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כריתות 22
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where it had been separated, whilst in the instance of Rab it had not been separated; as it has been taught: The blood found on a loaf of bread must be scraped away and the loaf may be eaten; that between the teeth may be sucked and swallowed without hesitation. Some there are who report the statement of Rab Shesheth with reference to that which has been taught: I might have thought that he who drinks human milk transgresses a prohibition, and this might be supported by the following a fortiori conclusion: if the milk of an unclean animal is forbidden, although with regard to uncleanness by contact it follows the lenient ruling, how much more should the milk of those that walk on two legs, who follow the stringent view regarding uncleanness by contact, be forbidden! The text therefore teaches, This is unclean unto you: this is unclean; human milk, however, is not unclean but clean. I might exclude only milk in relation to which the law is not constant, but not blood in relation to which the law is constant, therefore the text teaches, ‘This is unclean unto you’: this is unclean; human blood, however, is not unclean but clean. Upon this remarked Rab Shesheth: ‘One is not even enjoined to refrain from it’. We have learnt elsewhere: The heart must be torn and its blood removed; if he had not torn it, he has nevertheless not transgressed. Said R. Zera in the name of Rab: This holds good only with regard to the heart of a fowl which is not as big as an olive's bulk in all; the heart of a beast, however, which comprises an olive's bulk, is forbidden and [whoso eats it] incurs the penalty of kareth. An objection was raised: [It has been taught:] The blood of the spleen or of the heart or of the kidneys, or of any other limb is subject to a prohibition; the blood of those that walk on two legs or that of reptiles and creeping things is forbidden, but one is not liable for it! — That which is there taught refers to the blood within; Rab, however, refers to blood that came from elsewhere. But is not the blood within identical With the blood of a limb? — And even according to you, is not the blood of the kidneys men tioned in addition to the blood of a limb? You must thus admit that the one is stated and then the other; then say here, too, that the one is stated and then the other. [It says:] ‘From elsewhere’ — From where? — Said R. Zera: It absorbs it with the last breath. ...OF THE BLOOD [OF THE ARTERIES] WHEREBY LIFE ESCAPES, HE IS LIABLE. It has been stated: What is the definition of ‘the blood of arteries upon which life depends’? R. Johanan says: That which gushes forth; Resh Lakish says: From the black drop onward. An objection was raised: Which is the blood of arteries whereby life escapes? That which gushes forth, to the exclusion of secondary blood, because it flows gently. May we not assume that the first as well as the last blood that flow gently are regarded as secondary blood; and this is then in contradiction to Resh Lakish? — No, only the blackened blood is excluded, but the first and the last blood, though flowing gently, are regarded as life blood. An objection was raised: Which is regarded as life blood? That which gushes forth, to the exclusion of the first and last blood, which flow gently. This is in contradiction to Resh Lakish! — He might retort: Tannaim differ on this point, as has been taught: Which is regarded as life blood? That which gushes forth. This is the view of R. Eliezer. R. Simeon holds: From the black drop onward. The School of R. Ishmael taught: The text ‘And drink the blood of the slain’: excludes the gushing blood from rendering plants susceptible to uncleanness. R. Jeremiah put the following query before R. Zera: What is the law if one drew blood from an animal and received it in two vessels? For [the blood which is] in the first vessel, according to all views one is liable; but what of that in the second; is one liable for it or not? — He replied: Therein differ R. Johanan and Resh Lakish, as has been stated: If one drew blood from an animal and received it in two vessels, Resh Lakish says: He is liable to two sin-offerings; R. Johanan says: He is liable to one sin-offering only. R. JUDAH HOLDS, HE IS LIABLE FOR SECONDARY BLOOD. Said R. Eleazar: R. Judah admits, however, with reference to atonement, for it is written: For it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life: the blood whereby life escapes causes atonement, the blood whereby life does not escape does not cause atonement. Said Rab Nahman b. Isaac: We have also learnt in confirmation thereof, for it has been taught: [It would have sufficed had the text stated,] Blood, why does it say, Any manner of blood? Because Scripture reads: ‘For it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life’; from this we only learn that the blood of consecrated animals whereby life escapes and which makes atonement, [is forbidden], whence do we know that blood of unconsecrated animals and secondary blood [are forbidden]? Because it reads: ‘Any manner of blood’. And [it is established that] an anonymous [tradition in the] Sifra represents the view of R. Judah. MISHNAH. FOR DOUBTFUL MISAPPROPRIATION OF SACRED PROPERTY R. AKIBA DECLARES ONE LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; WHILE THE SAGES DECLARE HIM EXEMPT. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, ADMITS THAT HE NEED NOT MAKE RESTITUTION UNTIL HE BECOMES AWARE [OF HIS TRESPASS], WHEN HE MUST BRING WITH IT AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILT-OFFERING. SAID R. TARFON: WHEREFORE SHOULD HE BRING TWO GUILT-OFFERINGS? LET HIM RATHER RESTORE THE CAPITAL TOGETHER WITH THE FIFTH, OFFER A GUILT-OFFERING OF THE VALUE OF TWO SELA'S AND STIPULATE: IF I DID COMMIT SACRILEGE, HERE IS MY RESTITUTION AND THIS MY GUILT-OFFERING; AND IF THE SACRILEGE WAS DOUBTFUL, LET THE MONEY BE A FREEWILL GIFT AND THE [OFFERING A] SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; SINCE THAT WHICH IS OFFERED FOR A KNOWN [TRESPASS] IS OF THE SAME KIND AS THAT OFFERED FOR A DOUBTFUL ONE. SAID R. AKIBA: HIS WORDS SEEM PLAUSIBLE IN THE CASE OF A MINOR MISAPPROPRIATION; BUT IF HIS DOUBT RELATED TO THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF A HUNDRED MANEHS, WOULD IT NOT BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO BRING A GUILT-OFFERING FOR TWO SELA'S RATHER THAN RESTORE OUT OF DOUBT THE SUM OF A HUNDRED MANEHS? R. AKIBA INDEED AGREES WITH R. TARFON IN THE CASE OF A MINOR MISAPPROPRIATION.
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GEMARA. It has been taught: The expression And if any one intimates that one is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubtful sacrilege; thus the view of R. Akiba. The Sages declare him exempt. May we assume that they differ in the following point: R. Akiba holds, we may derive the law above from the law below, while the [other] Rabbis hold, we may not derive the law above from the law below? — Said R. Papa: All agree that we may derive the law above from the law below, otherwise we should not find [a basis for the law] that a bullock has to be slaughtered on the north side of the altar; but the reason why the Rabbis here declare him exempt, lies in the textual analogy to a sin-offering based on the common term mitzwoth: as [that text] there speaks of an offence for which one is liable to kareth in the case of wilful transgression, to a sin-offering in the case of erroneous transgression, and to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubt, so for all other offences, for which one is liable to kareth in the case of wilful transgression, and to a sin-offering in the case of erroneous transgression, one is liable to a suspensive guilt-offering in the case of doubt; this excludes sacrilege, since for the wilful transgression thereof one is not liable to kareth, as has been taught: If one committed sacrilege wilfully, Rabbi says, He is liable to the death penalty; the Sages say, [He has merely transgressed] a prohibition. And R. Akiba? — He maintains that the textual analogy regarding the sin-offering for heleb, based upon the common term mitzwoth, is to be applied only for the following purpose: as that text relates to a fixed sacrifice, so must all be fixed sacrifices, thus excluding sacrifices of higher or lesser value. And the Rabbis? — They hold, a gezerah shawah cannot be applied partially. Are we, then, to conclude that R. Akiba holds that one may apply a gezerah shawah partially? — Say, rather, all agree that a gezerah shawah cannot be applied partially; but this is the reason of R. Akiba. The text says, And if any one: ‘And’ implies an addition to the foregoing, so we therefore derive the law above from the law below. And the Rabbis? — They hold [that the inference is in the reverse direction], and we must derive the law below from the law above regarding silver shekels for guilt-offerings. And R. Akiba? — He holds, a hekkesh cannot be applied partially. Are we, then, to conclude that the Rabbis hold that a hekkesh can be applied partially? Is it not definitely established that a hekkesh cannot be applied partially? — All agree that a hekkesh cannot be applied partially, but here the Rabbis maintain that the textual analogy founded upon the common term ‘mitzwoth’ supersedes the hekkesh. And R. Akiba? — The law regarding silver shekels for guilt-offerings he derives from: This is the law of the guilt-offering: there is one law for all guilt-offerings, which includes the silver shekels. And the Rabbis? — Although it is written, ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, there is still need for the phrase, ‘and if any one’, the ‘and’ implying an addition to the foregoing, and thereby deriving the law below from the law above. For as to [the passage], ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, from which is derived that one law rules all guilt-offerings, it might be said to apply to unconditional guilt-offerings only [and not to suspensive guilt-offerings]; for since the suspensive guilt-offering is brought [e.g.] for [the eating of] doubtful heleb, I might have argued that doubtful transgression should not be more stringent than certain transgression; and as in the case of certain transgression a sin-offering of the value of a danka suffices, so also in the case of doubtful transgression a guilt-offering of the value of a danka should suffice. It is for this reason that the Divine Law wrote, ‘And if any one’, the ‘and’ implying an addition to the foregoing. The above [conclusion of R. Akiba] is valid according to him who holds that an inference may be made from [the text], ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’; but according to him who holds that one cannot make any inference from, ‘This is the law of the guilt-offering’, what can be said? — The law will then be derived from that relating to the guilt-offering of sacrilege by a textual analogy based upon the common term be'erkeka; whilst regarding the guilt-offering of the designated bondmaid, in connection with which be'erkeka is not mentioned, the law will be derived by an analogy based upon the common term ayil. R. AKIBA, HOWEVER, ADMITS etc. What is the meaning of AND IF THE SACRILEGE WAS DOUBTFUL? — Said Raba: Read, ‘And if the doubt remains for ever, it shall be a suspensive guilt-offering, since that which is offered for a known [trespass] is of the same kind as that offered for a doubtful one’. But has he not, after all, to bring an unconditional guilt-offering when he becomes aware of the transgression? — Said Raba: From this ruling of both we learn that knowledge at the outset is not essential with regard to an unconditional guilt-offering. MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN BROUGHT A SIN-OFFERING OF A BIRD BY REASON OF A DOUBT, AND PRIOR TO THE PINCHING OF ITS NECK SHE LEARNT THAT THE BIRTH WAS A CERTAINTY, SHE SHALL OFFER IT AS FOR A CERTAINTY, FOR THAT WHICH SHE OFFERS IN THE CASE OF CERTAINTY IS OF THE SAME KIND AS THAT WHICH SHE OFFERS IN THE CASE OF DOUBT. [IF THERE WAS] A PIECE OF UNCONSECRATED FOOD AND A PIECE OF CONSECRATED FOOD, AND A PERSON ATE ONE OF THEM AND DOES NOT KNOW WHICH OF THEM HE ATE, HE IS EXEMPT. R. AKIBA DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING. IF HE THEN ATE THE SECOND [PIECE], HE IS LIABLE TO AN UNCONDITIONAL GUILT-OFFERING. IF HE ATE THE ONE [PIECE] AND ANOTHER CAME AND ATE THE OTHER, EACH OF THEM IS LIABLE TO A SUSPENSIVE GUILT-OFFERING; THIS IS THE VIEW OF R. AKIBA. R. SIMEON SAYS: THEY TOGETHER BRING ONE GUILT-OFFERING. SAID R. JOSE
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