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כתובות 71
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
[a repetition of] the incident of Beth Horon. R. JUDAH SAID: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH etc. Is not this the same ruling as that of the first Tanna? — Abaye replied: He came to teach us [the law concerning] a priest's wife. Raba replied: The difference between them is a full month and a defective month. Rab stated: This was taught only in the case of a man who specified [the period of the prohibition], but where he did not specify, he must divorce her immediately and give her the kethubah. Samuel, however, stated: Even where the period was not specified [the husband] need not divorce her, since it is possible that he might discover some reason for [the remission of] his vow. But surely they had once been in dispute upon this principle; for have we not learned, 'If a man forbade his wife by vow to have intercourse, Beth Shammai ruled: [She must consent to the deprivation for] two weeks; Beth Hillel ruled: [Only for] one week'; and Rab stated, 'They differ only in the case of a man who specified [the period of abstention] but where he did not specify the period he must divorce her forthwith and give her the kethubah', and Samuel stated, 'Even where the period had not been specified the husband need not divorce her, since it might be possible for him to discover some reason for [the annulment of] his vow'? — [Both disputes were] necessary. For if [their views] had been expressed in the former case it might have been assumed that only in that case did Rab maintain his view, since [the appointment] of a steward is not possible, but that in the latter case where [the appointment] of a steward is possible, he agrees with Samuel. And if [their views] had been stated in the latter case it might have been assumed that only in that case did Samuel maintain his view, since the appointment of a steward is possible. but that in the former case he agrees with Rab. [Hence both statements were] necessary. We learned: IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. Now according to Rab [there is no contradiction since] the latter may apply to a man who did not specify [the period of the prohibition] and the former to a man who did specify [the period]. According to Samuel, however, a contradiction arises! — Here we are dealing with a case, for instance, where the woman made the vow and he confirmed it; R. Meir holding the opinion that [the husband] had himself put his finger between her teeth. But does R. Meir hold the principle, 'He has himself put his finger between her teeth'? Surely it was taught: If a woman made the vow of a nazirite and her husband heard of it and did not annul it, she, said R. Meir and R. Judah, has thereby put her own finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing'. she may be divorced without [receiving] her kethubah. R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: He has put his finger between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if he said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the habit of vowing', he may divorce her but must give her the kethubah! — Reverse [the views]: R. Meir and R. Judah said: 'He has put' and R. Jose and R. Eleazar said: 'She has put'. But is R. Jose of the opinion that it is she who put? Have we not learned: R. Jose ruled: [THIS APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN? — Read: R. Meir and R. Jose said, 'He has put'; R. Judah and R. Eleazar said, 'She has put'. But does R. Judah uphold the principle of 'She put'? Have we not learned: R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY? — Read: R. Meir and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put'. and R. Eleazar said, 'She put'. And should you find [some ground] for insisting that the names must appear in pairs, then read: R. Meir and R. Eleazar said, 'She put', and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He put'; and this anonymous Mishnah is not in agreement with R. Meir. Is R. Jose, however, of the opinion that [THIS APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN; from which it is evident that a husband has the right to annul [such vows]? This, surely, is incongruous [with the following]. These are the vows which a husband may annul: Vows which involve an affliction of soul [as, for instance, if a woman said, 'I vow not to enjoy the pleasure of bathing] should I bathe' [or] 'I swear that I shall not bathe', [or again, 'I vow not to make use of adornments] should I make use of an adornment', [or] 'I swear that I shall not make use of any adornments'. R. Jose said: These are not regarded as vows involving an affliction of soul; and the following are vows that involve an affliction of soul: '[I swear] that I shall not eat meat' or 'that I shall not drink wine' or 'that I shall not adorn myself
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with coloured garments'! — Here we are dealing with matters affecting their intimate relations. This explanation is satisfactory according to him who maintains that a husband may annul [vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations. — What, however, can be said [in explanation] according to him who maintains that a husband may not annul [such vows]? For it was stated: [As to vows on] matters affecting their intimate relations, R. Huna ruled: A husband may annul them; R. Adda b. Ahabah ruled: A husband may not annul them, for we do not find that a fox should die of the dust of his den! — The fact, however, is that we are here dealing with a case, for instance, where she made her marital intercourse dependent upon her use of adornments, by saying. 'The enjoyment of your intercourse shall be forbidden to me should I ever make use of any adornment.' [This explanation] is in agreement with a ruling of R. Kahana. For R. Kahana ruled, [If a woman said to her husband]. 'The enjoyment of my intercourse [shall be forbidden] to you', he may compel her to such intercourse; [if, however, she vowed,] 'The enjoyment of your intercourse [shall be forbidden] to me' he must annul [her vow] because no person is to be fed with a thing that is forbidden to him. But let her not adorn herself and consequently not be forbidden to him! — If so, she would be called, 'The ugly woman'. But then let her adorn herself and be forbidden [intercourse] either for two weeks, according to Beth Shammai or for one week according to Beth Hillel!' — These apply only to a case where he [the husband] has forbidden her by a vow [to have intercourse with him], because [in such circumstances] she thinks 'He may have been angry with me and will later calm down'. Here, however, since she has made the vow and he remained silent, she comes to the conclusion: 'Since he remained silent he must indeed hate me'. R. JOSE RULED: [THIS APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN. What is the TIME LIMIT? — Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: Twelve months. Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R. Johanan replied: Ten years. R. Hisda citing Abimi replied: A festival; for the daughters of Israel adorn themselves on a festival. AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT IS] THIRTY DAYS. Why just THIRTY DAYS? — Abaye replied: Because a prominent woman enjoys the scent of her cosmetics for thirty days. MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHALL NOT GO TO HER FATHER'S HOUSE, AND HE LIVES WITH HER IN THE SAME TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH; BUT IF FOR TWO MONTHS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO THE KETHUBAH. WHERE HE, HOWEVER, LIVES IN ANOTHER TOWN, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL, [BUT IF FOR] THREE FESTIVALS, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHALL NOT VISIT A HOUSE OF MOURNING OR A HOUSE OF FEASTING, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH, BECAUSE THEREBY HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S DOORS] AGAINST HER. IF HE PLEADS, HOWEVER, [THAT HIS ACTION] WAS DUE TO SOME OTHER CAUSE HE IS PERMITTED [TO FORBID HER]. IF HE SAID TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE NO VOW] PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL SO-AND-SO WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME' OR 'WHAT I HAVE TOLD YOU' OR 'THAT YOU SHALL FILL AND POUR OUT ON THE RUBBISH HEAP', HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH. GEMARA. This, surely, is self-contradictory. You said, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL, which implies that if it was for two festivals he must divorce her and give her also her kethubah. But read the concluding clause, [IF FOR] THREE FESTIVALS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH, from which it follows, does it not, that if it was for two only he may keep [her as his wife]? Abaye replied: The concluding clause refers to a priest's wife, and it represents the view of R. Judah. Rabbah b. 'Ulla said: There is no contradiction, for one refers to a woman who was anxious [to visit her parents home] and the other applies to one who was not anxious. Then was I in his eyes as one that found peace, R. Johanan interpreted: like a bride who was found faultless in the house of her father-in-law and she is anxious to go and tell of her success at her paternal home. And it shall be at that day, saith the Lord, that thou shalt call me Ishi, and shalt not call me Ba'ali, R. Johanan interpreted: Like a bride in the house of her father-in-law and not like a bride in her paternal home. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW etc. One can well understand that in respect [of her prohibition to enter] A HOUSE OF FEASTING
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