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בכורות 17
Soncino English Talmud · Berean Standard Bible
[of offspring in exempting] that is why Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel said to him: EVEN UNTO TEN GENERATIONS THE OFFSPRING ARE EXEMPT. But according to R. Huna who said that the first Tanna does not go up to [two] generations [of offspring in exempting], what does Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel mean by ‘unto ten generations’? R. Huna can reply: R. Simeon b. Gamaliel refers to [the second clause] where the Israelite put [the offspring in the place of their mothers], and where the Tanna In question goes up to [two] generations [of offspring]. Come and hear: If one received a flock from a heathen on ‘iron terms’, their offspring are exempt. but the offspring of the offspring are liable [to the law of the firstling]. Now, is this not an argument against R. Judah? — R. Judah can reply: Read: They and their offspring. Some there are who say: ‘They and their offspring are exempt’. Now is this not an argument against R. Huna? — R. Huna can reply: Read: They, the offspring, are exempt, whereas the offspring of the offspring are liable to the law of the firstling. IF A EWE GAve BIRTH TO WHAT LOOKED LIKE A GOAT etc. R. Oshaia of Nehardea came bringing a Baraitha with him: A ewe born of a goat or a goat born of a ewe, is declared liable by R. Meir, whereas the Sages exempt it. Said R. Oshaia to Rabbah: When you go up into the presence of R. Huna, inquire from him: R. Meir makes it liable for what? Shall I say for [the law of] the firstling? Does not R. Meir hold that [when Scripture says]: But the firstling of an ox, it intimates that the law of the firstling does not apply until the sire is an ox and its firstling is an ox? [Shall I say] then, he means liable to the rule of [giving] the first shorn wool to the priest? [Hardly so], for does he not hold with the Tanna of the School of Ishmael who taught: Lambs whose wool is hard, are exempt from the rule of the first shorn wool, for it says: And if he were not warmed with the fleece of my sheep? He replied to him: Let us see, we are dealing here with a case where a ewe gave birth to what looked like a goat and its sire was a he-goat and the difference of opinion is whether we take into consideration the nature of the sire in connection with the prohibition of killing the mother with its young on the same day. For R. Meir holds that we take into consideration the nature of the sire, whereas the Rabbis hold that we do not take into consideration the nature of the sire. If so, let them also differ as to whether we take into consideration the nature of the sire in other cases, as in the dispute between Hanania and the Rabbis? Rather, the reference is indeed to the law of the firstling, and what we are dealing here with is the case of a ewe born of a ewe which, in turn, was born of a goat. One authority [R. Meir] maintains that we follow the mother and this is not a nidmeh, while the other authority maintains that we follow the mother's mother, and therefore this is a nidmeh. Or if you prefer I may say: It is a case of a ewe born of a goat which, in turn, was born of a ewe. One authority maintains that the sheep goes back to its former status whereas the other authority maintains that the sheep does not go back to its former status. R. Ahi said: We suppose it possesses certain marks [resembling the mother]. And who are the Sages [who exempt]? — R. Simeon, who holds [that the law of the firstling does not apply] until its head and the greater part of the body resemble its mother. Said R. Johanan: R. Meir agrees however that in the case of the goat for the New Moon, we require it to be the offspring of a she-goat. What is the reason? Because Scripture says: And one [he-goat], — the singled out since the six days of the Creation. And do we derive it from this text? Do we not derive it from another text as follows: [Scripture says]: a bullock or a sheep; this excludes kil'ayim; [the words] ‘or a goat’ exclude nidmeh? — Both texts are necessary. For, from the latter text alone, I might have inferred that this is the case only when it has not returned to its original status, but where it has returned to its original status I might have thought it is not a case of nidmeh. And from the former text alone I might have inferred that this is only the case with an obligatory sacrifice, but in the case of a freewill-offering there is no prohibition as regards nidmeh. There is therefore a need [for both texts]. Said R. Aha b. Jacob: All [the authorities concerned, even R. Meir] agree that by using its wool one does not become liable to lashes for kil'ayim. For Scripture says: Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff wool and linen together; just as the linen must be proper linen, so the wool must be proper wool. Said R. Papa: All [the authorities concerned] agree that its wool is disqualified for purple blue. For Scripture says: Thou shalt not wear mingled stuff. Thou shalt make thee twisted cords; just as the flax must be proper flax, so the wool must be proper wool. Said R. Nahman b. Isaac: All [the authorities concerned] agree that its wool is not liable to the uncleanness of plagues. For Scripture says: Whether it be a woollen garment or a linen garment; just as the flax must be proper flax, similarly the wool must be proper wool. Said R. Ashi: We will also say something [on similar lines]. If one trains a vine over a fig-tree, its wine is unfit for libations. What is the reason? Scripture says: A sacrifice and drink-offerings; just as the sacrifice must be a normal animal, similarly the drink-offerings must be a normal liquid. Rabina demurred to this. If one trains flax over a shrub does it cease to be proper flax? If this is so, then you cannot say that ‘just as flax must be proper flax’, since flax can also be transformed! — He replied to him: In the one case, the smell had altered, in the other, its smell has not altered. MISHNAH. IF A EWE WHICH NEVER BEFORE HAD GIVEN BIRTH BORE TWO MALES AND BOTH HEADS CAME FORTH SIMULTANEOUSLY, R. JOSE THE GALILEAN SAYS: BOTH BELONG TO THE PRIEST FOR SCRIPTURE SAYS: THE MALES SHALL BE THE LORD'S WHEREAS THE SAGES SAY: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN EXACTLY [IF BOTH HEADS CAME FORTH SIMULTANEOUSLY]. ONE THEREFORE REMAINS [WITH THE ISRAELITE] AND THE OTHER IS FOR THE PRIEST. R. TARFON SAYS: THE PRIEST CHOOSES THE BETTER ONE. R. AKIBA SAYS: WE COMPROMISE BETWEEN THEM, AND THE SECOND ONE [IN THE ISRAELITE'S POSSESSION] IS LEFT TO PASTURE UNTIL IT BECOMES BLEMISHED.37
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THE OWNER IS LIABLE FOR THE [PRIEST'S] GIFTS, WHEREAS R. JOSE EXEMPTS HIM. IF ONE OF THEM DIED, R. TARFON SAYS: THEY DIVIDE [THE LIVING ONE]. R. AKIBA SAYS: THE CLAIMANT MUST PRODUCE THE EVIDENCE. IF IT GAVE BIRTH TO A MALE AND A FEMALE, THE PRIEST RECEIVES NOTHING [IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES]. GEMARA. The School of Jannai said: Of R. Jose the Galilean we have heard that he said: It is possible to ascertain [simultaneity] in natural processes, and, therefore, how much more so is it possible to ascertain exactly in human actions. The Rabbis [we know] hold that it is impossible to ascertain simultaneity in natural processes. What is their view with reference to human actions? — Come and hear: A red line went round the altar in order to divide between the blood to be sprinkled above and the blood to be sprinkled below. Now if you say that it is impossible to be exact in human actions, sometimes the priest might put the blood which should be above, below the [middle of] the altar? — The line is made somewhat wide. Come and hear. [Proof can be adduced] from the measurements of the furniture [of the Sanctuary] and from the measurements of the altar! — It is different there, since the Divine Law said: Do it, and in whatever manner you are able to do it, it will be satisfactory, as David said: All this the Lord made me understand in writing by His hand upon me. Said R. Kattina: Come and hear: [If an unclean oven] is divided into two and the parts are equal, both are unclean, for it is impossible to be exact! — R. Kahana replied: An earthen vessel is different because it has holes. Come and hear: If [a slain body is] found at exactly the same distance between two cities, both bring two heifers. These are the words of R. Eliezer. What is the reason? Is it not because he holds that it is possible to be exact in human actions and the words [the city] which is nearest imply [even the cities] which are nearest? — No. R. Eliezer
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