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כתובות 68
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on the silver [coloured] cloths or on the gold [coloured] ones?' 'It is in view of such cases' [R. Hanina] remarked, 'that R. Eleazar said: Come let us be grateful to the rogues for were it not for then, we would have been sinning every day, for it is said in Scripture, And he cry unto to the Lord against thee, and it be sill unto thee. Furthermore, R. Hiyya b. Rab of Difti taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said, Any one who shuts his eye against charity is like one who worships idols, for here it is written, Beware that there be not a base thought in thy heart etc. [and thine eye will be evil against thy poor brother] and there it is written, Certain base fellows are gone out, as there [the crime is that of] idolatry, so here also [the crime is like that of] idolatry'. Our Rabbis taught: If a man pretends to have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a shrunken leg, he will not pass out from this world before actually coming into such a condition. If a man accepts charity and is not in need of it his end [will be that] he will not pass out of the world before he comes to such a condition. We learned elsewhere: He may not be compelled to sell his house or his articles of service'. May he not indeed? Was it not taught: If he was in the habit of using gold articles he shall now use copper ones? — R. Zebid replied. This is no difficulty. The one refers to the bed and table: the other to cups and dishes. What difference is there in the case of the cups and dishes that they are not [to be sold]? Obviously because he can say, '[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me', [but then, in respect of] a bed and table also, he might say [the cheaper article] is unacceptable to me! — Raba the son of Rabbah replied: [This refers] to a silver strigil. R. Papa replied: There is no difficulty: one [refers to a man] before he came under the obligation of repayment, and the other refers to a man after he had come under the obligation of repayment. MISHNAH. IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT AND THEY ASSIGNED TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ, SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY, RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER. R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND MUST RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. GEMARA. Samuel stated: In respect of the marriage outfit the assessment is to be determined by [the disposition of] the father. All objection was raised: 'The daughters are to be maintained and provided for out of the estate of their father. In what manner? It is not to be said, "Had her father been alive he would have given her such and such a sum" but the estate is valued and she is given [her due share]'. Does not ['provided for' refer to] the marriage outfit? — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: No; [it refers to] her own maintenance. But, surely, it was stated: 'Are to be maintained and provided for'; does not one [of the expressions] refer to the marriage outfit and the other to her own maintenance? — No; the one as well as the other refers to her own maintenance, and yet there is no real difficulty, for one of the expressions refers to food and drink and the other to clothing and bedding. We learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID, SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. Now what is meant by POOR and RICH? If it be suggested that POOR means poor in material possessions, and RICH means rich in such possessions, the inference [should consequently be] that the first Tanna holds the opinion that even when a man was rich and became poor she is given as much as before; but, surely, [it may be objected] he has none [to give]. Must it not then [be concluded that] POOR means poor in mind and RICH means rich in mind, and yet it was stated, THE ESTATE SHOULD RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE]. from which it clearly follows that we are not guided by the assumed disposition [of her father], and this presents an objection against Samuel! He holds the same view as R. Judah. For we learned, R. JUDAH RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND SHOULD RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. [Why], then, [did he not] say, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah'? — If he had said, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah', it might have been assumed [to apply] only [where her father had actually] given her in marriage, since [in that case] he has revealed his disposition, but not [to a case where] he had not given her in marriage, hence he taught us that R. Judah's reason is that we are guided by our assumption [as to whit was her father's disposition], there being no difference whether he had already given her in marriage or whether he had not given her in marriage; the only object he had in mentioning [the case where a father] gave her in marriage was to let you know the extent of the ruling of the Rabbis [who maintain] that although he had already given her in marriage and had thereby revealed his disposition, we are nevertheless not to be guided by the assumption [as to what may have been the father's disposition]. Said Raba to R. Hisda: In our discourse we stated in your name, 'The halachah is in agreement with R. Judah. The other replied: May it be the will [of Providence] that you may report in your discourses all such beautiful sayings in my name. But could Raba, however, have made such a statement? Surely, it was taught: Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate; and Raba stated that the law is in agreement with Rabbi! — This is no difficulty. The former [is a case] where we have formed some opinion about him; the latter is one where we have not formed any opinion about him. This explanation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For R. Adda b. Ahaba stated: It once happened that Rabbi gave her a twelfth of [her father's] estate. Are not the two statements contradictory? Consequently it must be inferred that the one [refers to a father of whom] some opinion had been formed while the other [refers to one of whom] we have formed no opinion. This is conclusive proof. [To turn to] the main text. Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate. They said to Rabbi: According to your statement, if a man had ten daughters and one son the sons should receive no share at all on account of the daughters? He replied: What I mean is this: The first [daughter] receives a tenth of the estate, the second [receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left, and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the second] had left, and then they divide again [all that they had received] into equal shares.
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But did not each one receive what was hers? — It is this that was meant: If all of theme wish to marry at the same time they are to receive equal shares. This provides support for [the opinion] of R. Mattena; for R. Mattena has said: If all of them wish to marry at the same time they are to receive one tenth. 'One tenth'! Can you imagine [such a ruling]? The meaning must consequently be that they are to receive their tenths at the same time. Our Rabbis taught: The daughters, whether they had attained their adolescence before they married or whether they married before they had attained their adolescence, lose their right to maintenance but not to their allowance for marriage outfit; so Rabbi. R. Simeon b. Eleazar said: If they also attained their adolescence, they lose the right to their marriage outfit. How should they proceed? — They hire for themselves husbands and exact their outfit allowance. R. Nahman stated: Huna told me, The law is in agreement with Rabbi. Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman: IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER CONSENT, AND THEY ASSIGNED TO HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ, SHE MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY, RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER. The reason then is because she was a minor; had she, however, been older her right would have been surrendered! — This is no difficulty; the one is a case where she protested; the other, where she did not protest. This expla nation may also be supported by a process of reasoning. For otherwise there would arise a contradiction between two statements of Rabbi. For it was taught, 'Rabbi said, A daughter who is maintained by her brothers is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate', [which implies] only when she is maintained but not when she is not maintained. Must it not in consequence be concluded that one [statement deals with one] who protested and the other [with one] who did not protest. This proves it. Rabina said to Raba: R. Adda b. Ahaba told us in your name, If she attained her adolescence she need not lodge a protest; if she married she need not lodge a protest; but if she attained her adolescence and was also married it is necessary for her to lodge a protest. But could Raba have made such a statement? Surely, Raba pointed out an objection against R. Nahman [from the Mishnah of] AN ORPHAN, and the other replied that 'the one is a case where she protested, the other where she did not protest'! — This is no difficulty. One is a case where she is maintained by them; the other, where she is not maintained by them. R. Huna stated in the name of Rabbi: [The right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah. What is meant by 'is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? Should it be suggested that whereas for the allowance for a marriage outfit even property pledged may be seized, [for the fulfilment of an obligation under] the terms of a kethubah no pledged property may be seized, what [new point, it may be objected,] does this teach us? Surely it is a daily occurrence [that pledged property] is seized for marriage outfit but not for maintenance! [Should it], however, [be suggested that] whereas for a marriage outfit movable objects also may be seized, [for the fulfilment of an obligation under] a condition in a kethubah only real estate. but not movable objects, may be seized, [it may be objected that,] according to Rabbi, for the one as well as the other [movable objects] may be seized. For it was taught: Both landed property and movable property may be seized for the maintenance of a wile or daughters; so Rabbi! What, then, is meant by '[The right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah'? — As it was taught: If a man said that his daughters must not be maintained out of his estate he is not to be obeyed. [If, however, he said, that] his daughters shall not receive their marriage outfit out of his estate he is obeyed, because [the right to] marriage outfit is not the same as that conferred by a condition in a kethubah.
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