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מנחות 14
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
But if you say that they are regarded as two bodies [there], why are they combined [here]? The author of that [Baraitha] is Rabbi. For it was taught: If he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the one loaf [on the morrow], and likewise [he slaughtered] the other lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the other loaf [on the morrow], Rabbi says, I maintain that this offering is valid. Now this is so only because he referred to two halves, but had he referred to an olive's bulk of both [loaves] they would be combined. Whose ruling does Rabbi follow? If you say that of the Rabbis, but [according to them] even though the intention was in respect of one loaf only [both would be piggul]; and if you say that of R. Jose, then our original question confronts us again. It must be that he follows the ruling of the Rabbis, but read not [in the above mentioned Baraitha] ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes piggul with regard to an olive's bulk from both’, but rather ‘unless he expressed an intention which makes piggul with regard to an olive's bulk in both’, even though the intention was only [in respect of an olive's bulk] of one [loaf]. He thus rejects the view of R. Meir who said, A wrongful intention expressed during the service of half the mattir renders the offering piggul; and he teaches us [that it is not so]. If so, why is this introduced by the expression ‘It must be’? If, of course, you would have said that the author of that Baraitha meant from both [loaves] and in both [lambs], adopting thus the view of R. Jose and rejecting the views of R. Meir and the Rabbis, the expression ‘It must be’ would be quite in order. But if you merely say that he adopted the view of the Rabbis, rejecting only the view of R. Meir, why then the expression ‘It must be’? Moreover R. Ashi had raised an objection [against R. Huna from the following]: Come and hear: Rabbi says in the name of R. Jose, If [whilst performing a service outside] he expressed an intention which makes piggul in respect of another service which is performed outside, the offering is piggul, if in respect of another service which is performed inside, it is not piggul. Thus, if whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of sprinkling the blood thereof on the morrow’, it is not piggul, for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed inside. If whilst standing inside he said, ‘Behold I am sprinkling the blood with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, or, ‘of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, it is not piggul for this is an intention expressed whilst serving inside in respect of a service performed outside. If whilst standing outside he said, ‘Behold I am slaughtering with the intention of pouring out the residue of the blood on the morrow’, or ‘of burning the sacrificial portions on the morrow’, it is piggul; for this is an intention expressed whilst serving outside in respect of a service performed outside. Now [in the latter case] where the intention was of pouring out the residue of the blood, what is it that becomes piggul? Should you say that it is the blood that becomes piggul, but does the blood become piggul? Behold we have learnt: For the following things the penalty of piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, the frankincense, the incense-offering, the meal-offering of the priests, the meal-offering offered with the drink-offerings, the meal-offering of the anointed [High] Priest, and the blood! Obviously then it is the flesh that becomes piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the flesh at all R. Jose holds that it nevertheless becomes piggul, how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the [flesh of the] offering! Moreover Rabina had raised an objection [against R. Huna] from the following: Come and hear: if he took out the handful intending to eat the remainder or to burn the handful on the morrow, in this case R. Jose agrees that the offering is piggul and that the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. Now where the intention was to burn the handful, what is it that becomes piggul? Should you say that it is the handful that becomes piggul, but does the handful become piggul? Behold we have learnt: For the following things the penalty of piggul is not incurred: viz., the handful, etc. Obviously then it is the remainder that becomes piggul. Now if in that case where no intention was expressed with regard to the remainder at all
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It nevertheless becomes piggul how much more so in this case where he actually expressed an intention with regard to the [flesh of the] offering! — Rather said R. Johanan, This is the reason for R. Jose's opinion: Scripture regards [the two loaves] as one body and Scripture also regards them as two bodies. As one body-since one cannot be offered without the other; and as two bodies-since the Divine Law ordains that each [loaf] shall be prepared separately. Therefore if they were reckoned as one, they are thereby united, since Scripture regards them as one body; if they were separated, they remain thus separated, since Scripture regards them also as two bodies. R. Johanan raised the following questions: What is the position if one expressed an intention which makes piggul in respect of the loaves of the thank-offering? or in respect of the baked meal-offering? — Thereupon R. Tahlifa the Palestinian recited to him the following teaching: You must say the same of the loaves of the Thank-offering, and you must say the same of the baked meal-offering. Our Rabbis taught: If during the slaughtering he intended to eat a half-olive's bulk [of the flesh after its prescribed time], and during the sprinkling [of the blood] he also intended to eat a half-olive's bulk [after its prescribed time], the offering is piggul, for the slaughtering and the sprinkling can be reckoned together as one. Some explained that this applied only to the slaughtering and the sprinkling since they are both mattirin, but not to the receiving and the bringing nigh; whilst others explained that this applied even to these services which are not consecutive, and all the more to those services which are consecutive. This surely cannot be, for Levi has taught: The four services, viz., slaughtering, receiving, bringing nigh, and sprinkling cannot be reckoned together so as to render piggul! — Raba answered, There is no contradiction: the one represents the view of Rabbi, the other the view of the Rabbis. For it was taught: If he slaughtered the lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the one loaf [on the morrow], and likewise [he slaughtered] the other lamb intending to eat a half-olive's bulk of the other loaf [on the morrow], Rabbi says, I maintain that this offering is valid. Said Abaye to him, perhaps Rabbi held that view only in the case of a [wrongful intention expressed during] half the mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, but he might not uphold that view in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating? Raba son of R. Hanan then said to Abaye, But if [as you say,] Rabbi holds that in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, [the offering is piggul], then he should declare the offering piggul even in the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] half the mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating, as a precautionary measure against the case of [a wrongful intention expressed during] the whole mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating; for R. Jose adopts such a precautionary measure, and the Rabbis also adopt such a precautionary measure. ‘R. Jose adopts such a precautionary measure’, as we have learnt: [If he intended] to burn the frankincense thereof on the morrow, R. Jose says, it is invalid, but the penalty of kareth is not incurred on account thereof; but the Rabbis say, it is piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof. ‘And the Rabbis also adopt such a precautionary measure’, as we have learnt: If he expressed an intention which makes piggul during the [burning of the] handful and not during the [burning of the] frankincense, or during the [burning of the] frankincense and not during the [burning of the] handful, R. Meir says, It is piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred; but the Rabbis say, The penalty of kareth is not incurred unless the intention which makes piggul was expressed during the service of the whole of the mattir. — He replied, There is no comparison between the cases. I grant you that there R. Jose declares invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was in respect] of the handful of frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was in respect] of the handful of the meal-offering; and also that the Rabbis declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful of the sinner's meal-offering; and that they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the frankincense of the dishes. And in the case of the lambs too, they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the slaughtering] of one lamb as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the slaughtering] of the other lamb too; and they declare invalid the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of one dish of frankincense as a precautionary measure against the case [where the wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the other dish too. In our case, however, is there ever a case of [a wrongful intention expressed during the service of] half a mattir in respect of half [the minimum quantity for] eating [that renders piggul], so that we should take here precautionary measures? Indeed it stands to reason that this is the explanation of the view of the Rabbis, for in the next clause [of that Mishnah] it states: The Rabbis, however, agree with R. Meir that if it was a sinner's meal-offering or a meal-offering of jealousy, and he expressed an intention which makes piggul during the burning of the handful, the offering is piggul and the penalty of kareth is incurred on account thereof, since the handful [alone] is the [entire] mattir. Now why was it necessary for this [last expression] to be stated? It is quite obvious, for is there then [in these cases] any other mattir? We must therefore say that it teaches us this: namely, the reason [why the Rabbis declare the offering invalid in the case where a wrongful intention was expressed during the burning] of the handful [of the ‘ordinary meal-offering] is that there is the handful of the sinner's meal-offering which is similar to it [and which is a real case of piggul]. MISHNAH. IF ONE OF THE [TWO] LOAVES OR ONE OF THE [TWO] ROWS [OF THE SHEWBREAD] BECAME UNCLEAN, R. JUDAH SAYS, BOTH MUST BE TAKEN OUT TO THE PLACE OF BURNING, FOR THE OFFERING OF THE CONGREGATION MAY NOT BE DIVIDED. BUT THE SAGES SAY, THE UNCLEAN [IS TREATED] AS UNCLEAN, BUT THE CLEAN MAY BE EATEN. GEMARA. R. Eleazar said, They differ only [in the case where one loaf became unclean] before the sprinkling of the blood, but [where it became unclean] after the sprinkling, all agree that the unclean one is treated as unclean and the clean one may be eaten. And [in the case where one became unclean] before the sprinkling, on what principle do they differ? — R. Papa said, They differ as to whether the [High Priest's] plate renders [the offering] acceptable [where] the eatable portions [had become unclean]. [
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