Parallel
עירובין 20
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
that there are two kinds of trees? [Well then] in this case also [one might submit that there are] two kinds of wall. Abaye enquired of Rabbah: If a courtyard opened out on one side into [an area] between the strips of wood [around a well], is it [permitted] to move objects from its interior into that between the strips and from between the strips to its interior? The other replied: This is permitted. ‘What if two [courtyards opened out in a similar manner]?’ — ‘It is forbidden’, the other replied. Said R. Huna: [In the case of] two [courtyards the movement of objects is] forbidden even [where the tenants] have prepared an ‘erub, this being a preventive measure against the possible assumption that an ‘erub is effective in the case of a space enclosed by strips of wood. Raba said: If [the tenants] prepared an ‘erub [the movement of objects is] permitted. Said Abaye to Raba: ‘[A ruling] was taught which provides support to your view: If a courtyard opens out on one side into [an area] between the strips of wood [around a well] it is permitted to move objects from its interior into that between the strips and from between the strips to the interior, but if two [courtyards opened out in this manner the movement of objects is] forbidden. This, however, applies only where [the tenants] prepared no ‘erub but where they did prepare an ‘erub’ they are allowed [to move their objects]’. Must it be said that this presents an objection against R. Huna? — R. Huna can answer you: There [it is a case] where [a breach] also combined them. Abaye enquired of Raba: What [is the ruling where] the water dried up on the Sabbath? The other replied: [The enclosure] was recognized [as a valid] partition only on account of the water, [and since] no water is here available, there is here no [validity] in the partition either. Rabin enquired: What [is the ruling where] the water dried up on the Sabbath and on [the same] Sabbath [other water] appeared? — Abaye replied: Where they were dried up on the Sabbath you have no need to ask, for I have already asked [this question] from the Master and he made it plain to me that it was forbidden. [As regards water that] appeared [on the Sabbath] you have also no need to enquire, for [the enclosure] would thus be a partition made on the Sabbath, concerning which it was taught: Any partition that was put up on the Sabbath is valid whether [this was done] unwittingly, intentionally, under compulsion or willingly. But has it not been stated in connection with this ruling that R. Nahman said: This applied only to throwing but not to moving? R. Nahman's statement was made only in respect of [a partition that was put up] intentionally. R. Eleazar said: One who throws [any object] into [the area] between strips [of wood] around wells is liable. [Is not this] obvious, for if [the strips had] not [Pentateuchally constituted a valid] partition how could it have been permitted to draw water? — [The ruling] was necessary only [for this purpose:] That [a man] who put up, in a public domain, [an enclosure] similar to that of strips of wood around wells, and threw an object into it, is liable. But is not this also obvious, [for if such an imperfect enclosure] would not [have been regarded as a valid] partition elsewhere, how could one be permitted to move any objects [within such an imperfect enclosure] in the case of a cistern? — [The ruling] was rather necessary [for this purpose:] Although many people cross the enclosure [it is regarded as a private domain]. What [principle,] however, does he thereby teach us? That even [the passage of] many people does not destroy [the validity of] a partition? But [this, it may be contended, was already] once said [by] R. Eleazar. For have we not learnt: R. Judah ruled: If a public road cuts through then, it should be diverted to [one of the] sides, and the Sages ruled: This was not necessary; and both R. Johanan and R. Eleazar remarked: Here they informed you of the unassailable validity of partitions? — If [the principle had to be derived] from there it might have been presumed that only ‘Here [etc.]’; but that he himself is not of the same opinion; hence we were told [that not only] ‘Here [etc.],’ but he himself also is of the same opinion. Then why did he not state this ruling and there would have been no need for the other? — The one was derived from the other. IT IS PERMITTED TO BRING [THE STRIPS] CLOSE TO THE WELL etc. Elsewhere we learned: A man must not stand in a public domain and drink in a private domain, or in a private one and drink in a public one, unless he puts his head and the greater part of his body into the domain in which he drinks,
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and the same [ruling applies to one drinking from, or] in a wine-press. Now in the case of a human being it has been laid down that it is necessary for his head and the greater part of his body [to be in the domain from which he drinks], is it necessary in the case of a cow also that its lead and the greater part of its body [shall be in the domain from which it drinks] or not? Wherever [the keeper] holds the vessel and does not hold the animal there can be no question that it is necessary for its head and the greater part of its body to be within [the private domain]. The question only arises where he holds the vessel and also the animal. Now what is the ruling? — The other replied: You have learnt it: PROVIDED A COW CAN BE WITHIN [THE ENCLOSURE WITH] ITS HEAD AND THE GREATER PART OF ITS BODY WHEN DRINKING. [This refers,] does it not, to a case where [the keeper] holds both the cow and the vessel? — No, [it may refer to one] who holds the vessel but not the cow. But is it at all permitted [to give drink to a cow on the Sabbath] where one holds the vessel and not the animal? Was it not in fact taught: A man must not fill [a vessel with] water and hold it before his beast on the Sabbath but he fills [his bucket] and pours it out [into a trough] and the cow drinks of its own accord? — Surely, in connection with this ruling it was stated: Abaye explained: Here [we are dealing] with a manger that stands in a public domain, that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide and one of whose sides projects into [the area] between the strips of wood, a preventive measure having been enacted against the possibility that the man might observe that the manger was damaged and, proceeding to repair it, would carry the bucket with him and thus carry an object from a private into a public domain. But does one incur guilt in such circumstances? Has not R. Safra in the name of R. Ammi who had it from R. Johanan in fact said: If a man was removing his things from one corner into another and then changed his mind and carried them out [into a public domain] he is exempt, since the lifting up [of the objects] was not originally intended for this purpose? — Rather [this is the explanation:] Sometimes he might, after he repaired the manger, carry [the bucket] back again and thus he would carry from the public into a private domain. Some there are who say: In the case of a human being it had definitely been laid down that it was enough if his head and the greater part of his body [were in the domain from which he drinks]. Is it enough, however, in the case of a cow, that its head and the greater part of its body [should be in the domain from which it drinks] or not? Wherever [the keeper] holds the vessel and also the cow, there can be no question that it is enough for its head and the greater part of its body to be [within the private domain]. The question only arises where he holds the vessel but not the cow. Now what is the ruling? — The other replied: You have learnt it: PROVIDED A COW CAN BE WITHIN [THE ENCLOSURE WITH] ITS HEAD AND THE GREATER PART OF ITS BODY WHEN DRINKING. [This refers,] does it not, to a case where [the keeper] holds the vessel but not the cow? — No, [it may refer to one] who holds both the vessel and the cow. And this may also be justified logically; for if he held the vessel only and not the cow, would [the supply of the water have been] permitted seeing that it was in fact taught: A man must not fill [a vessel with] water to hold it before his beast [on the Sabbath], but he fills [his bucket] and pours it out [into a trough] and the cow drinks of its own accord? Surely, in connection with this ruling it was stated: Abaye explained: Here [we are dealing] with a manger that stands in a public domain, that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and one of whose sides projects into [an area] between the strips of wood [where it is possible] that the man might sometimes observe that the manger was damaged and, proceeding to repair it, would carry the bucket with him and thus carry an object from a private into a public domain. Does one, however, incur guilt in such circumstances? Has not R. Safra in the name of R. Ammi who had it from R. Johanan in fact said: If a man was removing his things from one corner into another and then changed his mind and carried them out [into a public domain] he is exempt, since the lifting up [of the objects] was not originally intended for this purpose? — Rather, [this is the explanation:] Sometimes he might, after he had repaired the manger, carry [the bucket] back again, and would thus carry from the public into a private domain. Come and hear: A camel whose head and the greater part of its body is within [a private domain] may be crammed within [that domain]. Now is not the act of cramming, the same as holding the bucket and the animal, and yet it is required that its head and the greater part of its body [shall be within the private domain]. R. Aha son of R. Huna replied in the name of R. Shesheth: A camel is different since its neck is long. Come and hear: A beast whose head and the greater part of its body is within [a private domain] may be crammed within [that domain]. Is not cramming the same as holding the bucket and the animal, and yet it was required that its head and the greater part of its body [shall be within the private domain]. [It may be objected] that by the expression of ‘beast’, also a camel [was meant]. Were not, however, both camel and beast separately mentioned? — Were they mentioned in juxtaposition? So it was also taught: R. Eleazar forbids this in the case of a camel, because its neck is long. R. Isaac b. Adda stated: Strips [of wood] around wells were permitted to festival pilgrims only. But was it not taught: Strips [of wood] around wells were permitted for cattle only? — By cattle [was meant] the cattle of the festival pilgrims, but a human being40
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