Makkot — Daf 9a

שאין בה שוה פרוטה דא"ר אמי א"ר יוחנן הכהו הכאה שאין בה שוה פרוטה לוקה ולא מקשינן הכאה לקללה:

חוץ מעל ידי גר תושב וכו': אלמא גר תושב עובד כוכבים הוא אימא סיפא גר תושב גולה ע"י גר תושב אמר רב כהנא לא קשיא כאן בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב כאן בגר תושב שהרג ישראל

איכא דרמי קראי אהדדי כתיב (במדבר לה, טו) לבני ישראל ולגר ולתושב בתוכם תהיינה שש הערים וכתיב (במדבר לה, יב) והיו לכם הערים למקלט לכם ולא לגרים אמר רב כהנא ל"ק כאן בגר תושב שהרג ישראל כאן בגר תושב שהרג גר תושב

ורמינהי לפיכך גר ועובד כוכבים שהרגו נהרגין קתני גר דומיא דעובד כוכבים מה עובד כוכבים לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה ולא שנא דקטל דלאו בר מיניה נהרג אף גר לא שנא דקטל בר מיניה ולא שנא קטל דלאו בר מיניה נהרג

אמר רב חסדא ל"ק כאן שהרגו דרך ירידה כאן שהרגו דרך עלייה דרך ירידה דישראל גלי איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות דרך עלייה דישראל פטור הוא נהרג

א"ל רבא ולאו ק"ו הוא ומה דרך ירידה דישראל גלי איהו נמי סגי ליה בגלות דרך עלייה דישראל פטור איהו נהרג

אלא אמר רבא באומר מותר א"ל אביי אומר מותר אנוס הוא א"ל שאני אומר אומר מותר קרוב למזיד הוא

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאיתמר כסבור בהמה ונמצא אדם כנעני ונמצא גר תושב רבא אומר חייב אומר מותר קרוב למזיד הוא רב חסדא אומר פטור אומר מותר אנוס הוא

איתיביה רבא לרב חסדא (בראשית כ, ג) הנך מת על האשה אשר לקחת מאי לאו בידי אדם

לא בידי שמים דיקא נמי דכתיב (בראשית כ, ו) מחטוא לי

ולטעמיך (בראשית לט, ט) וחטאתי לאלהים לאלהים ולא לאדם אלא דינו מסור לאדם הכא נמי דינו מסור לאדם

איתיביה אביי לרבא (בראשית כ, ד) הגוי גם צדיק תהרוג התם כדקא מהדרי עלויה (בראשית כ, ז) ועתה השב אשת האיש כי נביא הוא

which is estimated [in damages] at less than a perutah, as R. Ammi, reporting R. Johanan, said that if one struck a [wounding] blow worth [in damages] less than a perutah, the assailant receives a flogging1 [and that no analogy between battery and imprecation is admitted].2 SAVE NOT FOR A SOJOURNING — STRANGER, etc. This implies that the sojourning-stranger is treated as a heathen [in regard to the law of refuge];3 but then read the latter clause: A SOJOURNING-STRANGER GOES INTO BANISHMENT FOR [ANOTHER] SOJOURNING-STRANGER [in accordance with the law of refuge]?4 — Said R. Kahana: It is not difficult [to explain the seeming discrepancy]; the last clause provides for a sojourning-stranger who had slain [inadvertently] another sojourning — stranger, whereas the previous clause provides for a sojourning-stranger who had slain an Israelite. Some throw into contrast one [Scriptural] text against another. It is written: For the children of Israel and for the stranger and for the sojourner among them, shall these six cities be for refuge . . .5 And again it is written: [Speak unto the children of Israel . . .] and the cities shall be unto you [for refuge from the avenger]6 — which implies for ‘you’ [exclusively] but not for strangers? — Said R. Kahana: It is not difficult [to explain], as one text [verse twelve] provides for a sojourning — stranger who killed an Israelite,7 while the other text [verse fifteen] provides for a sojourning-stranger who killed another sojourning-stranger.8 [As against this interpretation,] some cited [in contrast] the following: ‘Therefore, stranger and heathen who killed [a person]9 are killed.’ In this quotation ‘stranger’ and ‘heathen’ are taken together as of the same category,10 that is to say, that just as in the case of a ‘heathen’ [killing someone] it made no difference whether he killed a person of his own status or not of his own status, he was slain: so in the case of a ‘stranger’, it likewise made no difference whether he killed a person of his own status or not of his own status, he would be slain? — Said R. Hisda: It is not difficult to explain [the seeming discrepancy in the texts],11 as one12 provides for a case where death results from a downward movement, whereas the other13 [provides for a case] where it results from an upward movement.14 In the case of a downward motion, where an Israelite would go into banishment, it is enough if the ‘stranger’ too is allowed to go into banishment, whereas in the case of an upward motion, where an Israelite is acquitted, the [sojourning] ‘stranger’ dies for it. 15 Said Raba: But does not an argument a fortiori demand a contrary conclusion? Why, if in a death by a downward motion, where an Israelite would go into banishment, it is considered enough for a ‘stranger’ also to go into banishment, would you,in the case of death by an upward motion, where an Israelite is acquitted, insist on a ‘stranger’ being killed? — But, said Raba, [the severity is explicable] where the ‘stranger’ thought he had a right to kill. Said Abaye to him: If he thought that he had a right to kill, he is himself a victim of misadventure. Answered Raba: [Indeed, he is] for I consider anyone doing wrong thinking that it is permissible as next to a deliberate offender. And they both maintain that view [consistently] as both follow their own respective principles as expressed elsewhere. For it has been stated: Supposing one thought it was a beast and it happened to be a human being; a heathen and it happened to be a sojourning-stranger, Raba says he is liable [and R. Hisda says he is acquitted. Raba says he is liable]16 for one who thought he had a right to kill is next to a deliberate offender17 and R. Hisda says he is acquitted because one who thought he had a right to kill was [himself] a victim of a misadventure. Thereupon Raba referred R. Hisda to the [Scriptural] text, Behold, thou shalt die, because of the woman whom thou hast taken; for she is a man's wife.18 What else does it imply but liability to human execution [for his error]? — No, liability to Heaven's displeasure, and note carefully the context, And I also withheld thee from sinning against Me.19 Accepting your interpretation, how then would you explain this text, How then can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?20 Does it mean only [a sin] against God and not [an offence] against man?21 It can only mean that his trial is left to human authority, and the same is implied in the former text, viz., that the trial is left to human authority. Abaye then referred Raba to [Abimelech's plea], Lord, wilt Thou slay even a righteous nation?22 — But you have there the answer to that plea [of innocence], Now therefore restore the man's wife, for he is a prophet.23 compensation for injuries. If the injury is too paltry for monetary compensation, the assailant is flogged. Cf. Keth. 32b. is raised (in Sanh. 85a) in this way. If a son curses his condemned father who is on his way to execution, he is technically exempt although cursing a parent is a capital offence, (v. Ex. XXI, 17), as only cursing a man who did not act according to the usages ‘of thy people’. Is he also exempt (by analogy with imprecation) if be struck his condemned father a wounding blow? V. Ex. XXI, 15. The analogy between the two might be suggested by the close juxtaposition of verses 15 and 17 (yet divided by verse 16). R. Johanan is reported to have decided against the analogy, and similarly, though the imprecation of a Cuthean is not punishable, battery is. is afforded no refuge. which follows. sojourner. The problem arises from the ambiguous use of the terms rd ‘stranger’ and cau, ‘sojourner’. ‘Stranger’ means (a) an idolatrous newcomer, or (b) one who, after a while, discontinues idolatry, and leads a moral and honourable life; he is sometimes called ‘a son of Noah’. After prolonged residence he may become (c) a quasi, unavowed convert: he is then a ‘sojourning-stranger, and finally, (d) the avowed and formally accepted convert, the ‘righteous stranger’ esm rd who is an Israelite in the eyes of the law. An Israelite offender is naturally treated according to his native (Biblical) code; but if an Israelite is the victim, how is the non — Israelite offender to be legally treated, according to Biblical law or his own? There are fundamental differences, e.g., in a criminal case of incest or murder, the Israelite law demands two Jewish witnesses, at least; their forewarning to the offender; twenty-three judges, etc., which are not requisite in the non-Jewish code where one witness or even (it is surmised) the judges’ personal knowledge (without other witnesses) is enough to condemn, etc.; v. Sanh. 57 ff. Maim. Yad Melakim VIII, 10 ff. IX, 14 ff. with death. explanation (and reading) that trial is left to God because there were no witnesses to prove his guilt, otherwise it would be dealt with by human authority.