Parallel
חולין 114
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
whenever a man does not incur stripes for the eating he likewise does not incur stripes for the cooking thereof. Another version runs as follows: There is no dispute at all that for the cooking he certainly incurs stripes; they differ only with regard to the eating thereof: he who says he does not incur stripes contends that a prohibition cannot be superimposed upon an existing prohibition, and he who says he incurs stripes contends that for this very reason did the Divine Law express the prohibition of eating by the term ‘cooking’ [to signify that] whenever a man incurs stripes for the cooking he likewise incurs stripes for the eating thereof. Alternatively you may say: One teaches one thing, the other teaches another thing, but they do not differ at all. An objection was raised. If a man cooked [flesh] in whey, he is not liable. If he cooked blood in milk, he is not liable. If he cooked bones, nerves, horns or hoofs in milk, he is not liable. If he cooked [consecrated flesh] that was piggul or left over or unclean [flesh] in milk, he is liable! — That Tanna is of the opinion that a prohibition can be superimposed upon an existing prohibition. ‘If a man cooked flesh in whey, he is not liable’. This supports the view of R. Simeon b. Lakish. For we have learnt: Whey is counted as milk, and the sap [of olives] is counted as oil. Said R. Simeon b. Lakish: They taught this only in respect of rendering seeds susceptible to contract uncleanness, but in respect of the prohibition of cooking flesh in milk whey is not counted as milk. Our Rabbis taught: [It is written: Thou shalt not seethe a kid] in its mother's milk. From this I know [that the kid is forbidden] in its mother's milk, but whence do I know [that it is also forbidden] in cow's milk or in ewe's milk? From the following a fortiori argument: If [in the milk of] its mother, a species with which the kid may be mated, it is forbidden to cook [the kid], how much more [in the milk of] a cow or of a ewe, with which species the kid may not be mated, is it forbidden to cook [the kid]! And the text also states: In its mother's milk. But why is this [latter] verse necessary? It has been inferred [from the a fortiori argument], has it not? — R. Ashi answered: Because one can argue that the first proposition of the [a fortiori] argument is unsound: Whence do you adduce the argument? From ‘its mother’! [As against this it may be argued] that is so in the case of its mother, since it is forbidden to be slaughtered [with the kid on the same day]; will you then say the same in the case of a cow which is not forbidden to be slaughtered [with the kid on the same day]? The text therefore teaches, ‘In its mother's milk’. Another [Baraitha] teaches: It is written: ‘In its mother's milk’. From this I know [that the kid is forbidden] in its mother's milk, but where do I know [that it is forbidden] in the milk of its ‘older sister’! From the following a fortiori argument: If [in the milk of] its mother, which enters the cattle-pen together [with the kid] to be tithed, it is forbidden to cook [the kid], how much more [in the milk of] its ‘older sister’, which does not enter the cattlepen together [with the kid] to be tithed, is it forbidden to cook the kid! And the text also teaches, ‘In its mother's milk’. But why is this latter verse necessary? It has been inferred [from the a fortiori argument], has it not? — R. Ashi answered: Because one can argue that the first proposition of the [a fortiori] argument is unsound. Whence do you adduce the argument? From its mother! [As against this it may be argued] that is so in the case of its mother, since it is forbidden to be slaughtered [with the kid on the same day]; will you then say the same in the case of its ‘older sister’ which is not forbidden to be slaughtered [with the kid on the same day]? The text therefore teaches, ‘In its mother's milk’. We have thus learnt [the prohibition with regard to] ‘the older sister’, but whence do we know it with regard to ‘the younger sister’? It can be inferred from both together. But from which do you proceed to make the inference? You may infer it from ‘its mother’. But [if it be objected to that] this is so in the case of ‘its mother’, since it may not be slaughtered [with the kid on the same day]. then the case of ‘the older sister’ argues otherwise. And [if it be objected to that] this is so in the case of ‘the older sister’, since it does not enter the cattlepen with the kid to be tithed, then the case of ‘its mother’ argues otherwise. The argument thus goes round; the reason given for this does not apply to the other, and the reason given for the other does not apply to this one. What they have in common is that each is flesh, and in the milk of each [the kid] may not be cooked; thus I will include ‘the younger sister’ too, for since it is flesh, [the kid] may not be cooked in its milk. But by this argument ‘the older sister’ can also be inferred from both together? — This is indeed so. Then for what purpose do I require the verse: ‘In its mother's milk’? — It is required for what has been taught. It is written: ‘In its mother's milk’. We know [that it is forbidden] in its mother's milk,
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but whence do we know [that it is forbidden] in its own milk? From the following a fortiori argument: if, where the fruit is not forbidden with the fruit — as in the case of slaughtering — the fruit with the dam is forbidden, how much more, therefore, where the fruit is forbidden with the fruit — as in the case of cooking — is the fruit forbidden with the dam! And the text also teaches, ‘In its mother's milk’. But why is this latter verse necessary? It has been inferred [from the a fortiori argument], has it not? — R. Ahadboi b. Ammi answered: Because we can refute the argument thus: A colt, the offspring of a mare, and which is also the ‘brother’ of a mule, could prove otherwise: for the fruit is forbidden with the fruit, nevertheless the fruit with the dam is permitted. But surely [this is no refutation since] that is due to the seed of the sire only; for, in truth, the case of a male mule, the offspring of a mare, and which is also the ‘brother’ of a female mule, could prove the reverse: for the fruit is permitted with the fruit and the fruit with the dam is forbidden! Rather said Mar the son of Rabina: Because one can refute the argument thus: A slave, the son of a bondwoman, who is also the brother of a freed bondwoman, could prove otherwise: for the fruit is forbidden with the fruit, nevertheless the fruit with the mother is permitted. But [this too is no refutation since] that position is due solely to the deed of emancipation; for, in truth, the case of a slave, the son of a freed bondwoman, who is also the brother of a bondwoman, could prove the reverse: for the fruit is permitted with the fruit, and the fruit with the ‘mother’ is forbidden! Rather said R. Idi b. Abin: Because one can refute the argument thus: The case of diverse seeds could prove otherwise: for the fruit is forbidden with the fruit, nevertheless the fruit with the mother is permitted. But is not the fruit with the fruit forbidden only by reason of the ‘mother’? For when grains of wheat and barley are together in a vessel they are not forbidden! — Rather said R. Ashi: Because one can refute the argument thus. It is indeed [forbidden] in the case of fruit with fruit for they are two separate bodies; will you say the same in the case of the fruit with the dam which is one body? Consequently the [extra] verse is necessary. R. Ashi said: Whence do we know that flesh [cooked] in milk may not be eaten? From the verse: Thou shalt not eat any abominable thing; everything which I declared to be abominable to you comes under the law of Thou shalt not eat. I know from this that it is forbidden to be eaten; whence do I know that it is forbidden to derive any benefit from it? From R. Abbahu's statement. For R. Abbahu stated in the name of R. Eleazar: Wherever Scripture says: ‘It shall not be eaten’, or ‘Thou shalt not eat’, or ‘Ye shall not eat’, a prohibition both in respect of eating and in respect of deriving benefit is implied, unless Scripture expressly states otherwise as it did in the case of nebelah. For it has been taught: [The verse,] Ye shall not eat of anything which dieth of itself; unto the stranger that is within thy gates thou mayest give it, that he may eat it,’ or thou mayest sell it unto a gentile, only tells me that it may be given away [as a gift] to a stranger or sold to a gentile. How do I know that it may be sold to a stranger? Because Scripture says. ‘Unto the stranger . . . thou mayest give it . . . or thou mayest sell it’. How do I know that it may be given away to a gentile? Because Scripture says. ‘Thou mayest give it . . . or thou mayest sell it unto a gentile’. Hence it may be derived that both giving and selling may be applied to a stranger or to a gentile: so R. Meir. R. Judah says: The words are to be taken literally, viz., giving away to a stranger and selling to a gentile. What is the reason for R. Judah's view? — He contends thus: Were the words to be interpreted according as R. Meir suggests, the Divine Law should have said: ‘Ye shall not eat of anything that dieth of itself; unto the stranger that is within thy gates thou mayest give it that he may eat it, as well as sell it’. Wherefore does it say ‘or’? To prove that the words are to be taken literally, viz., giving away to a stranger and selling to a gentile. And R. Meir? — He would reply that ‘or’ indicates that it is preferable to give it away [as a gift] to a stranger rather than sell it to a gentile. And R. Judah? — He would say that no Scriptural term is needed to indicate this preference of giving it away to the stranger rather than selling it to a gentile, it stands to reason, since the one you are bidden to support whereas the other you are not bidden to support. (Mnemonic: Sabbath; Ploughing; Divers kinds of seeds; It and its young; Letting the mother bird go from the nest). According to this,
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