עירובין 46

46:1

But should it not then be forbidden all the more because it was produced on the festival? — The fact, however, is that the water in the clouds is in constant motion. Now you have arrived at this explanation you can raise no difficulty about the ocean either, since the water in the ocean is also in constant motion, and it was taught: Running rivers and gushing springs are on a par with the feet of all men. R. Jacob b. Idi stated in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: The halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri. Said R. Zera to R. Jacob b. Idi: ‘Did you hear it explicitly or did you understand it by implication?’ — ‘I’, the other replied: ‘have heard it explicitly’ — What was that general statement? — [The one in] which R. Joshua b. Levi has laid down: The halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of the laws of ‘erub. What need then was there for the two statements? — R. Zera replied: Both were required. For if we had been informed only that ‘the halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri’, it might have been assumed [that this applies in all cases] whether the halachah leads to a relaxation or to a restriction; hence we were informed that ‘the halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of the laws of ‘erub.’ Then let him state, ‘The halachah is in agreement with the authority that maintains the less restrictive ruling in respect of ‘erub’; for what purpose was it necessary to state also that ‘the halachah is in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri’? — It was required because it might have been presumed that the statement applied only to an individual authority who differs from another individual authority or to several authorities who differ from several other authorities, but not to an individual authority who differed from several authorities. Said Raba to Abaye: Consider! The laws of ‘erub are Rabbinical, [of course]. Why then should it matter whether an individual differs from another individual or whether an individual authority differs from several other authorities? — Said R. Papa to Raba: Is there no difference in the case of a Rabbinical law between a dispute of two individuals and one between an individual authority and several other authorities? Have we not in fact learnt: R. Eliezer ruled: For any woman who had passed three menstrual periods [without observing any discharge of blood] it is sufficient [to regard herself as menstrually unclean from] the time when she [observed a re-appearance of such a discharge]. And it was taught: It once happened that Rabbi gave a practical decision in agreement with the ruling of R. Eliezer, and after he had recollected he remarked: R. Eliezer deserves to be relied upon in a time of need. Now what is meant by the expression ‘after he recollected’? If it be suggested: After he recollected that the halachah was not in agreement with R. Eliezer but with the Rabbis [the difficulty would arise:] How could he act in agreement with his view even in a time of need? It must consequently be conceded that the law was laid down neither in agreement with R. Eliezer nor in agreement with the Rabbis, and that it was after he had recollected that not one individual but several authorities differed from him that he remarked: ‘R. Eliezer deserves to be relied upon in a time of need’. Said R. Mesharsheya to Raba (or, as others say. R. Nahman b. Isaac said to Raba): Is there no difference in the case of a Rabbinical law between a dispute of two individuals and one between an individual authority and several authorities? Was it not in fact taught: [On receiving] an early report [of the death of a near relative both] the seven and the thirty days of mourning must be observed [but on receiving] a belated one only one day of mourning is to be observed. And what is meant by ‘early’ and ‘belated’? [A report received] within thirty [days of the death is said to be] ‘early’ [and one received] after thirty [days from the death is said to be] ‘belated’; so R. Akiba. The Sages, however, ruled: Whether a report is early or belated both the seven and the thirty days of mourning must be observed. And in connection with this Rabbah b. Bar Hana stated in the name of R. Johanan: Wherever you come across a law which an individual authority relaxes and several authorities restrict, the halachah is in agreement with the majority who restrict it, except in this case where the halachah is in agreement with R. Akiba, though he relaxes the law and the Sages restrict it. In this respect he is of the same opinion as Samuel who laid down: The halachah is in agreement with the authority that relaxes the law in the case of a mourner. Thus it follows that it is only in the case of mourning that the Rabbis have relaxed the law but that elsewhere, even in respect of a Rabbinical law a difference is to be made between a dispute of two individuals and a dispute of an individual authority against a number of authorities!

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46:2

R. Papa replied: It was required: Since it might have been presumed that this applied Only to ‘erubs of courtyards but not to ‘erubs of Sabbath limits, hence it was necessary [to make that statement also]. Whence however, is it derived that a distinction is made between ‘erubs of courtyards and ‘erubs of Sabbath limits? — From what we learned: R. Judah ruled: This applies Only to ‘erubs of Sabbath limits but in the case of ‘erubs of courtyards an ‘erub may be prepared for a person whether he is aware of it or not, since a privilege may be conferred upon a man in his absence but no disadvantage may be imposed upon him except in his presence. R. Ashi replied: It was required: Since it might have been assumed that this applied only to the remnants of an ‘erub but not to the beginnings of one. Whence, however, is it derived that a distinction is made between the remnants of an ‘erub and the beginnings of one? — From what we learned: R. Jose ruled: This applies only to the beginnings of the ‘erub but in the case of the remnants of one even the smallest quantity of food is sufficient, the sole reason for the injunction to provide ‘erubs for courtyards being that the law of ‘erub shall not be forgotten by the children. R. Jacob and R. Zerika said: The halachah is always in agreement with R. Akiba when he differs from a colleague of his; with R. Jose even when he differs from several of his colleagues, and with Rabbi when he differs from a colleague of his. To what [extent were these meant to influence] the law in practice? — R. Assi replied: [To the extent of adopting them for] general practice, R. Hiyya b. Abba replied. [To the extent of being] inclined [in their favour], and R. Jose son of R. Hanina replied: [To the extent only of viewing them merely as] apparently acceptable. In the same sense did R. Jacob b. Idi rule in the name of R. Johanan: In a dispute between R. Meir and R. Judah the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah, in one between R. Judah and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose; and there is no need to state that in a dispute between R. Meir and R. Jose the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose, for, since [it has been laid down that the opinion of the former is] of no consequence where it is opposed by that of R. Judah, can there be any question [as to its inconsequence] where it is opposed by that of R. Jose? R. Assi said: I also learn that in a dispute between R. Jose and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Jose; for R. Abba has laid down on the authority of R. Johanan that in a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah — Now [since the latter's opinion is] of no consequence where it is opposed by R. Judah can there be any question [as to its inconsequence] where it is opposed by that of R. Jose? The question was raised: What [is the law where a ruling is a matter of dispute between] R. Meir and R. Simeon? — This is undecided. R. Mesharsheya stated: Those rules are to be disregarded. Whence does R. Mesharsheya derive this view? If it be suggested: From the following where we learned, R. SIMEON REMARKED: TO WHAT MAY THIS CASE BE COMPARED? TO THREE COURTYARDS THAT OPEN ONE INTO THE OTHER AND ALSO INTO A PUBlic DOMAIN, WHERE, IF THE TWO OUTER ONES MADE AN ERUB WITH THE MIDDLE ONE, IT IS PERMITTED TO HAVE ACCESS TO THEM AND THEY ARE PERMITTED ACCESS TO IT, BUT THE TWO OUTER ONES ARE FORBIDDEN ACCESS TO ONE ANOTHER; in connection with which R. Hama b. Goria stated in the name of Rab, ‘The halachah is in agreement with R. Simeon’, and who is it that differs from him? Evidently R. Judah; and since [this cannot be reconciled with what] has been laid down that ‘In a dispute between R. Judah and R. Simeon the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah’ it must consequently follow that those rules are to be disregarded? But is this really a difficulty? Is it not possible that the rules are disregarded only where a ruling to the contrary had been stated, but that where no such ruling is stated the rules remain in force? — [R. Mesharsheya's view] is rather derived from the following where we learned: ‘If a town that belonged to an individual was converted into one belonging to many, one ‘erub may be provided for all the town; but if a town belonged to many and was converted into one belonging to an individual no single ‘erub may he provided for all the town unless a section of it of the size of the town of Hadashah in Judea, which contains fifty residents, is excluded; so R. Judah. R. Simeon ruled:

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