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מנחות 17
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
The keen intellects of Pumbeditha said, An intention which makes piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning renders the offering piggul. And this is so even according to the Rabbis who ruled that an intention which makes piggul expressed during the service of half the mattir does not render piggul, for that is their ruling only in the case where he expressed an intention [which makes piggul] about the remainder [of the meal-offering], the frankincense, however, remaining unaffected; but in this case where he expressed an intention [which makes piggul] about the frankincense, it is as though he had expressed the intention during the service of the whole mattir. Raba said, We have also learnt to the same effect: This is the general rule: If one took the handful or put it into the vessel or brought it nigh, or burnt it, intending to eat a thing that it is usual to eat or to burn a thing that it is usual to burn, outside its proper place, the offering is invalid but the penalty of kareth is not incurred; but if [he intended the like] outside its proper time, the offering is piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred. Now presumably the service of burning is similar to the other [services], and as with the others [the intention which makes piggul may be] either concerning the eating [of the remainder] or concerning the burning [of the frankincense], so with the service of burning [the intention which makes piggul may be] either concerning the eating [of the remainder] or concerning the burning [of the frankincense]! — No; with the others the intention may be either concerning the eating or concerning the burning, but with the service of burning the intention can be only concerning the eating but not concerning the burning. R. Menasiah b. Gadda was once sitting before Abaye and recited the following in the name of R. Hisda: An intention which makes piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render the offering piggul. And this is so even according to R. Meir who ruled that an intention which makes piggul expressed during the service of half the mattir renders piggul; for that is his ruling only where the intention expressed was concerning the remainder, since it is the handful that renders the remainder permissible; in this case, however, since the handful does not render the frankincense permissible, it cannot make the offering piggul. Thereupon Abaye said to him, Tell me, Sir, was that [statement] in the name of Rab? He replied, Yes. And it has been so reported: R. Hisda said in the name of Rab, An intention which makes piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render the offering piggul. R. Jacob b. Abba said in the name of Abaye, We have also learnt the same: IF HE SLAUGHTERED ONE OF THE LAMBS INTENDING TO EAT A PART OF IT ON THE MORROW, THAT [LAMB] IS PIGGUL BUT THE OTHER [LAMB] IS VALID; IF HE INTENDED TO EAT OF THE OTHER [LAMB] ON THE MORROW, BOTH ARE VALID. Now what is the reason? It is, is it not, because [the one lamb], not being the mattir of the other, cannot make the offering piggul by reason of an intention concerning [that other]? — No, there the reason is because they are not joined in one vessel; here, however, since they are joined in the one vessel, they are considered as one. R. Hamnuna said, The following was taught me by R. Hanina and is equal in worth to me to all my studies: If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow], [and] to eat the remainder on the morrow, the offering is piggul. What is it that he teaches us? If he teaches us that an intention which makes piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning renders the offering piggul, then he should [only] have said, If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow]. And if he teaches us that an intention which makes piggul expressed during the service of half the mattir renders piggul, then he should have [only] said, If he burnt the handful intending to eat the remainder on the morrow. And if he teaches us both these rules, then he should have said, If he burnt the handful intending to burn the frankincense [on the morrow] and to eat the remainder on the morrow! — R. Adda b. Ahabah said, Actually he is of the opinion that an intention which makes piggul expressed during one service of burning concerning another service of burning does not render piggul, and he holds also that an intention which makes piggul expressed during the service of half the mattir does not render piggul, yet in this case it is different since the wrongful intention has spread over the entire meal-offering. A Tanna once recited before R. Isaac b. Abba: If he burnt the handful intending to eat the remainder [on the morrow], all hold it to be piggul. But surely this is a matter of dispute? — Rather render: All hold it to be invalid. But could he not have corrected himself thus: It is piggul, that is, according to R. Meir? — The Tanna evidently was taught the ruling ‘all hold’, and he confused in his mind ‘piggul’ with ‘invalid’; but he would not confuse ‘it is [piggul]’ with ‘all hold’. MISHNAH. IF HE TOOK THE HANDFUL FROM THE MEAL-OFFERING INTENDING TO EAT A THING THAT IT IS NOT USUAL TO EAT OR TO BURN A THING THAT IT IS NOT USUAL TO BURN, THE OFFERING IS VALID; BUT R. ELIEZER DECLARES IT TO BE INVALID. IF HE INTENDED TO EAT LESS THAN AN OLIVE'S BULK OF A THING THAT IT IS USUAL TO EAT, OR TO BURN LESS THAN AN OLIVE'S BULK OF A THING THAT IT IS USUAL TO BURN, THE OFFERING IS VALID. IF HE INTENDED TO EAT A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK AND TO BURN A HALF-OLIVE'S BULK, THE OFFERING IS VALID, FOR EATING AND BURNING CANNOT BE RECKONED TOGETHER. GEMARA. R. Assi said in the name of R. Johanan, What is the reason for R. Eliezer s view? Because the verse reads, And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings be at all eaten. The verse here speaks of two ‘eatings’. the ‘eating’ by man and the ‘eating’ by the altar, to inform you that as there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man, so there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually ‘eaten’ by the altar; and furthermore, as there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man in regard to man's eating thereof and concerning what is usually ‘eaten’ by the altar in regard to the altar's ‘eating’ thereof, so there can be a wrongful intention concerning what is usually eaten by man in regard to the altar's ‘eating’ thereof and concerning what is usually ‘eaten’ by the altar in regard to man's eating thereof. And why is this? Because the Divine Law expressed [the burning upon the altar] by the term ‘eating’. And the Rabbis, [what would they say to this]? — The reason why the Divine Law expressed it by the term ‘eating’ was [to teach you]
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that it makes no difference whether the wrongful intention for the altar was expressed by the use of the term ‘eating’ or by use of the term ‘burning. Or [to teach you] that as for eating the quantity of an olive's bulk is essential, so for the burning the quantity of an olive's bulk is essential. The term ‘eating’, however, always means in the usual manner. And R. Eliezer? — If so, [he says], the Divine Law should have stated either he'akol he'akol or ye'akel ye'akel; why does it say he'akol ye'akel? That you may infer two things therefrom. R. Zera said to R. Assi, If this is the reason for R. Eliezer's view, then one should also incur the penalty of kareth? And should you say that this is indeed so, but you yourself have reported in the name of R. Johanan that R. Eliezer admits that one is not thereby liable to kareth! — He replied, Tannaim differ as to the real view of R. Eliezer; some say that it is invalid by Biblical law, others that it is invalid by Rabbinical law only. For it was taught: If one slaughtered an animal-offering intending to drink its blood on the morrow, or to burn its flesh on the morrow, or to eat of the sacrificial portions on the morrow, the offering is valid; but R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid. If he intended to leave some of its blood for the morrow, R. Judah declares it to be invalid. R. Eleazar said, Even in this case, R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid, and the Sages declare it to be valid. Now whose view does R. Judah adopt? Do you say that of the Rabbis? But surely if in the case where the intention expressed is included under the term ‘eating’ the Rabbis declare the offering to be valid, how much more so in this case! It must therefore be that of R. Eliezer. And thereupon R. Eleazar had said, ‘Even in this case, R. Eliezer declares it to be invalid, and the Sages declare it to be valid’. Is not R. Eleazar identical with R. Judah? It must therefore be said that the difference between them is on the question of kareth. The first Tanna is of the opinion that in the case of ‘leaving’ [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only, but in the other cases [R. Eliezer holds that] he is even liable to kareth; whereas R. Eleazar comes to tell us that in both these cases [R. Eliezer holds that] it is invalid only but the penalty of kareth is not incurred! — No, all are of the opinion that there is no penalty of kareth involved; but in this dispute there are three different views. The first Tanna is of the opinion that only in the other cases do they differ, but in the case of ‘leaving’ all agree that it is valid. [
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