Bava Kamma — Daf 83b

מתני׳ החובל בחבירו חייב עליו משום חמשה דברים בנזק בצער בריפוי בשבת ובושת:

בנזק כיצד סימא את עינו קטע את ידו שיבר את רגלו רואין אותו כאילו הוא עבד נמכר בשוק ושמין כמה היה יפה וכמה הוא יפה:

צער כואו (או) בשפוד או במסמר ואפילו על ציפורנו מקום שאינו עושה חבורה אומדין כמה אדם כיוצא בזה רוצה ליטול להיות מצטער כך:

ריפוי הכהו חייב לרפאותו עלה בו צמחים אם מחמת המכה חייב שלא מחמת המכה פטור חייתה ונסתרה חייתה ונסתרה חייב לרפאותו חייתה כל צורכה אינו חייב לרפאותו:

שבת רואין אותו כאילו הוא שומר קישואין שכבר נתן לו דמי ידו ודמי רגלו:

בושת הכל לפי המבייש והמתבייש:

גמ׳ אמאי (שמות כא, כד) עין תחת עין אמר רחמנא אימא עין ממש

לא סלקא דעתך דתניא יכול סימא את עינו מסמא את עינו קטע את ידו מקטע את ידו שיבר את רגלו משבר את רגלו ת"ל (ויקרא כד, כא) מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה לתשלומין אף מכה אדם לתשלומין

ואם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר (במדבר לה, לא) לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח אשר הוא רשע למות לנפש רוצח אי אתה לוקח כופר אבל אתה לוקח כופר לראשי אברים שאין חוזרין

הי מכה אילימא (ויקרא כד, כא) מכה בהמה ישלמנה ומכה אדם יומת ההוא בקטלא כתיב

אלא מהכא (ויקרא כד, יח) מכה נפש בהמה ישלמנה נפש תחת נפש וסמיך ליה (ויקרא כד, יט) ואיש כי יתן מום בעמיתו כאשר עשה כן יעשה לו האי לאו מכה הוא הכאה הכאה קאמרינן מה הכאה האמורה בבהמה לתשלומין אף הכאה האמורה באדם לתשלומין

והא כתיב (ויקרא כד, יז) ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות יומת בממון ממאי דבממון אימא במיתה ממש

לא סלקא דעתך חדא דהא איתקש למכה בהמה ישלמנה ועוד כתיב בתריה כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו ושמע מינה ממון

ומאי אם נפשך לומר תו קא קשיא לתנא מאי חזית דילפת ממכה בהמה לילף ממכה אדם

אמרי דנין ניזקין מניזקין ואין דנין ניזקין ממיתה אדרבה דנין אדם מאדם ואין דנין אדם מבהמה

היינו דקתני אם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח אשר הוא רשע למות כי מות יומת לנפש רוצח אי אתה לוקח כופר אבל אתה לוקח כופר לראשי אברים שאינן חוזרין

והאי לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח למעוטי ראשי אברים הוא דאתא האי מבעי ליה דאמר רחמנא לא תעביד ביה תרתי לא תשקול מיניה ממון ותקטליה האי (דברים כה, ב) מכדי רשעתו נפקא רשעה אחת אתה מחייבו ואי אתה מחייבו שתי רשעיות

ואכתי מבעי ליה דקאמר רחמנא לא תשקול ממון ותפטריה א"כ לכתוב רחמנא לא תקחו כופר לאשר הוא רשע למות לנפש רוצח למה לי ש"מ לנפש רוצח אי אתה לוקח כופר אבל אתה לוקח כופר לראשי אברים שאינן חוזרין

וכי מאחר דכתיב לא תקחו כופר מכה מכה למה לי אמרי אי מהאי הוה אמינא אי בעי עינו ניתיב ואי בעי דמי עינו ניתיב קמ"ל מבהמה מה מכה בהמה לתשלומין אף מכה אדם לתשלומין:

תניא ר' דוסתאי בן יהודה אומר עין תחת עין ממון אתה אומר ממון או אינו אלא עין ממש אמרת הרי שהיתה עינו של זה גדולה ועינו של זה קטנה היאך אני קורא ביה עין תחת עין

וכי תימא כל כי האי שקיל מיניה ממונא התורה אמרה (ויקרא כד, כב) משפט אחד יהיה לכם משפט השוה לכולכם

אמרי מאי קושיא דלמא נהורא שקיל מיניה נהורא אמר רחמנא נישקול מיניה דאי לא תימא הכי

MISHNAH. ONE WHO INJURES A FELLOW MAN BECOMES LIABLE TO HIM FOR FIVE ITEMS: FOR DEPRECIATION, FOR PAIN, FOR HEALING, FOR LOSS OF TIME AND FOR DEGRADATION. HOW IS IT WITH 'DEPRECIATION'? IF HE PUT OUT HIS EYE, CUT OFF HIS ARM OR BROKE HIS LEG, THE INJURED PERSON IS CONSIDERED AS IF HE WERE A SLAVE BEING SOLD IN THE MARKET PLACE, AND A VALUATION IS MADE AS TO HOW MUCH HE WAS WORTH [PREVIOUSLY]. AND HOW MUCH HE IS WORTH [NOW]. 'PAIN' — IF HE BURNT HIM EITHER WITH A SPIT OR WITH A NAIL, EVEN THOUGH ON HIS [FINGER] NAIL WHICH IS A PLACE WHERE NO BRUISE COULD BE MADE, IT HAS TO BE CALCULATED HOW MUCH A MAN OF EQUAL STANDING WOULD REQUIRE TO BE PAID TO UNDERGO SUCH PAIN. 'HEALING' — IF HE HAS STRUCK HIM, HE IS UNDER OBLIGATION TO PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES. SHOULD ULCERS [MEANWHILE] ARISE ON HIS BODY, IF AS A RESULT OF THE WOUND, THE OFFENDER WOULD BE LIABLE, BUT IF NOT AS A RESULT OF THE WOUND, HE WOULD BE EXEMPT. WHERE THE WOUND WAS HEALED BUT REOPENED, HEALED AGAIN BUT REOPENED, HE WOULD STILL BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO HEAL HIM. IF, HOWEVER, IT HAD COMPLETELY HEALED [BUT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED] HE WOULD NO MORE BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO HEAL HIM. 'LOSS OF TIME' — THE INJURED PERSON IS CONSIDERED AS IF HE WERE A WATCHMAN OF CUCUMBER BEDS  [SO THAT THE LOSS OF SUCH WAGES  SUSTAINED BY HIM DURING THE PERIOD OF ILLNESS MAY BE REIMBURSED TO HIM]. FOR THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN PAID TO HIM THE VALUE OF HIS HAND OR THE VALUE OF HIS LEG [THROUGH WHICH DEPRIVATION HE WOULD NO MORE BE ABLE TO CARRY ON HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT]. 'DEGRADATION' — ALL TO BE ESTIMATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS OF THE OFFENDER AND THE OFFENDED. GEMARA. Why [pay compensation]? Does the Divine Law not say 'Eye for eye'?  Why not take this literally to mean [putting out] the eye [of the offender]? — Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught: You might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put out, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken. [Not so; for] it is laid down, 'He that smiteth any man…' 'And he that smiteth a beast …'  just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be paid.  And should this [reason] not satisfy you,  note that it is stated, 'Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death',  implying that it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take 'satisfaction',  whereas you may take 'satisfaction' [even] for the principal limbs, though these cannot be restored.' To what case of 'smiting' does it refer? If to [the Verse] 'And he that killeth a beast, shall make it good: and he that killeth a man, shall be put to death',  does not this verse refer to murder?  — The quotation was therefore made from this text: And he that smiteth a beast mortally shall make it good: life for life,  which comes next to and if a man maim his neighbour: as he hath done so shall it be done to him.  But is [the term] 'smiting' mentioned in the latter text?  — We speak of the effect of smiting implied in this text and of the effect of smiting implied in the other text: just as smiting mentioned in the case of beast refers to the payment of compensation, so also does smiting in the case of man refer to the payment of compensation. But is it not written: And he that smiteth  any man mortally shall surely be put to death  [which, on account of the fact that the law of murder is not being dealt with here,  surely refers to cases of mere injury and means Retaliation]?  — [Even this refers to the payment of] pecuniary compensation. How [do you know that it refers] to pecuniary compensation? Why not say that it really means capital punishment?  — Let not this enter your mind; first, because it is compared to the case dealt with in the text, 'He that smiteth  a beast mortally shall make it good', and furthermore, because it is written soon after, 'as he hath done so shall it be done to him',  thus proving that it means pecuniary compensation. But what is meant by the statement, 'if this reason does not satisfy you'? [Why should it not satisfy you?] — The difficulty which further occurred to the Tanna was as follows: What is your reason for deriving the law of man injuring man from the law of smiting a beast and not from the law governing the case of killing a man [where Retaliation is the rule]? I would answer: It is proper to derive [the law of] injury  from [the law governing another case of] injury,  and not to derive [the law of] injury  from [the law governing the case of] murder. It could, however, be argued to the contrary; [that it is proper] to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [another case of] man but not to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [the case of] beast. This was the point of the statement 'If, however, this reason does not satisfy you.' [The answer is as follows:] 'It is stated: Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer that is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death, implying that it was only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these cannot be restored.' But was the purpose of this [verse], Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, to exclude the case of principal limbs? Was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not make him  subject to two punishments, i.e. that you should not take from him pecuniary compensation as well as kill him? — This, however, could be derived from the verse, According to his crime,  [which implies that] you can make him liable for one crime but cannot make him liable for two crimes.  But still was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not take pecuniary compensation from him and release him from the capital punishment? — If so the Divine Law would have written, 'Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for him who is guilty [and deserving] of death'; why then write 'for the life of a murderer' unless to prove from it that it is only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom, whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these could not be restored? But since it was written, Moreover ye shall take no ransom [implying the law of pecuniary compensation in the case of mere injury], why do I require [the analogy made between] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring man and] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring beast]? — It may be answered that if [the law would have had to be derived only] from the former text, I might have said that the offender has the option, so that if he wishes he may pay with the loss of his eye or if he desires otherwise he may pay the value of the eye; we are therefore told [that the inference is] from smiting a beast: just as in the case of smiting a beast the offender is liable for pecuniary compensation so also in the case of injuring a man he is liable for pecuniary compensation. It was taught: R. Dosthai b. Judah says: Eye for eye means pecuniary compensation. You say pecuniary compensation, but perhaps it is not so, but actual retaliation [by putting out an eye] is meant? What then will you say where the eye of one was big and the eye of the other little, for how can I in this case apply the principle of eye for eye? If, however, you say that in such a case pecuniary compensation will have to be taken, did not the Torah state, Ye shall have one manner of law,  implying that the manner of law should be the same in all cases? I might rejoin: What is the difficulty even in that case? Why not perhaps say that for eyesight taken away the Divine Law ordered eyesight to be taken away from the offender?  For if you will not say this,