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כריתות 20
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
R. Oshaia raised an objection: [We have learnt:] R. SIMEON SHEZURI AND R. SIMEON SAID: THEY DID NOT DISPUTE REGARDING TRANSGRESSIONS OF THE SAME DENOMINATION, WHEN [IT IS AGREED THAT] HE IS LIABLE. ABOUT WHAT DID THEY DISPUTE? ABOUT TRANSGRESSIONS OF DIFFERENT DENOMINATIONS: R. ELIEZER DECLARES HIM LIABLE TO A SIN-OFFERING, AND R. JOSHUA DECLARES HIM EXEMPT. And what did R. Judah [in the Mishnah] say? That their dispute was in the case of a person who intended to pick grapes and he picked figs, or black [grapes] and he gathered white ones. Now, are not figs and grapes, or black grapes and white grapes, of two different denominations? Is this not, then, identical with [the views of] R. Simeon and R. Simeon Shezuri? What then does R. Judah come to teach us? Hence you must say that they differ concerning unpurposed action, R. Judah holding that one is liable for unpurposed action; whereas R. Simeon and R. Simeon Shezuri hold that one is exempt for unpurposed action! — No; all agree that for unpurposed action one is exempt; they differ rather in this point: R. Simeon Shezuri holds that if the purpose escaped the gatherer's mind [and he erred] in respect of the same denomination, all agree that he is liable, and that their dispute is in the case [where the error related to] two different denominations; whilst R. Judah maintains that they differ both in the instance of one denomination and in that of two denominations. Raba said, They differ in the matter of sequence. As it has been taught: If there were before a person [on the Sabbath] two burning [or extinguished] candles and he intended to extinguish the one but extinguished the other, or to kindle the one but kindled the other, he is exempt; if he intended first to kindle the one and then to extinguish the other, and he first extinguished and then kindled, if with one breath he is liable, if with two breaths he is exempt. But is this not obvious? — I might have thought that since his design was not realized, seeing that he wanted first to kindle and then to extinguish, but in his act [we might regard it as if] the extinguishing was done first and then the kindling, he should accordingly be exempt; therefore we are told [that this is not so]; for although [the kindling] did not precede [the extinguishing], neither did it follow. Our Rabbis taught: If one removed coals [from a burning pile] on the Sabbath, he is liable to a sin-offering; R. Simeon b. Eleazar says in the name of R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok: He is liable to two [offerings], because he extinguished the upper coals and kindled the lower ones. How is this case to be understood? If he intended to extinguish as well as to kindle, what is the reason of the one who exempts him [from the second offering]? And if he did not intend to kindle, what is the reason of the one who holds him liable to two? — R. Eleazar and R. Hanina both explained the case as follows: He intended to extinguish the upper coals knowing that this would set the lower ones ablaze. The first Tanna holds that one is exempt for any kindling which is to his disadvantage; while R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok holds him liable. R. Johanan also said: It speaks of a blacksmith. Said R. Johanan: Until now the reason for this law has not been found. Ammi b. Abin and R. Hanania b. Abin both explained [the case as follows:]
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He intended to extinguish as well as to kindle. The first Tanna follows R. Jose's view, who holds, that kindling was singled out [in Scripture] in order to establish for it a prohibition; while R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok holds with R. Nathan, who maintains that kindling was singled out to establish separate [acts of work]. Raba explained: They differ in the matter of the sequence. Rab Ashi explained: He intended to extinguish and the kindling followed of its own accord; the first Tanna agrees with R. Simeon who maintains that one is exempt for an unintentional act; whilst R. Eliezer son of R. Zadok follows R. Judah who holds that one is liable for an unintentional act. Our Rabbis taught: If a man removed coals on the Sabbath in order to warm himself therewith, and they flared up of their own accord — one [Baraitha] teaches that he is liable, but another teaches that he is exempt. That which teaches that he is liable adopts the view that one is liable for an act of work which is not required for its own sake; and that which teaches that he is exempt adopts the view that one is not liable for an act of work which is not required for its own sake. MISHNAH. IF ONE ATE [AN OLIVE'S BULK] OF THE BLOOD OF SLAUGHTERED CATTLE, BEASTS OR FOWL, EITHER CLEAN OR UNCLEAN, OR OF THE BLOOD OF A STABBED ANIMAL, OR OF THE BLOOD OF MUTILATION, OR OF THE BLOOD OF THE ARTERIES WHEREBY LIFE ESCAPES, HE IS LIABLE; BUT OF THE BLOOD OF THE SPLEEN OR OF THE HEART, OR OF THE BLOOD FOUND IN EGGS, OR OF THE BLOOD OF LOCUSTS, OR OF THE SECONDARY BLOOD, HE IS NOT LIABLE. R. JUDAH HOLDS: HE IS LIABLE FOR SECONDARY BLOOD. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: [From the text:] Ye shall eat no manner of blood, I might infer that even the blood of those that walk on two legs, and the blood found in eggs, and the blood of locusts and of fish were included; therefore the text teaches, whether it be of fowl or of beast: as fowl and beast are characterised in that they are subject both to light and weighty uncleanness, and are [at times] forbidden and permitted, and are of the category of flesh, so all are included that are subject to light and weighty uncleanness; I must therefore exclude the blood of those that walk on two legs, for they are subject to weighty uncleanness and not to light uncleanness; 17
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