חולין 2 — parallel

2:1

MISHNAH. ALL MAY SLAUGHTER, AND THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID, EXCEPT A DEAF — MUTE, AN IMBECILE OR A MINOR, LEST THEY INVALIDATE THEIR SLAUGHTERING; AND IF ANY OF THESE SLAUGHTERED WHILE OTHERS WERE STANDING OVER THEM, THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. STANDING OVER THEM, THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. GEMARA. The expression ALL MAY SLAUGHTER [implies a right] in the first instance, yet the expression AND THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID [implies merely a sanction] after the act! — R. Aha the son of Raba said to R. Ashi: Is it correct that the expression ‘ALL MAY . . .’ [implies a right] in the first instance? If so, [consider the Mishnah]: ‘All may change. whether man or woman’; is that also a right in the first instance? Is it not written: He shall not alter it, nor change it, a good for a bad, or a bad for a good? — No, for there the Mishnah goes on to explain: ‘Not that a person is allowed to change, but only that, if he has changed, the change is effective and he receives forty stripes’. Then, [consider this Mishnah]: ‘All may vow another's valuation and their valuation may be vowed by others, and they may vow another's worth and their worth may be vowed by others’; is that also a right in the first instance? Is it not written: And if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee? And it is further written: Better it is that thou shouldest not vow, than that thou shouldest vow and not pay. And it has been taught: Better than both is he who does not vow at all; this is the opinion of R. Meir. R. Judah says. Better than both is he who vows and pays. Now, even R. Judah refers only to the case of one who says. ‘Behold, let this be a sacrifice’,

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2:2

but not to the case of one who says. ‘Behold, I take it upon me [to bring a sacrifice]’. Does then the expression ‘ALL MAY . . . ‘ never imply a right in the first instance? What then of the statements: ‘All must observe the law of Sukkah’, and, ‘All must observe the law of Zizith’? Do these not imply a duty in the first instance? — [No;] I do not say so of the expression ‘All must’. Then take this case: ‘All lay the hand [upon the head of the sacrifice], whether man or woman’. Does this not mean a duty in the first instance? Surely it is written: And he shall lay his hand . . . and it shall be accepted for him. — The truth of the matter is: ‘ALL MAY . . . ‘ sometimes implies a right in the first instance and sometimes implies a sanction after the act. This being so, in the case of our Mishnah, why should you say that it is a right in the first instance and consequently raise a difficulty? Say, rather, it is a sanction after the act and there will be no difficulty. — He replied: My difficulty is the expression. AND THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID. Since it states, AND THEIR SLAUGHTERING IS VALID, which is obviously a sanction after the act, ALL MAY SLAUGHTER must be a right in the first instance, for otherwise why is it necessary to state the sanction after the act twice? Rabbah b. Ulla said: This is the interpretation of the Mishnah. ALL MAY SLAUGHTER: even an unclean person [may slaughter] a common beast. An unclean person [may slaughter] a common beast! Surely this is obvious! — What is meant is this: [An unclean person may slaughter] a common beast in connection with which the cleanness proper to hallowed things has been observed; and the Tanna is of the opinion that common things kept in the cleanness proper to hallowed things are regarded as hallowed. How does he [the unclean person] proceed [in slaughtering]? — He fetches a long knife and slaughters therewith so as to avoid touching the flesh [of the beast]. But in the case of consecrated beasts he should not slaughter lest he touch the flesh. Nevertheless, if he did slaughter and declared: ‘I am certain that I did not touch the flesh’, his slaughtering is valid. EXCEPT A DEAF-MUTE, AN IMBECILE OR A MINOR: whose slaughtering even in the case of common beasts, and even after the act is invalid, lest they pause, press or thrust. [Now on this interpretation, when the Mishnah continues:] AND IF ANY OF THESE SLAUGHTERED, to which [persons] does this statement refer? If we were to say it refers to a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, [in that case], having just now dealt with these, [the Tanna] should have said: ‘And if they slaughtered’! And if it refers to an unclean person slaughtering a common beast, surely you have said that he may slaughter even in the first instance! Or again, if it refers to an unclean person slaughtering a consecrated beast, surely you have said that in his case it is sufficient if he said: ‘I am certain [that i did not touch the flesh]’! — [It refers to the latter case] when he is not present to be questioned. But is the law concerning an unclean person slaughtering a consecrated beast derived from [our Mishnah] here? Is it not derived from [that other Mishnah] there which reads: If any of those who are unfit [for service in the Temple] slaughtered [a consecrated beast], the slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid even if performed by them that are not priests or by women or by slaves or by unclean persons, and even if the beast was intended for a sacrifice of the highest grade; provided that the unclean person does not touch the flesh? — Here [our Mishnah] is the source of the law; [the other Mishnah] there mentions the unclean person slaughtering consecrated animals only because it mentions all others who are unfit. If you wish, however, I can say. There is the source of the law, seeing that it is in the tractate which deals with consecrated things; [our Mishnah] here mentions the unclean person slaughtering consecrated beasts only because it mentions the unclean person slaughtering common beasts. This unclean person of whom we speak, how did he become unclean? If we were to say that he became unclean by touching a corpse, [there is this difficulty]. The Divine law says: One slain with a sword,

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