Parallel Talmud
Bava Metzia — Daf 5a
Babylonian Talmud (Gemara) · Soncino English Talmud
ולמאן דאמר הילך פטור אמאי איצטריך קרא למעוטי קרקע משבועה הא כל קרקע הילך הוא
אמר לך איצטריך קרא היכא דחפר בה בורות שיחין ומערות
א"נ היכא דטענו כלים וקרקעות והודה בכלים וכפר בקרקעות
ת"ש דתני רמי בר חמא ארבעה שומרין צריכין כפירה במקצת והודאה במקצת שומר חנם והשואל נושא שכר והשוכר
היכי דמי לאו דא"ל הילך
לא דאמר ליה ג' פרות מסרתי לך ומתו כולהו בפשיעה וא"ל איהו חדא לא היו דברים מעולם וחדא מתה באונס וחדא מתה בפשיעה דבעינא שלומי לך דלאו הילך הוא
ת"ש דתני אבוה דרבי אפטוריקי לדרבי חייא קמייתא מנה לי בידך והלה אומר אין לך בידי כלום והעדים מעידים אותו שיש בידו חמשים זוז יכול ישבע על השאר
ת"ל (שמות כב, ח) על כל אבדה אשר יאמר כי הוא זה על הודאת פיו אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו על העדאת עדים
מתניתא קא רמית עליה דר' חייא ר' חייא תנא הוא ופליג
והא קרא קאמר ההוא למודה מקצת הטענה
ואבוה דר' אפטוריקי אמר לך כתיב הוא וכתיב זה חד למודה מקצת הטענה וחד להעדאת עדים דפטור
ואידך חד למודה מקצת הטענה וחד למודה ממין הטענה
ואידך מודה ממין הטענה לית ליה וסבר ליה כר"ג דתנן טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורין פטור ור"ג מחייב:
ההוא רעיא דהוו מסרי ליה כל יומא חיותא בסהדי יומא חד מסרו ליה בלא סהדי לסוף אמר להו לא היו דברים מעולם אתו סהדי אסהידו ביה דאכל תרתי מינייהו א"ר זירא אם איתא לדר' חייא קמייתא משתבע אשארא
אמר ליה אביי אם איתא משתבע והא גזלן הוא א"ל שכנגדו קאמינא
השתא נמי דליתא לדר' חייא נחייביה מדרב נחמן
דתנן מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי פטור ואמר רב נחמן משביעין אותו שבועת היסת
דרב נחמן תקנתא היא
Now according to him who says that 'Here they are' does not require an oath, why is it necessary to derive from a Scriptural verse the exemption of land from the law of oath, since all land [available to the creditor is as if the debtor said,] 'Here they are'? — He can answer you: The derivation from the Scriptural verse is necessary where [the debtor] has dug pits, ditches and caves [thereby destroying the value of the land], or where one claims vessels and land, and the claim in regard to the vessels is admitted, while the claim in regard to the land is disputed. Come and hear: Rami b. Hama teaches: Four kinds of bailees require to put forward a partial denial and a partial admission [in order to be liable to an oath]: the gratuitous bailee, the borrower, the paid bailee, and the hirer. How is it to be understood? Is it not that the bailee says to the claimant, 'Here it is'? — No. [It refers to a case where] the owner says to the bailee, 'I handed you over three cows, and they have all died through your negligence', while the bailee says to the owner, 'One I never received; one died through an accident, and one has died through my negligence, for which I am willing to pay you', so that it is not like [an offer to return the animal by saying.] 'Here it is.' Come and hear what the father of R. Apotoriki taught, as a refutation of the first [law of] R. Hiyya: [If one says to another,] 'You have a hundred [zuz] in your possession belonging to me', and the other says, 'I have nothing belonging to you,' and witnesses testify that the defendant owes the plaintiff fifty [zuz] — I might think that the defendant ought to swear regarding the rest; therefore the Scriptural text tells us, for any manner of lost thing, whereof he saith that it is this, [indicating thereby that] you impose [an oath] on him in consequence of his own admission, but you do not impose [an oath] on him in consequence of the evidence of witnesses! — Do you wish to refute R. Hiyya by citing a Baraitha [that contradicts his view]? R. Hiyya is a Tanna, and he may disagree with it. But [the Baraitha] quotes a Scriptural text? — That [text] refers to one who admits part of the claim. And the father of R. Apotoriki? — He will answer you: [The text] says, it, and it also says, this — one term is [meant to apply] to him who admits part of the claim, and the other [is meant to indicate] that in the case of witnesses giving evidence [regarding part of the disputed claim] the defendant is free from taking an oath]. And the other? — He applies one term to him who admits part of the claim, and the other [he utilises for the purpose of proving] that the admission [of part of the claim involves an oath only if the admission] refers to the same kind of object as is claimed [by the plaintiff]. And the other? — He does not share the view that the admission has to refer to the same kind of object, for he is of the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel, as we have learned: If the plaintiff claims wheat, and the defendant admits barley, the defendant is free [from taking an oath], but Rabban Gamaliel obliges [the defendant to take an oath]. There was a shepherd to whom people entrusted cattle every day in the presence of witnesses. One day they handed it over to him without witnesses. Subsequently he gave a complete denial [of the receipt of the cattle]. But witnesses came and testified that he had eaten two of the cattle. Said R. Zera: If the first [law of] R. Hiyya is valid, [the shepherd] ought to swear regarding the remainder. Abaye, however, answered him: If [the law were] valid, would [the shepherd be allowed to] swear? Is he not a robber? — [R. Zera] replied: I mean, his opponent should swear. But even if R. Hiyya's law is rejected, should we not impose an oath [upon the claimant] because of the view of R. Nahman, as we have learned: [If one says to another,] 'You have in your possession a hundred [zuz] belonging to me,' and the other says, 'I have nothing belonging to you,' he is free [from taking an oath]; but R. Nahman adds: We make him take 'an oath of inducement'? — R. Nahman's rule is [only a Rabbinical] provision, [made irrespective of the law],