Keritot — Daf 26a

למפשטיה לא מדרב דימי ולא מדאביי

אלא מהא חטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום יוה"כ מכפר ומינה חטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום הוא דיוה"כ מכפר אבל דידע בה לא מכפר

ואמר רב תחליפא אבוה דרב הונא משמיה דרבא חייבי מלקיות שעבר עליהן יה"כ חייב פשיטא מאי שנא מחייבי חטאות ואשמות ודאין

סלקא דעתך אמינא התם ממונא הוא אבל הכא דגופא הוא אימא לא קמ"ל

והא אנן תנן הודע ולא הודע עשה ולא תעשה

לא קשיא הא דאתרו ביה הא דלא אתרו ביה

אלא מעתה (סימן יולד"ת מצור"ע נזי"ר סוט"ה בעגל"ה)

ספק יולדת שעבר עליה יוה"כ לא תייתי דהא כפר עליה יוה"כ דחטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום הוא אמר רב הושעיא (ויקרא טז, טז) לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם

ולר' שמעון בן יוחי דאמר יולדת חוטאת היא מאי איכא למימר יולדת כי קא מייתי קרבן לאישתרויי באכילת קדשים הוא ולא לכפרה מתיא

אמר רב אשי אף אנן נמי תנינא האשה שיש עליה חטאת העוף ספק ועבר עליה יוה"כ חייבת להביא לאחר יוה"כ מפני שמכשרתה לאכול בזבחים

אלא מעתה ספק מצורע שעבר יוה"כ לא מייתי דהא עבר עליה יוה"כ דחטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום הוא אמר ר' אושעיא לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם

והא אמר ר' שמואל בר נחמני אמר ר' יוחנן על ז' דברים נגעים באים (סימן גג"ג ששל"ץ) מצורע כי מייתי לאו לכפרה מייתי אלא לאישתרויי באכילת קדשים הוא

אלא מעתה ספק נזיר שעבר עליו יוה"כ לא מייתי קרבן דהא כפר יוה"כ דחטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום הוא אמר ר' אושעיא לכל חטאת ולא לכל טומאה

ולרבי אלעזר בן הקפר דאמר נזיר חוטא הוא מאי איכא למימר נזיר כי קא מייתי קרבן לאו לכפרה מייתי לאשתרויי באכילת קדשים הוא

אלא מעתה ספק סוטה שעבר עליה יוה"כ לא תייתי דהא כפר עלה יוה"כ דחטא שאינו מכיר בו אלא המקום אמר רבי הושעיא לכל חטאתם ולא לכל טומאתם

אמר אביי בועל מכיר בו רבא אמר סוטה כי מתייא לברר עון קא אתיא

אלא מעתה עגלה ערופה שעבר עליה יוה"כ וכו' אמר אביי הורג מכיר רבא אמר אמר קרא (במדבר לה, לד) ולארץ לא יכופר לדם אשר שפך בה וגו

רב פפא אמר אמר קרא (דברים כא, ח) כפר לעמך ישראל וגו ראויה כפרה זו שתכפר על יוצאי מצרים

השתא דאמרת חטא שאין מכיר בו אלא המקום יוה"כ מכפר אימא כי מתיידע ליה בתר יוה"כ נמי לא מייתי חטאת אמר ר' זעירא לא מצית אמרת דכתיב קרא ידיעה גבי חטאת וגבי נשיא וגבי צבור

צריכי דאי כתב קרא גבי יחיד הוה אמינא כולהון מיחיד לא אתאן דאיכא למיפרך מה ליחיד שכל קרבנו נקבה

נכתוב גבי נשיא ונייתי הנך מנשיא

יחיד מנשיא לא אתי דאיכא למיפרך מה לנשיא שכן אין בשמיעת קול תאמר ביחיד שכן ישנו בשמיעת קול

וצבור מנשיא לא אתי דאיכא למיפרך מה לנשיא שכן בקרבנו נקבה

נכתוב גבי צבור יחיד ונשיא מינה איכא למיפרך מה לצבור שכן אין חייבין אלא על העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה

מחדא ידיעה לא אתיא תיתי חדא ידיעה מתרתי לא נכתוב ידיעה גבי יחיד ותיתי מנשיא וצבור

איכא למיפרך מה לנשיא וצבור שכן אינן בשמיעת קול תאמר ביחיד שישנו בשמיעת קול

לא נכתוב קרא ידיעה גבי צבור ותיתי מידיעה דיחיד ונשיא איכא למיפרך מה ליחיד ונשיא שכן יש בקרבן נקבה תאמר בצבור שאין בקרבן נקבה

לא נכתוב גבי נשיא ותיתי מידיעה דיחיד וצבור מאי פרכת אי משום דאינן בשמיעת הקול יחיד יוכיח דאינו בשמיעת הקול

ואי משום דיש בכל קרבנו נקבה צבור יוכיח דאין בקרבנן נקבה עד דאית להון ידיעה לא מחייב למה לי דכתיב ידיעה גבי נשיא

אם אינו ענין לגופיה דהא אתיא מיחיד וצבור תנהו ענין להיכא דמתיידע ליה בתר יום הכפורים דמייתי חטאת

אביי אמר אי דלא כתיב ידיעה גבי נשיא מיחיד וצבור לא אתי משום דאיכא למיפרך מה ליחיד וצבור שכן אין עשויין להשתנות תאמר

be expounded in the manner of Rab Dimi and Abaye, but it may be derived from this argument: ‘The Day of Atonement expiates sins that are known to the Lord alone;’ from which it follows that the Day of Atonement expiates only sins known to the Lord alone, but it does not expiate sins of which the transgressor himself is conscious. Furthermore said Rab Tahlifa, father of Rab Huna, in the name of Raba: They that are liable to stripes and the Day of Atonement had intervened, are still liable thereto. Is this not obvious? for wherein does it differ from the instance relating to sin-offerings and unconditional guilt-offerings? — I might have argued: There money only is involved;1 in this instance, however, since his person is involved, I might say that it is not so. He, therefore, teaches us [that the law is the same]. But have we not learnt:2 Known as well as unknown [sins], positive as well as negative commandments?3 This is no contradiction; in the one instance the transgressor was warned, in the other he was not warned. 4 But if this is so,5 (Mnemonic: A woman after confinement; a leper; a nazirite; a woman suspected of infidelity; the heifer) a woman after a doubtful confinement, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should also not [bring her offering],6 for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one known to the Lord alone’! — Said R. Hoshaia: [It reads.] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness.7 But according to R. Simeon son of Yohai, who holds that a woman in confinement is a sinner,8 what can be said? — The sacrifice that she brings is, nevertheless, for the purpose of permitting her to partake of consecrated food, and is not expiatory.9 Remarked Rab Ashi: We have also learnt likewise: A WOMAN WHO IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD FOR A DOUBT, AND THE DAY OF ATONEMENT HAD INTERVENED, IS STILL BOUND TO OFFER IT AFTER THE DAY OF ATONEMENT, BECAUSE IT RENDERS HER FIT TO PARTAKE OF SACRIFICIAL FLESH. Then a doubtful leper, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not [bring his offering], for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. But did not R. Samuel b. Nahmani say in the name of R. Jonathan: For seven sins leprosy afflicts man?10 — The leper when bringing his offering does so, not for the purpose of expiation,11 but in order to render him fit to partake of consecrated food. Then a nazirite in doubt,12 if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not bring an offering, for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. But according to R. Eleazar b. ha-Kappar, who holds that the nazirite is a sinner,13 what can be said? — The nazirite when bringing his offering does so, not for the purpose of expiation, but in order to enable him to resume his naziriteship in a state of cleanness.14 Then a woman suspected of doubtful infidelity,15 if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not bring her offering, for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness.16 Abaye said: The adulterer is aware17 [of the sin]. Raba said: The woman suspected of infidelity, in bringing [the sacrifice] does so for the purpose of ascertaining her guilt. 18 Then the heifer whose neck is to be broken,19 if the Day of Atonement had intervened, [should not be offered]! — Said Abaye: The murderer is aware [of the sin]. Raba said: Scripture reads, And no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, etc.20 R. Papa said: Scripture reads, Forgive Thy people Israel, etc.;21 this atonement was applicable even to those who went out from Egypt. Now that you have established that a sin known to the Lord alone is atoned for by the Day of Atonement, then I might say that when one becomes aware [of the sin] after the Day of Atonement he should not need to bring a sin-offering!22 — Said R. Ze'ira: You cannot say so, for Scripture states ‘knowledge’ in connection with the sin-offering [of the individual] and also with that of the prince and of the congregation.23 But is it not necessary [with each of these]? For if it was only mentioned in connection with the ordinary individual, I should have said that the others could not be derived from the ordinary individual because of this objection: It is so with the ordinary individual, since his offering is invariably female.24 Then let it be stated in connection with the prince alone, and I should derive the others from the case of the prince! — The case of the individual cannot be derived from that of the prince, for it can be objected to: It is so with the prince, since he is not included in the law regarding the refusal of evidence;25 but can you say so of the individual who is included in this law? Similarly the instance of the congregation cannot be derived from that of the prince, for I might object: It is so with the prince since his offering may at times be female.26 Then let it be stated only in connection with the congregation, and I should derive the case of the individual and of the prince from it! — I can object: It is so with the congregation since they are liable only when ignorance of the law is followed by action in error. 27 From the mention of ‘knowledge’ in any one case you cannot indeed derive the others, but from its mention in two instances you might derive the third. Let ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the ordinary individual, and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the prince and the congregation! — I might object: It is so with the prince and the congregation since they are not subject to the law regarding the refusal of evidence;28 but can you say so of the individual who is subject to this law? Let then ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the congregation and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned with the individual and the prince! — I might object: It is so with the individual and the prince since their sacrifice may at times be female;29 but can you say so of the congregation whose sacrifice can never be female? Let, then, ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the prince and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the individual and the congregation! For what argument can be raised in objection thereto? If the fact that the sacrifice is offered only where ignorance of the law [is followed by action in error],30 the individual proves [the opposite]; and if that the sacrifice is at all times a female, the congregation prove [the opposite],31 for they never offer a female and are nevertheless liable only when aware of the sin. Wherefore, then, was, ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the prince? As it is not required for its own purpose, since it may be derived from that of the individual and the congregation, apply it to the case where the transgressor becomes aware [of his sin] after the Day of Atonement,32 to the effect that he must bring a sin-offering. Abaye said: If ‘knowledge’ were omitted in the text relating to the prince I should not have derived it from the cases of the individual and the congregation. for I might object: It is so with the individual and the congregation since they cannot change their status; can you say so sacrifice. In our instance, however, bodily chastisement is involved. Atonement atones for it, thus in contradiction to Rab Tahlifa's ruling. When, however, this penalty is due, the Day of Atonement does not effect its remission. sin; whilst Rab Tahlifa's ruling implies only the expiation of doubtful sins by the Day of Atonement. G.G.G. Sh. Sh. L.Z., which are the initial letters of the Hebrew words for the seven sins, viz., Immorality, arrogance, robbery, bloodshed, false oath, slander, and meanness.’ to in this question (Rashi). the murderer; or, if the murderer is unknown, through the offering of the heifer. out of Egypt would be liable to bring a heifer, although many a Day of Atonement had intervened in the meantime, because the Day of Atonement does not expiate a case of unidentified murder. who commits a sin liable to a sin-offering; ibid. v. 23 referring to the prince; and ibid. v. 14 with reference to the congregation. This expression, the threefold repetition of which is unnecessary for the context, as will be explained later, is taken to intimate that whenever the sin becomes known a sin-offering is required. even though the Day of Atonement has intervened. regarded as of lesser severity. I might therefore have thought that only this individual brings a sin-offering when aware of the sin; the others, however, are liable even in the case of doubt. Therefore the restrictive term ‘if be known’ is used also with the others. refusal to give evidence incurs a guilt-offering, but only in the case of an ordinary individual. A prince, on the other hand, cannot give evidence; cf. Sanh. 18a. congregation thereupon committed in error. of ommission. ruling that no sin-offering is brought except where there is awareness of sin, I should reply, the individual disproves this, for his transgression is not the outcome of an erroneous decision and he is nevertheless subject to the same ruling concerning awareness of sin. therefore the prince, who at times offers a male, is not subject thereto, I should reply that the case of the congregation disproves this, which is always liable to a male offering and yet is subject to our ruling. Atonement, a sin-offering is due.