for Rabbah, it is well, [and] he is not self contradictory: here [in the case of circumcision], an action is wanting, whereas there an action is not wanting. But R. Hisda is self-contradictory? — I will tell you: when does R. Hisda reject [the argument of] ‘since’? [where it leads] to [greater] leniency; [but where it results] in stringency, he accepts it. Mar Zutra son of R. Mari said to Rabina: [The Baraitha] teaches: ‘since uncircumcision disqualifies, and uncleanness disqualifies, [then] just as uncleanness, part uncleanness was not made tantamount to entire uncleanness, so uncircumcision, part uncircumcision was not made tantamount to entire uncircumcision. How is this uncleanness meant? Shall we say, it means uncleanness of the person, and what is meant by, ‘part uncleanness was not made tantamount to entire uncleanness’? That if there are four or five unclean persons and four or five clean persons, the unclean do not disqualify [the Paschal lamb] for the clean. But then in the case of uncircumcision too they do not disqualify, for we learned, FOR CIRCUMCISED AND UNCIRCUMCISED . . . IT IS FIT: how then is uncleanness different, that he is certain about it, and how is uncircumcision different, that he is doubtful? Hence it must refer to uncleanness of the flesh, and what is meant by, ‘part uncleanness was not made tantamount to entire uncleanness’? For where one of the limbs becomes unclean, that which becomes unclean we burn, while the others we eat. To what have you [thus] referred it? To uncleanness of the flesh! Then consider the sequel: ‘you judge that which does not apply to all sacrifices by that which does not apply to all sacrifices, hence let not time [dis]prove it, since it applies to all sacrifices’. Now what does ‘uncleanness mean? Shall we say, uncleanness of the flesh, — why does it not apply to all sacrifices? Hence it is obvious that it refers to uncleanness of person, and what does ‘it does not apply to all sacrifices’ mean? For whereas in the case of all [other] sacrifices an uncircumcised person and an unclean person can send their sacrifices, in the case of the Passover offering an uncircumcised person and an unclean person cannot send their Passover offerings. Thus the first clause refers to uncleanness of the flesh, while the second clause refers to uncleanness of the person? — Yes, answered he to him, he argues from the designation of uncleanness. Alternatively, the sequel too refers to the uncleanness of flesh. Then what is [meant by] ‘it does not apply to all sacrifices’? [It means this], for whereas in the case of all [other] sacrifices, whether the fat is defiled while the flesh remains [clean], or the flesh is defiled while the fat remains [clean], he [the officiating priest] sprinkles the blood; in the case of the Passover offering, if the fat is defiled while the flesh remains [clean], he sprinkles the blood; but if the flesh is defiled while the fat remains [clean], he must not sprinkle the blood. To what have you referred it: to uncleanness of the flesh? Then consider the final clause: ‘you judge a thing which was not freed from its general interdict by a thing which was not freed from its general interdict, hence let not uncleanness disprove it, seeing that it was freed from its general interdict.’ In which [case]? Shall we say.
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in the case of uncleanness of the flesh; where was it permitted? Hence it obviously refers to uncleanness of the person, and where was it permitted? In the case of a community? Thus the first clause refers to uncleanness of flesh, while the second clause refers to the uncleanness of the person? — Yes: he argues from the designation of uncleanness. Alternatively, the whole refers to uncleanness of the flesh; and [as to the question,] where was it permitted? [It was] in [the case of] the uncleanness of the Paschal lamb. For we learned: The Paschal lamb which comes [if offered] in uncleanness is eaten in uncleanness, for at the very outset it did not come for [aught] except to be eaten. R. Huna son of R. Joshua raised an objection: If a Paschal lamb has passed its year and he [its owner] slaughtered it at its own time for its own purpose; and similarly, when a man kills other [sacrifices] as a Passover offering in its [own] time, — R. Eliezer disqualifies [it]; while R. Joshua declares it fit. Thus the reason [that R. Eliezer disqualifies it] is that it is in its own time, but [if it were slaughtered] at a different time it is fit; yet why so? Let us say, Since he disqualifies [it] in its own time, he also disqualifies it at a different time? — Said R. Papa. There it is different, because Scripture saith, Then ye shall say, The sacrifice of the Lord's passover it is: let it retain its own nature: neither may it be [slaughtered] in the name of other [sacrifices], nor may others [be slaughtered] in its name; in its time when it is disqualified [if slaughtered] in the name of others, others are disqualified [if slaughtered] in its name; at a different time, when it is fit [if slaughtered] in the name of others, others are fit [if slaughtered] in its name. R. Simlai came before R. Johanan [and] requested him, Let the Master teach me the Book of Genealogies. Said he to him, Whence are you? — He replied, From Lod. And where is your dwelling? In Nehardea. Said he to him, We do not discuss it either with the Lodians or with the Nehardeans, and how much more so with you, who are from Lod and live in Nehardea! But he urged him, and he consented, Let us learn it in three months, he proposed. [Thereupon] he took a clod and threw it at him, saying, If Beruriah, wife of R. Meir [and] daughter of R. Hanina b. Teradion, who studied three hundred laws from three hundred teachers in [one] day, could nevertheless not do her duty in three years, yet you propose [to do it] in three months! As he was going he said to him, Master, What is the difference between [a Passover sacrifice which is offered both] for its own purpose and for a different purpose, and [one that is offered both] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it? — Since you are a scholar, he answered him, come and I will tell you. [When it is killed] for its own purpose and for another purpose, its disqualification is in [respect of] itself; [when he kills it] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, its disqualification is not in [respect of] itself; [when it is] for its own purpose and for another purpose, it is impossible to distinguish its prohibition; [when it is] for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is possible to distinguish its interdict. [Sacrificing] for its own purpose and for another purpose applies to the four services; for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, does not apply to the four services. [The disqualification of sacrificing] for its own purpose and for another purpose applies to the community as to an individual; for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, does not apply to the community as to an individual. R. Ashi said: [That] its disqualification is intrinsic and [that] it is impossible to distinguish its prohibition are [one and] the same thing. For why does he say [that] its disqualification is intrinsic? Because it is impossible to distinguish its prohibition. Rami the son of Rab Judah said: Since the day that the Book of Genealogies was hidden, the strength of the Sages has been impaired and the light of their eyes has been dimmed. Mar Zutra said, Between ‘Azel’ and ‘Azel’ they were laden with four hundred camels of exegetical interpretations! It was taught: Others say, If he put the circumcised before the uncircumcised, it is fit; the uncircumcised before the circumcised, it is disqualified. Wherein does [the case where he put] circumcised before uncircumcised differ, that it is fit, — because we require [them to be] all uncircumcised: then [where he put] the uncircumcised before the circumcised too, we require all [to be] uncircumcised, which is absent?
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