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כתובות 42
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
HER HANDIWORK, HOWEVER, AND ANYTHING SHE FINDS EVEN IF SHE HAD NOT COLLECTED [THE PROCEEDS]. BELONG TO HER BROTHERS IF HER FATHER DIED. GEMARA. What [new law] does he teach us? Have we not [already] learned: The seducer pays three forms [of compensation] and the violator four. The seducer pays compensation for indignity and blemish as well as the statutory fine, and the violator pays an additional [form of compensation] in that he pays for the pain? — It was necessary [to teach us that the compensation is due] TO HER FATHER. [But] that [the compensation is due] to her father is also obvious, since a seducer has to pay for it? For if [it were to be given] to herself [the objection could be raised], why should the seducer pay [to her when] he acted with her consent? — It was necessary [to tell us of the case where] HER ACTION WAS TRIED [which is a point in] dispute between R. Simeon and the Rabbis. We have learned elsewhere: [If a man said to another] 'You have violated or seduced my daughter', and the other replied. 'I did not violate or seduce her'. 'I adjure you' [said the first] and the other responded. 'Amen', but afterwards admitted his guilt, he is liable. R. Simeon, however, exempts him, for no fine is paid on one's own admission. They, however, said to him: Though no man pays a fine on his own admission he nevertheless pays compensation for indignity and blemish on his own admission. Abaye enquired of Rabbah: What is the law according to R. Simeon where a man said to another, 'You have violated or seduced my daughter, and I have brought you to law and you were ordered to pay me [a stipulated sun, of] money' and the other replied. 'I have neither violated nor seduced her, nor have you brought me to law nor have I been ordered to pay you any money', and after he had taken an oath he admitted his guilt? Is [his liability], since his action had been tried, civil and he consequently incurs thereby a sacrifice for [having taken a false] oath, or is it possible that, though his action had been tried, his liability is still regarded as penal? — The other replied: It is a civil liability and he incurs thereby the obligation to bring a sacrifice for a false oath. He pointed out to him the following objection: R. Simeon, said, As it might have been presumed that if a man said to another, 'You have violated or seduced my daughter' and the other replied 'I have neither violated nor seduced her', [or if the first said]. 'Your ox has killed my bondman' and the other replied, 'He did not kill him', or if a bondman said to his master, 'You have knocked out my tooth' or 'You have blinded my eye'. and he replied. 'I have not knocked it out' or 'I have not blinded it' and [the defendant] took the oath but afterwards admitted his liability it might have been presumed that he is liable, hence It was explicitly stated in Scripture, And he deal falsely with his neighbour a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbour; or have found that which was lost, and deal falsely therein, and swear to a lie, as these are distinguished by the characteristics of being civil cases so must all [other cases where similar liabilities may be incurred be distinguished by the characteristics] of being civil. These, therefore, are excluded [from liability] since they are penal.
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Does not [this ruling refer to a man] whose action had already been tried? — No, [it deals] with one whose action had not yet been tried. But, surely, since the first clause deals with the case of a man whose action had been tried, would not the final clause also deal with such a case? For in the first clause it was stated: 'I only knew [that liability is incurred in] cases where compensation is paid for the actual value only, whence, however, is it deduced that [such liability is also incurred in] cases where the payment is double, fourfold or fivefold and [in those of] the violator, the seducer and the calumniator? From Scripture which explicitly stated, And commit a trespass, [implying that all such are] included'. Now, how is this statement to be understood? If [it is one referring to] a man whose action had not yet been tried [the objection could be raised:] Is double compensation payable in such circumstances? It is obvious, therefore, that [the reference is to one] whose action had already been tried. And since the first clause deals with one whose action had been tried, the final clause also must deal, must it not, with one whose action had already been tried? — The other replied: I could have answered you that the first clause deals with one whose action had already been tried, and the final clause with one whose action had not yet been tried and that the entire Baraitha represents the view of R. Simeon, but I would not give you forced interpretations, for, were I to do so, you might retort: Then either the first clause should begin with 'R. Simeon said' or the final clause should conclude with 'these are the words of R. Simeon'. The fact, however, is that the entire [Baraitha] refers to one whose action had already been tried, the first clause being the view of the Rabbis and the final clause that of R. Simeon, and I must agree with you in regard to the sacrifice for [taking a false] oath, for the All-Merciful has exempted him [as may be deduced] from [the text] And he deal falsely. When I, however, said, that 'It is a civil liability' [I was only implying that a man had the right] to transmit such a liability as an inheritance to his sons. Again he raised an objection against him: R. SIMEON RULED, IF HER FATHER DIED BEFORE SHE COULD COLLECT [HER DUES] THEY BELONG TO HER. Now if you maintain [that such compensation] is a civil liability in respect of being transmitted as an inheritance to one's sons, why should the compensation belong to her? Should it not, in fact, belong to the brothers? — This subject, said Raba, both Rabbah and R. Joseph found difficult for twenty-two years and no solution was forthcoming. It was only when R. Joseph assumed the presidency of the academy that he solved it: There it is different [from other penal liabilities] because Scripture said, Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty [shekels of] silver [which implies that] the Torah has not conferred upon the father the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him; when Rabbah, however, said, 'It is a civil liability in respect of being transmitted as an inheritance to his sons' he was referring to other penal liabilities. But then, in the case of a bondman it is written in Scripture, He shall give into their master thirty shekels of silver, would it here also [be maintained that] the Torah has not conferred upon the master the right of possession before the money had actually been handed to him? — The yitten cannot be compared with we-nathan. If so, [instead of deducing the exemption from sacrifice] from the Scriptural text, 'And he deal falsely', should not the deduction rather be made from 'Then … shall give'? — Raba replied: The text of 'And he deal falsely' was required in a case, for instance, where the girl's action had been tried and then she became adolescent and died, in which case when the father receives [the fine] he inherits [it] from her. If so, [however, how could it be said:] 'These, therefore, are excluded [from liability] since they are in fact penal' when they are in fact civil? — R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [The meaning is], These are excluded since they were originally penal. He pointed out to him another objection: R. Simeon, however. exempts him, for no fine is paid on ones own admission. The reason then is because his action had not been tried but if it had been tried, in which case he does pay, even on his own admission, he would incur. also, would he not, [the obligation of bringing] a sacrifice for swearing [a false oath]? — R. Simeon argues with the Rabbis on the lines of their own view. According to my own view [he argued] the All-Merciful has exempted the man even after he had been tried [as may be deduced] from the text 'And deal falsely'. According to your view, however, you must at least admit that [the man is exempt] if he has not yet been tried, since the claim advanced against him is penal
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