Bava Kamma — Daf 84b

אלהים בעינן וליכא

אלא מאי שנא שור בשור ושור באדם דשליחותייהו קא עבדינן מידי דהוה אהודאות והלואות אדם באדם ואדם בשור נמי שליחותייהו קא עבדינן מידי דהוה אהודאות והלואות

אמרי כי קא עבדינן שליחותייהו במידי דקים לן בגויה במידי דלא קים לן בגויה לא עבדינן שליחותייהו

אמרי שור בשור ושור באדם נמי לא קים לן בגויה אלא פוק חזי היכא מזדבני תורא בשוקא אדם באדם ואדם בשור נמי פוק חזי היכא מזדבני עבדי בשוקא

ועוד תשלום כפל ותשלום ארבעה וחמשה דקיצי נעבד שליחותייהו

אמרי כי קא עבדינן שליחותייהו בממונא בקנסא לא עבדינן שליחותייהו

אדם באדם דממונא הוא נעבד שליחותייהו כי קא עבדינן שליחותייהו במילתא דשכיחא אדם באדם דלא שכיחא לא עבדינן שליחותייהו

הרי בושת ופגם דשכיח נעביד שליחותייהו אמרי הכי נמי דהא רב פפא אגבי ארבע מאה זוזי לבושת והא ליתיה לדרב פפא דשלח ליה רב חסדא לרב נחמן ושלח ליה חסדא חסדא קנסא קא מגבית בבבל

אלא כי עבדינן שליחותייהו במילתא דשכיחא ואית ביה חסרון כיס אבל מילתא דשכיחא ולית ביה חסרון כיס אי נמי מילתא דלא שכיחא ואית ביה חסרון כיס לא עבדינן שליחותייהו הלכך אדם באדם אע"ג דאית ביה חסרון כיס כיון דלא שכיחא לא עבדינן שליחותייהו בושת אע"ג דשכיחא כיון דלית ביה חסרון כיס לא עבדינן שליחותייהו

ושור בשור גובין בבבל והאמר רבא שור שהזיק אין גובין אותו בבבל דאזיק מאן אילימא דאזיק אדם מאי איריא שור דאזיק אדם אפילו אדם דאזיק אדם נמי אין גובין אותו בבבל אלא פשיטא דאזיק שור וקתני אין גובין אותו בבבל

אמרי התם בתם הכא במועד והאמר רבא אין מועד בבבל אמרי דאייעד התם ואייתוה להכא

והא מילתא דלא שכיחא היא ומילתא דלא שכיחא הא אמרת דלא עבדינן שליחותייהו דאתו רבנן דהתם וייעדוה הכא סוף סוף מילתא דלא שכיחא היא ואת אמרת מילתא דלא שכיחא לא קא עבדינן שליחותייהו

אלא כי קאמר רבא בשן ורגל דמועדין מתחילתן נינהו:

צער כוואו בשפוד או במסמר וכו': צער שלא במקום נזק משתלם מאן תנא אמר רבא בן עזאי היא דתניא רבי אומר כויה נאמרה תחילה בן עזאי אומר חבורה נאמרה תחילה

במאי קא מיפלגי רבי סבר כויה דלית בה חבורה משמע כתב רחמנא חבורה לגלויי עלה דכויה דאית בה חבורה אין אי לא לא

ובן עזאי סבר כויה דאית בה חבורה משמע כתב רחמנא חבורה לגלויי עלה דכויה דלית בה חבורה

מתקיף לה רב פפא אדרבה איפכא מסתברא רבי אומר כויה נאמרה תחילה סבר כויה דאית בה חבורה משמע כתב רחמנא חבורה לגלויי עלה דכויה דלית בה חבורה

בן עזאי אומר חבורה נאמרה תחילה סבר כויה דלית בה חבורה משמע כתב רחמנא חבורה לגלויי עלה דכויה דאית בה חבורה אין אי לא לא ואמסקנא קיימי

אי נמי דכולי עלמא כויה בין דאית בה חבורה בין דלית בה חבורה משמע והכא

required the designation of Elohim which is lacking [in Babylon]? But if on the other hand the difference in the case of chattel [damaged] by Cattle or chattel [damaged] by Man is because we [in Babylon] are acting merely as the agents [of the mumhin  judges in Eretz Yisrael] as is the practice with matters of admittances and loans,  why then in the case of man [injured] by Man or man [injured] by Cattle should we similarly not act as their agents as is indeed the practice with matters of admittances and loans?  — It may, however, be said that we act as their agents only in regard to a matter of payment which we can fix definitely, whereas in a matter of payment which we are not able to fix definitely [but which requires valuation] we do not act as their agents. But I might object that [payment for damage done] to chattel by Cattle or to chattel by Man we are similarly not able to fix definitely, but we have to say, 'Go out and see at what price an ox is sold on the market place.' Why then in the case of man [injured] by Man, or man [injured] by Cattle should you not similarly say, 'Go out and see at what price slaves are sold on the market place'? Moreover, why in the case of double payment  and four-fold or five-fold payment  which can be fixed precisely should we not act as their agents?  — It may, however, be said that we may act as their agents only in matters of civil liability, whereas in matters of a penal nature  we cannot act as their agents. But why then regarding payment [for an injury done] to man by Man which is of a civil nature should we not act as their agents? — We can act as their agents only in a matter of frequent occurrence, whereas in the case of man injured by Man which is not of frequent occurrence we cannot act as their agents. But why regarding Degradation,  which is of frequent occurrence, should we not act as their agents? — It may indeed be said that this is really the case, for R. Papa ordered four hundred zuz to be paid for Degradation. But this order of R. Papa is no precedents for when R. Hisda sent to consult R. Nahman [in a certain case] did not the latter send back word, 'Hisda, Hisda, are you really prepared to order payment of fines in Babylon?'  — It must therefore be said that we can act as their agents only in a matter which is of frequent occurrence and where actual monetary loss is involved,  whereas in a matter of frequent occurrence but where no actual monetary loss is involved, or again in a matter not of frequent occurrence though where monetary loss is involved we cannot act as their agents. It thus follows that in the case of man [injured] by Man, though there is there actual monetary loss, yet since it is not of frequent occurrence we cannot act as their agents, and similarly in respect of Degradation, though it is of frequent occurrence, since it involves no actual monetary loss, we cannot act as their agents. Is payment for damage done to chattel by Cattle really recoverable in Babylon? Has not Raba said: 'If Cattle does damage, no payment will be collected in Babylon'?  Now, to whom was damage done [in this case stated by Raba]? If we say to man, why then only in the case of Cattle injuring man?  Is it not the fact that even in the case of Man injuring man  payment will not be collected in Babylon? It must therefore surely refer to a case where damage was done to chattel and it was nevertheless laid down that no payment would be collected in Babylon!  — It may, however, be said that that statement referred to Tam,  whereas this statement deals with Mu'ad.  But did Raba not say that there could be no case of Mu'ad  in Babylon? — It may, however, be said that where an ox was declared Mu'ad there [in Eretz Yisrael]  and brought over here [in Babylon, there could be a case of Mu'ad even in Babylon] — But surely this  is a matter of no frequent occurrence, and have you not stated that in a matter not of frequent occurrence we cannot act as their agents? — [A case of Mu'ad could arise even in Babylon] where the Rabbis of Eretz Yisrael came to Babylon and declared the ox Mu'ad here. But still, this also is surely a matter of no frequent occurrence,  and have you not stated that in a matter not of frequent occurrence we cannot act as their agents? — Raba must therefore have made his statement [that payment will be collected even in Babylon where chattel was damaged by Cattle] with reference to Tooth and Foot which are Mu'ad ab initio. PAIN: — IF HE BURNT HIM EITHER WITH A SPIT OR WITH A NAIL, EVEN THOUGH ON HIS [FINGER] NAIL WHICH IS A PLACE WHERE NO BRUISE COULD BE MADE etc. Would Pain be compensated even in a case where no depreciation was thereby caused? Who was the Tanna [that maintains such a view]? Raba replied: He was Ben 'Azzai, as taught: Rabbi said that 'burning'  without bruising is mentioned at the outset, whereas Ben 'Azzai said that [it is with] bruising [that it] is mentioned at the outset. What is the point at issue between them? Rabbi holds that as 'burning' implies even without a bruise, the Divine Law had to insert 'bruise',  to indicate that it is only where the burning caused a bruise that there would be liability,  but if otherwise this would not be so,  whereas Ben 'Azzai maintained that as 'burning' [by itself] implied a bruise, the Divine Law had to insert 'bruise' to indicate that 'burning' meant even without a bruise.  R. Papa demurred: On the contrary, it is surely the reverse that stands to reason:  Rabbi who said that 'burning', [without bruising] is mentioned at the outset holds that as 'burning,' implies also a bruise, the Divine Law inserted 'bruise' to indicate that 'burning,' meant even without a bruise,  whereas Ben 'Azzai who said that [it was] with bruising [that it] was mentioned at the outset maintains that as 'burning' implies even without a bruise, the Divine Law purposely inserted 'bruise' to indicate that it was only where the 'burning' has caused a bruise that there will be liability, but if otherwise this would not be so; for in this way they  would have referred in their statements to the law as it stands now in its final form. Or, alternatively, it may be said that both held that 'burning' implies both with a bruise and without a bruise, and here