עירובין 94

94:1

The tenants on either side may move their objects to the very foundation of the wall. The ruling of Rab, however, was not explicitly stated but was arrived at by implication. For Rab and Samuel were once sitting in a certain courtyard when a parting wall collapsed. ‘Take a cloak’, said Samuel to the people, ‘and spread it across, and Rab turned away his face. ‘If Abba objects’, Samuel told them, ‘take his girdle and the with it’. Now according to Samuel's view, what need was there for this, seeing that he ruled: ‘The tenants on either side may move their objects to the very foundation of the wall’? — Samuel did that merely for the sake of privacy. If Rab, however, held that this was forbidden, why did he not say so to him? The place was under Samuel's jurisdiction. If so, why did he turn away his face? — In order that it might not be said that he held the same opinion as Samuel. MISHNAH. IF THERE WAS A BREACH IN A WALL BETWEEN A COURTYARD AND A PUBLIC DOMAIN, ANY MAN WHO BRINGS ANY OBJECT FROM THE LATTER INTO A PRIVATE DOMAIN OR FROM A PRIVATE DOMAIN INTO IT IS GUILTY OF AN OFFENCE; SO R. ELIEZER. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: WHETHER A MAN CARRIED AN OBJECT FROM IT INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAin INTO IT HE IS EXEMPT BECAUSE IT HAS THE SAME STATUS AS A KARMELITH. GEMARA. As to R. Eliezer, does it become a public domain because there was a breach between it and the public domain? Yes; R. Eliezer follows his view, it having been taught: R. Judah citing R. Eliezer said: If the public chose a path for themselves, that which they have chosen is theirs. But this cannot be right, for did not R. Giddal citing Rab explain: This applies only to a case where their path had been lost in that field? And Should you reply that here also it is a case where their path had been lost in that courtyard, surely, [it could be retorted], did not R. Hanina state, ‘The dispute referred to [all the courtyard] as far as the position of its walls’? Read: The dispute concerned only the position of the wall. And if you prefer I might reply: Their dispute refers to the status of the sides of a public road, R. Eliezer holding that the sides of a public road are like the public road while the Rabbis hold that the sides of a public road are not like the public road. Why then did they not express their difference of opinion in respect of the sides of public roads generally? — If they had expressed their difference of view in respect of the sides of public roads generally it might have been assumed that the Rabbis; differed from R. Eliezer only where there were border-stones but where there were no border-stones they agree with him, hence we were informed [that even in the latter case they also differ from him]. But did he not say: FROM IT? — As the Rabbis used the expression FROM IT he also used a similar expression. As to the Rabbis however, how is it that R. Eliezer speaks of the sides of a public road and they retort to him FROM IT? — It is this that the Rabbis said to R. Eliezer: You agree with us, do you not, that where a man moved an object from it into a public domain or from a public domain into it he is exempt because it is a karmelith, well the same law should apply to the sides also. And R. Eliezer? There not many people tread on the spot but here they do. MISHNAH. IF A BREACH WAS MADE IN TWO SIDES OF A COURTYARD TOWARDS A PUBlic DOMAIN, AND SO ALSO IF A BREACH WAS MADE IN TWO SIDES OF A HOUSE, OR IF THE CROSS-BEAM OR SIDE-POST OF AN ALLEY WAS REMOVED, THE OCCUPIERS ARE PERMITTED THEIR USE FOR THAT SABBATH BUT FORBIDDEN ON FUTURE SABBATHS; SO R. JUDAH. R. JOSE RULED: IF THEY ARE PERMITTED THEIR USE ON THAT SABBATH THEY ARE ALSO PERMITTED ON FUTURE SABBATHS AND IF THEY ARE FORBIDDEN (IN FUTURE SABBATHS THEY ARE ALSO FORBIDDEN ON THAT SABBATH. GEMARA. With what kind of breach do we deal? If it be suggested: With one that was not wider then ten cubits, wherein, then, [it may be objected, does a breach] in one side differ [in such a case from breaches in two sides? Is it] that it may be regarded as a doorway, [should not breaches] in two sides also be regarded as doorways? If, however, the breach spoken of was wider than ten cubits, [should not the same restrictioss apply] even where it was only in one side? Rab replied: The fact is [that the breach spoken off was] not wider than ten cubits 54

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94:2

but it was one, for instance, that occurred in a corner where people make no doors. AND SO ALSO IF A BREACH WAS MADE IN TWO SIDES OF A HOUSE. Wherein does a breach in one side differ [from breaches in two sides]? Is it in that it may be assumed that the edge of the ceiling is deemed to extend downward and to close the gap, why should it not be assumed in the case of breaches in two sides also that the edge of the beam extends and closes them up? — At the school of Rab it was explained on the authority of Rab: This is a case of a house whose breaches, for instance, occurred in a corner and whose ceiling was lying in a slanting position so that it cannot be said that the edge of the ceiling extends downwards and closes them up. Samuel, however, replied: The breach might have been even wider than ten cubits. If so, should not the same restrictions apply even where the breach was made in one side? — [This was not mentioned] on account of the house. But does not the same difficulty arise in respect of a house: Wherein does a breach in one side differ [from breaches in two sides]? If it is in the assumption that the edge of the ceiling descends downward and closes the breach, why should not the same assumption, that the edge of the ceiling extends downwards and closes up the breaches, be made where these breaches occurred in two sides? Furthermore, it may be objected, does Samuel at all uphold the principle that the edge of a ceiling is deemed to descend downwards to close a gap, seeing that it was stated: ‘if an exedra was situated in a valley it is, Rab ruled, permitted to move objects within all its interior, but Samuel ruled: Objects may be moved within four cubits only’? — This is no difficulty: He does not uphold the principle in respect of four walls only but in respect of three walls he does. Does not the first difficulty, at any rate, remain? — As at the school of Rab it was explained in the name of Rab, ‘This is a case of a house whose breaches, for instance, occurred in a corner and whose ceiling was in a slanting position’, so here also it may be explained: This is a case of a house whose breaches, for instance, occurred in a corner and whose ceiling presented a four sided breach. Samuel does not give the same explanation as Rab since it was not stated that the ceiling was slanting. Rab, on the other hand, does not give the same explanation as Samuel, for in that case the house would in this respect have been in the same legal position as an exedra, and Rab follows his view that it is permitted to move objects in all the interior of an exedra, for it was stated: If an exedra, was situated in a valley, Rab ruled, it is permitted to move objects within all its interior; but Samuel ruled: Objects may be moved within four cubits only. Rab ruled that it was permitted to move objects in all its interior because we apply the principle: The edge of the ceiling descends and closes up. But Samuel ruled that objects might be moved within four cubits only because we do not apply the principle: The edge of the ceiling descends and closes up. [Where a breach was not wider than] ten cubits there is no divergence of opinion between them. They only differ where [the breach was] wider than ten cubits. Others read: Where it was wider than ten cubits there is no divergence of opinion between them, and they only differ [where it was not wider than] ten cubits. With reference, however, to Rab Judah's ruling

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