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כריתות 26
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
be expounded in the manner of Rab Dimi and Abaye, but it may be derived from this argument: ‘The Day of Atonement expiates sins that are known to the Lord alone;’ from which it follows that the Day of Atonement expiates only sins known to the Lord alone, but it does not expiate sins of which the transgressor himself is conscious. Furthermore said Rab Tahlifa, father of Rab Huna, in the name of Raba: They that are liable to stripes and the Day of Atonement had intervened, are still liable thereto. Is this not obvious? for wherein does it differ from the instance relating to sin-offerings and unconditional guilt-offerings? — I might have argued: There money only is involved; in this instance, however, since his person is involved, I might say that it is not so. He, therefore, teaches us [that the law is the same]. But have we not learnt: Known as well as unknown [sins], positive as well as negative commandments? This is no contradiction; in the one instance the transgressor was warned, in the other he was not warned. But if this is so, (Mnemonic: A woman after confinement; a leper; a nazirite; a woman suspected of infidelity; the heifer) a woman after a doubtful confinement, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should also not [bring her offering], for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one known to the Lord alone’! — Said R. Hoshaia: [It reads.] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. But according to R. Simeon son of Yohai, who holds that a woman in confinement is a sinner, what can be said? — The sacrifice that she brings is, nevertheless, for the purpose of permitting her to partake of consecrated food, and is not expiatory. Remarked Rab Ashi: We have also learnt likewise: A WOMAN WHO IS LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD FOR A DOUBT, AND THE DAY OF ATONEMENT HAD INTERVENED, IS STILL BOUND TO OFFER IT AFTER THE DAY OF ATONEMENT, BECAUSE IT RENDERS HER FIT TO PARTAKE OF SACRIFICIAL FLESH. Then a doubtful leper, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not [bring his offering], for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. But did not R. Samuel b. Nahmani say in the name of R. Jonathan: For seven sins leprosy afflicts man? — The leper when bringing his offering does so, not for the purpose of expiation, but in order to render him fit to partake of consecrated food. Then a nazirite in doubt, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not bring an offering, for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. But according to R. Eleazar b. ha-Kappar, who holds that the nazirite is a sinner, what can be said? — The nazirite when bringing his offering does so, not for the purpose of expiation, but in order to enable him to resume his naziriteship in a state of cleanness. Then a woman suspected of doubtful infidelity, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, should not bring her offering, for the Day of Atonement had effected atonement, since the sin is one ‘known to the Lord alone’! — Said Rab Oshaia: [It reads:] ‘Even all their sins’; but not all their uncleanness. Abaye said: The adulterer is aware [of the sin]. Raba said: The woman suspected of infidelity, in bringing [the sacrifice] does so for the purpose of ascertaining her guilt. Then the heifer whose neck is to be broken, if the Day of Atonement had intervened, [should not be offered]! — Said Abaye: The murderer is aware [of the sin]. Raba said: Scripture reads, And no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, etc. R. Papa said: Scripture reads, Forgive Thy people Israel, etc.; this atonement was applicable even to those who went out from Egypt. Now that you have established that a sin known to the Lord alone is atoned for by the Day of Atonement, then I might say that when one becomes aware [of the sin] after the Day of Atonement he should not need to bring a sin-offering! — Said R. Ze'ira: You cannot say so, for Scripture states ‘knowledge’ in connection with the sin-offering [of the individual] and also with that of the prince and of the congregation. But is it not necessary [with each of these]? For if it was only mentioned in connection with the ordinary individual, I should have said that the others could not be derived from the ordinary individual because of this objection: It is so with the ordinary individual, since his offering is invariably female. Then let it be stated in connection with the prince alone, and I should derive the others from the case of the prince! — The case of the individual cannot be derived from that of the prince, for it can be objected to: It is so with the prince, since he is not included in the law regarding the refusal of evidence; but can you say so of the individual who is included in this law? Similarly the instance of the congregation cannot be derived from that of the prince, for I might object: It is so with the prince since his offering may at times be female. Then let it be stated only in connection with the congregation, and I should derive the case of the individual and of the prince from it! — I can object: It is so with the congregation since they are liable only when ignorance of the law is followed by action in error. From the mention of ‘knowledge’ in any one case you cannot indeed derive the others, but from its mention in two instances you might derive the third. Let ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the ordinary individual, and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the prince and the congregation! — I might object: It is so with the prince and the congregation since they are not subject to the law regarding the refusal of evidence; but can you say so of the individual who is subject to this law? Let then ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the congregation and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned with the individual and the prince! — I might object: It is so with the individual and the prince since their sacrifice may at times be female; but can you say so of the congregation whose sacrifice can never be female? Let, then, ‘knowledge’ be omitted in connection with the prince and let it be derived from ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the individual and the congregation! For what argument can be raised in objection thereto? If the fact that the sacrifice is offered only where ignorance of the law [is followed by action in error], the individual proves [the opposite]; and if that the sacrifice is at all times a female, the congregation prove [the opposite], for they never offer a female and are nevertheless liable only when aware of the sin. Wherefore, then, was, ‘knowledge’ mentioned in connection with the prince? As it is not required for its own purpose, since it may be derived from that of the individual and the congregation, apply it to the case where the transgressor becomes aware [of his sin] after the Day of Atonement, to the effect that he must bring a sin-offering. Abaye said: If ‘knowledge’ were omitted in the text relating to the prince I should not have derived it from the cases of the individual and the congregation. for I might object: It is so with the individual and the congregation since they cannot change their status; can you say so
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of the prince whose status is liable to change? Abaye, therefore, said: [The law is rather inferred] from the following: Since the common term ‘mitzwoth’ has established between them a textual analogy, thus rendering them analogous one to the other, why then was ‘knowledge’ mentioned thrice [i.e.] in connection with the commoner, the prince and the congregation? As it is not required for their own cases, for they can be inferred from each other, by reason of the analogy based upon the common term ‘mitzwoth’, apply it to the case where the transgressor becomes aware [of his sin] after the Day of Atonement ‘ to the effect that he must bring a sin-offering. But why not argue thus: Granted that when the transgressor becomes aware of his sin after the Day of Atonement he must still bring a sin-offering, because the Day of Atonement does not apply to this specific sin; but in the case of the suspensive guilt-offering, since the offering is brought for the specific sin, he thereby receives atonement, so that when he becomes aware of his sin, after he had offered the suspensive guilt-offering, he need not bring a sin-offering! — Raba replied: Scripture reads, ‘If [the sin] be known to him’; at all events. Now that it is established that when he becomes aware of the sin he must still bring a sin-offering, what purpose did the suspensive guilt-offering serve? — Answered R. Zera, [It had the effect] that if he died, he died without sin. Raba demurred: But if he died, death purged him! Raba, therefore, answered: [It had the effect] of guarding him from chastisement. IF A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD WAS BROUGHT FOR A MATTER OF DOUBT etc. said Rab: It nevertheless effected atonement. If so, why must it be buried? — Because it was not guarded. When was it not guarded? If at the beginning, was it not alive? If at the end, does he not guard it? — The Mishnah speaks rather of the case where the woman became aware that she did not give birth. And by law, therefore, it should be permitted for use; but why must it be buried? It is a Rabbinical enactment. Rab's remark, however, was stated in connection with the following: If a woman brought a sin-offering of a bird by reason of a doubt, and prior to the pinching of its neck she learnt that the birth was a certainty, she shall offer it for a certainty, for that which she offers in the case of doubt is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of certainty. But if she learnt after the pinching of the neck that the birth was normal, then Rab says: The blood is sprinkled and drained out, atonement is effected, and [the bird] is permitted to be eaten. R. Johanan says: It is forbidden to be eaten as a precautionary measure lest it be said that a sin-offering of a bird in a matter of doubt may be eaten. Levi taught in support of Rab: In the case of a sin-offering of a bird brought by reason of a doubt, if it is learnt after the pinching of the neck that the birth was normal, the blood is sprinkled and drained out, atonement is effected, and it is permitted to be eaten. It was taught [in a Baraitha] in support of R. Johanan: In the case of a sin-offering of a bird brought by reason of a doubt, if it is learnt prior to the pinching of the neck that the birth did not take place. the bird reverts to its profane status or it may be sold to a fellowwoman; if it is learnt prior to the pinching of the neck that the birth was certain, it is offered as a certain sacrifice, for that which she offers in the case of doubt is of the same kind as that which she offers in the case of certainty; if it is learnt after the pinching of the neck that the birth did take place, the offering is forbidden even for all use, for it was offered from the outset for a doubt, it has atoned for the doubt, and so has served its purpose. MISHNAH. IF A MAN SET APART TWO SELA'S FOR A GUILT-OFFERING AND BROUGHT THEREWITH TWO RAMS FOR A GUILT-OFFERING, IF ONE WAS OF THE VALUE OF TWO SELA'S, IT MAY BE OFFERED FOR HIS GUILT-OFFERING, AND THE OTHER MUST BE LEFT TO PASTURE UNTIL IT BECOMES BLEMISHED WHEN IT IS SOLD AND ITS PRICE GOES TO THE FUND FOR FREEWILL-OFFERINGS. IF HE HAD BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY TWO RAMS FOR ORDINARY USE, ONE WORTH TWO SELA'S AND THE OTHER WORTH TEN ZUZ, THAT WHICH IS WORTH TWO SELA'S SHALL BE OFFERED FOR HIS GUILT-OFFERING AND THE OTHER FOR HIS TRESPASS. [IF HE HAD BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY] ONE [RAM] FOR A GUILT-OFFERING AND THE OTHER FOR ORDINARY USE, IF THAT FOR THE GUILT-OFFERING WAS WORTH TWO SELA'S IT SHALL BE OFFERED FOR HIS GUILT-OFFERING AND THE OTHER FOR HIS TRESPASS, AND WITH IT HE SHALL BRING A SELA’ AND ITS FIFTH. GEMARA. What means HIS TRESPASS which is stated in the first clause: AND THE OTHER FOR HIS TRESPASS? Shall I say it means the ram for the [Sacrilege] guilt-offering? But can it be said that the fifth is brought together with the ram [for the guilt-offering]? Bold it is written: And he shall make restitution for that which he hath done amiss in the holy thing, and shall add the fifth part thereto; whence we see that it is brought together with [the restitution of] his misappropriation! Moreover, the last clause states: [IF HE HAD BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY] ONE [RAM] FOR A GUILT-OFFERING, AND THE OTHER FOR ORDINARY USE, IF THAT FOR THE GUILT-OFFERING WAS WORTH TWO SELA'S, IT SHALL BE OFFERED FOR HIS GUILT-OFFERING, AND THE OTHER FOR HIS TRESPASS, AND WITH IT HE SHALL BRING A SELA’ AND ITS FIFTH. From this too we see that the fifth is brought together with [the restitution of] his misappropriation! — Rather, HIS TRESPASS means the value he had benefitted from the Sanctuary, which is the amount of the two sela's he had originally set apart for a guilt-offering, and with which he bought two rams for ordinary use. So that the one which is worth two sela's he brings as the ram for his guilt-offering, and the other which is worth ten zuz he gives as restitution for what he had benefitted from the Sanctuary, which exactly equals the amount of his misappropriation plus one fifth. And HIS TRESPASS means his misappropriation. Now how did you interpret HIS TRESPASS stated in the first clause? His misappropriation? Then read the last clause: [IF HE HAD BOUGHT WITH THE MONEY] ONE [RAM] FOR A GUILT-OFFERING, AND THE OTHER FOR ORDINARY USE, IF THAT FOR THE GUILT-OFFERING WAS WORTH TWO SELA'S IT SHALL BE OFFERED FOR HIS GUILT-OFFERING, AND THE OTHER FOR HIS TRESPASS, AND WITH IT HE SHALL BRING A SELA'S AND ITS FIFTH; whence we see that HIS TRESPASS means the ram for the [Sacrilege] guilt-offering. Accordingly in the first clause HIS TRESPASS means his misappropriation,
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