Chullin — Daf 31b

וכלים דומיא דאדם מה אדם דבעינן כוונה אף כלים נמי דקא מכוין להו אדם

וכי תימא ביושב ומצפה מאי למימרא

מהו דתימא ליגזר משום חרדלית של גשמים אי נמי ליגזר ראשין אטו כיפין קמ"ל דלא גזרינן

ומנא תימרא דלא מטבלינן בכיפין דתנן מטבילין בראשין ואין מטבילין בכיפין שאין מטבילין באויר

אלא חולין דלא בעי כוונה מיהא מנלן דתנן פירות שנפלו לתוך אמת המים ופשט מי שידיו טמאות ונטלן ידיו טהורות ופירות אינן בכי יותן

ואם בשביל שיודחו ידיו טהורות ופירות בכי יותן

איתיביה רבא לרב נחמן טבל לחולין והוחזק לחולין אסור למעשר הוחזק אין לא הוחזק לא

הכי קאמר אע"פ שהוחזק לחולין אסור למעשר

איתיביה טבל ולא הוחזק כאילו לא טבל מאי לאו כאילו לא טבל כלל

לא כאילו לא טבל למעשר אבל טבל לחולין הוא סבר דיחויי קא מדחי ליה נפק דק ואשכח דתניא טבל ולא הוחזק מותר לחולין ואסור למעשר

אמר ליה אביי לרב יוסף לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרבי יוחנן מהא

א"ל רבי יוחנן הוא דאמר כרבי יונתן בן יוסף

דתניא רבי יונתן בן יוסף אומר (ויקרא יג, נח) וכובס מה ת"ל שנית מקיש תכבוסת שניה לתכבוסת ראשונה מה תכבוסת ראשונה לדעת אף תכבוסת שניה לדעת

אי מה להלן בעינן דעת כהן אף כאן בעינן דעת כהן ת"ל (ויקרא יג, נח) וטהר מכל מקום

מתקיף לה רב שימי בר אשי ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי והאמר רבי יוחנן הלכה כסתם משנה

ותנן נפלה סכין ושחטה אע"פ ששחטה כדרכה פסולה והוינן בה טעמא דנפלה הא הפילה הוא כשרה ואע"ג דלא מיכוין ואמרינן מאן תנא דלא בעי כוונה לשחיטה אמר רבא רבי נתן היא

בשחיטה אפילו רבי יונתן בן יוסף מדגלי רחמנא מתעסק בקדשים פסול מכלל דחולין לא בעינן כוונה

ורבנן נהי דלא בעינן כוונה לזביחה לחתיכה בעינן

אמר רבא בהא זכנהו רבי נתן לרבנן מי כתיב וחתכת (דברים יב, כא) וזבחת כתיב אי בעינן כוונה לחתיכה אפילו לזביחה נמי ליבעי אי לא בעינן כוונה לזביחה לחתיכה נמי לא ליבעי

היכי דמי נדה שנאנסה וטבלה אילימא דאנסה חבירתה ואטבלה כוונה דחברתה כוונה מעלייתא היא

ועוד בתרומה נמי אכלה דתנן החרשת והשוטה והסומא ושנטרפה דעתה אם יש להן פקחות מתקנות אותן אוכלות בתרומה

א"ר פפא לר' נתן שנפלה מן הגשר ולרבנן שירדה להקר:

אמר רבא שחט פרה ושחט בהמה אחרת עמה לדברי הכל פסולה

And [on the contrary] vessels are to be on the same footing as a man, and as a man is capable of forming an intention so in the case of vessels a man must form an intention for them.1 But should you ask: If we are dealing with the case of a man who was sitting and waiting, why is it at all necessary to be taught?2 [I reply that] you might have disallowed [this immersion] as a precautionary measure lest he immerse himself in a torrent of rainwater;3 or you might have disallowed immersion at the edge4 [of the wave] as a precaution, lest it be thought that immersion is also allowed in the arch4 of the wave. We are therefore taught that no precautionary measures are necessary. And whence do we know that immersion is not allowed in the arch of the wave? — From [the following Baraitha] which was taught: Immersion is allowed at the edge [of the wave] but not in the arch of the wave, for immersion is not allowed in mid-air. Whence then do we derive the rule that in the case of common things the intention is not essential? — From [the following Mishnah] which we learnt: If fruits had fallen into a channel of water and a person whose hands were unclean stretched out his hands and took them, his hands have become clean,5 and the rule of ‘if water be put’6 does not apply to the fruits. But if his purpose was to wash his hands, his hands have become clean and the rule of ‘if water be put’ applies to the fruits. 7 Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman. [We have learnt:] If a man immersed himself to render himself fit to partake of common food and had this purpose in view, he is forbidden to partake of the Second Tithe.8 Now this is so only because he had this purpose in view, but if he did not have this purpose in view he may not [partake even of common food]!9 — [He replied,] This is what it means: Even though he had the purpose in view to render himself fit to partake of common food he is forbidden to eat Second Tithe. He raised this further objection: If he immersed himself but did not have any purpose in view, it is as if he had not immersed himself.8 Presumably it means: It is as if he had not immersed himself at all?9 — No, it means: It is as if he had not immersed himself for Second Tithe but he has certainly immersed himself for common food. Now he [Raba] thought that R. Nahman merely intended to point out a possible refutation; he accordingly went and searched, and found [the following Baraitha]: If he immersed himself and had no purpose in view, he is fit to eat common food but not Second Tithe. Abaye said to R. Joseph. Shall we say that this [last Baraitha] is a refutation of R. Johanan's view?10 — He replied. R. Johanan will concur with the view expressed by R. Jonathan b. Joseph. For it was taught: R. Jonathan b. Joseph says: It is written: And it shall be washed [the second time].11 Now what does ‘the second time’ teach us? We must compare the washing on the second occasion with the washing on the first occasion; as the latter must be intentional12 so the washing on the second occasion shall be intentional.13 But then it should follow, should it not, that as the washing on the first occasion must be by order of the priest, so shall the washing on the second occasion be by order of the priest? It is therefore written: ‘And it shall be clean’, in all circumstances. 14 But did R. Johanan really say this? Surely R. Johanan has stated that the halachah is always in accordance with the view of an anonymous Mishnah. And we have learnt: IF A KNIFE FELL DOWN AND SLAUGHTERED [AN ANIMAL]. EVEN THOUGH IT SLAUGHTERED IT IN THE PROPER WAY, THE SLAUGHTERING IS INVALID. And we argued the point thus: ‘This is so only because it fell down [of itself], but if one threw it [and it slaughtered an animal], the slaughtering would be valid, notwithstanding there was no intention [to slaughter according to ritual]’. And we asked: ‘Who is the Tanna that holds that the intention to slaughter [according to ritual] is not essential?’ And Raba said: ‘It is R. Nathan’!15 — With regard to shechitah even R. Jonathan b. Joseph16 would concede [that the intention is not essential]; for inasmuch as the Divine Law has expressly laid down that an act performed incidentally in connection with consecrated animals is invalid,17 it follows that with regard to ‘common’ things the intention is not essential. And the Rabbis?18 — [They will say:] Granted that with regard to ‘common’ animals It is not essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], but it is essential to have an intention to cut. In this matter, said Raba, R. Nathan triumphed over the Rabbis. For is there ever written: ‘And thou shalt cut?’ It is written: ‘And thou shalt slaughter’.19 Therefore, if it is essential to have the intention to cut, it is also essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], and if it is not essential to have the intention to slaughter [according to ritual], then it is not even essential to have the intention to cut. How did it happen that the menstruous woman accidentally immersed herself? Shall we say that another woman pushed her [into a mikweh] and she thus immersed herself? But surely the intention of the other woman is a perfect intention! Moreover, [in such a case] she would even be allowed to eat terumah! For we have learnt:20 If a woman was a deaf-mute or an imbecile or blind or not conscious [and she immersed herself], provided there were present women of sound mind to prepare everything for her, she may eat terumah! — R. Papa said: According to R. Nathan [it happened thus:] She fell from a bridge;21 according to the Rabbis [it happened thus:] She went down [into the sea] to cool herself.22 Raba said: If a person while slaughtering the Red Cow, slaughtered at the same time another animal, according to all views the Red Cow is invalid.23 is essential. immersed by the wave! the wave where it touches the ground, but not in the middle of the wave where it is arched above the ground; for it is essential that at the time of immersion the water must be touching the ground, and not suspended in mid-air. food the intention is not essential. uncleanness. Since the fruits became wet accidentally they are not thereby rendered susceptible to uncleanness; v. supra p. 77, n. 5. V. supra, loc. cit. common food. ‘common’ matters, whereas the above mentioned Baraitha states that an immersion without any special intention is valid with regard to ‘common’ food. the seventh day must be examined by a priest. If it is then found that the spot has remained stationary and has not spread over a greater surface, the garment must then be washed and locked away for a further seven days, at the end of which period it must be examined again by the priest. If it is now found that the infection has left, the garment must be washed a second time (here meaning: the ritual immersion in a mikweh) and it is then declared to be clean. express command of the priest. agreement with R. Johanan. garment becomes clean. slaughter according to ritual is not essential; but this is contrary to R. Johanan's view. 165. is not even required the intention to cut or to deal with the animal at all. Here the woman did not even have the intention to be in the water. regard to shechitah there must be the intention to cut, but not necessarily the intention to slaughter according to ritual.