Bava Kamma — Daf 77b

ואמר ריש לקיש אומר היה רבי שמעון פרה נפדית ע"ג מערכתה אלמא כל העומד לפדות כפדוי דמי

בשלמא רבי יוחנן לא אמר כרבי שמעון בן לקיש דקא בעי לאוקמה למתניתין אפילו בתמימין אלא ריש לקיש מאי טעמא לא אמר כרבי יוחנן

אמר לך (שמות כא, לז) וטבחו ומכרו כל היכא דאיתיה במכירה איתיה בטביחה וכל היכא דליתיה במכירה ליתיה בטביחה והני קדשים הואיל דכי מזבין קדשים לא הויא מכירה ליתנהו בטביחה

ואזדו לטעמייהו דאתמר המוכר טריפה לדברי ר' שמעון רבי יוחנן אמר חייב וריש לקיש אמר פטור

רבי יוחנן אמר חייב אע"ג דליתיה בטביחה איתיה במכירה וריש לקיש אמר פטור כיון דליתיה בטביחה ליתיה במכירה

איתיביה רבי יוחנן לר"ש בן לקיש גנב כלאים וטבחה טריפה ומכרה משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה מאי לאו ר"ש היא אלמא אע"ג דליתיה בטביחה איתיה במכירה

אמר ליה לא רבנן

אי רבנן טריפה במכירה איתא בזביחה ליתא

ואלא מאי ר"ש כלאים בטביחה איתא במכירה ליתא

אלא תנא טביחה והוא הדין למכירה אימא לרבנן נמי תנא מכירה והוא הדין לטביחה

ורבי יוחנן אמר לך האי מאי אי אמרת בשלמא ר"ש איידי דתנא טריפה בחדא תנא כלאים בחדא

אלא אי אמרת רבנן נערבינהו וניתנינהו גנב כלאים וטריפה טבחן ומכרן משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה קשיא

כלאים שה כתיב ואמר רבא זה בנה אב כל מקום שנאמר שה אינו אלא להוציא את הכלאים

שאני הכא דאמר קרא או לרבות את הכלאים

וכל או לרבות הוא והתניא (ויקרא כב, כז) שור או כשב פרט לכלאים או עז פרט לנדמה

אמר רבא הכא מענייניה דקרא והכא מענייניה דקרא הכא גבי גניבה דכתיב שור או שה שאי אתה יכול להוציא כלאים מביניהם או לרבות כלאים גבי קדשים דכתיב כשב ועז שאתה יכול להוציא כלאים מביניהם או למעט הוא

and Resh Lakish observed that R. Simeon used to say that the red heifer could be redeemed even after [it was slaughtered and] placed upon the wood for burning  thus proving that whatever has the possibility of being redeemed  is considered as if it had already been redeemed. We can understand why R. Johanan did not give the same answer [to the difficulty  propounded] as Resh Lakish,  as he was anxious to explain the ruling [of our Mishnah] even in the case of unblemished sacrifices. But why did Resh Lakish not give the same answer as R. Johanan?  — He could say: [Scripture says.] 'And he slaughtered it or sold it'  implying that it was only an animal [subject to this law] in the case of a sale that could be [subject to it] in the case of slaughter, whereas an animal which would not be [subject to this law] in the case of sale could similarly not be [subject to it] in the case of slaughter either. Now, in the case of these unblemished sacrifices, since if the thief had sold the sacrifices it would not have been a sale [to all intents and purposes],  they could not be [subject to this law even] when they were slaughtered. R. Johanan and Resh Lakish indeed followed their own lines of reasoning [elsewhere]. For it was stated: If a thief sells a stolen ox which is trefa,  according to R. Simeon,  R. Johanan said that he would be liable, whereas Resh Lakish said that he would be exempt. R. Johanan. who said that he would be liable, held that though this ox could not be subject to the law of slaughter it could yet be subject to the law of sale, whereas Resh Lakish who said that he would be exempt maintained that since this ox could not be subject to the law of slaughter, it could similarly not be subject to the law of sale either. R. Johanan objected to [the view of] Resh Lakish [from the following]: If he stole a hybrid animal and slaughtered it, or a trefa animal and sold it, he would have to make double payment. Now, does not this ruling follow the view of R. Simeon,  thus proving that though this ox would not be subject to the law of slaughter it could nevertheless be subject to the law of sale? — He replied: No; this is the view of the Rabbis.  But if this is the view of the Rabbis, why should a trefa ox be subject only to the law of sale and not to the law of slaughter? — You say then that it is the view of R. Simeon.  Why then should a hybrid animal be subject only to the law of slaughter and not to that of sale? We must say therefore that though slaughter is mentioned  the same law was meant to apply also to sale; so also according to the Rabbis, though sale is stated in the text,  the same law was meant to apply to slaughter.  R. Johanan, however, might say that this does not follow. It is true that if you say that the ruling follows R. Simeon, there is no difficulty: since it was necessary to state liability regarding trefa in the one case [of sale] only, it states liability regarding a hybrid animal also in the one case [of slaughter] only. But if you say that this ruling follows the Rabbis, why not join them together, and state thus: 'If the thief misappropriated a hybrid animal and a trefa [sheep or ox] and slaughtered them or sold them, he would have to make four-fold or five-fold payment'! This indeed is a difficulty. [But why should there be liability for four-fold or five-fold payment in the case of] a hybrid animal since Scripture says 'sheep'.  and Raba [elsewhere] said that this  is a locus classicus for the rule that wherever it says 'sheep', the purpose is to exclude a hybrid animal? — This case here is different, as Scripture says 'or',  implying the inclusion of a hybrid animal. [Does this mean to say that] the term 'or' everywhere implies an amplification? Was it not taught:  'When a bullock or a sheep:  this excepts a hybrid; or a goat:  this excepts an animal looking like a hybrid'? — Said Raba: The term 'or' in the one case is expounded in accordance with the subject matter of the verse, and the term 'or' in the other case is similarly expounded in accordance with the subject matter of that verse. Here in connection with theft where it is written 'an ox or a sheep', since it is impossible to produce a hybrid from the union of these two,  the term 'or' should be expounded to include  a hybrid [of a different kind], whereas in connection with sacrifices where it is written 'a sheep or a goat',  where it is possible for you to produce a hybrid from their union,  the term 'or' should rightly be taken to exclude  [the hybrid].