Bava Kamma — Daf 74a

מדסיפא במיפך והזמה רישא נמי במיפך והזמה

דקתני סיפא מעידנו את איש פלוני שהפיל את שן עבדו וסימא את עינו שהרי העבד אומר כן ונמצאו זוממין משלמין דמי עין לרב

היכי דמי אי דלא קא מודו להו בתראי בחבלא כלל דמי כוליה עבד לרב בעי שלומי ליה

אלא פשיטא דקא מודו כולהו בחבלא

ודקא אפכינן ואזמינהו

והיכי דמי אי דקא מאחרי אחורי הני בתראי אכתי דמי עבד לרב בעי שלומי

דכי מחייבי ליה לגברא אכתי גברא לאו בר חיובא הוא אלא דקא מקדמי קדומי הני בתראי

ואי דלא עמד בדין אכתי דמי כוליה עבד לרב בעי שלומי ליה דאכתי גברא לא מיחייב

אלא דעמד בדין

א"ל רב אחא בריה דרב איקא לרב אשי דוקיא דרבא מהיכא אילימא מרישא רישא מי קא מתכחשי מציעאי

כיון דאי לא מתזמי סהדותא כוותייהו קא קיימא דדינא כוותייהו פסקינן דיש בכלל מאתים מנה

הלכך קמאי הוא דקא מתכחשי מציעאי לא מתכחשי מידי

אמר ליה רבא סבר מדרישא בשלש כיתות סיפא נמי בשלש ודייק מסיפא

כגון דאתו בי תרי ואמרי הפיל את שינו וסימא עינו ופסקיניה לדינא אפומייהו

ואתו בי תרי אחריני ואמרי סימא את עינו והפיל את שינו דקא מכחשי להו להני קמאי ונמצאו זוממין קמאי משלמין דמי עין לרב

ואי סלקא דעתך הכחשה לאו תחילת הזמה היא אמאי משלמי הא אתכחשו להו מעיקרא אלא שמע מינה הכחשה תחילת הזמה היא

ואביי אמר לך בשלמא רישא לא סגי דלא שלש כיתות שהרי קתני הרב אומר כן

אלא סיפא למה לי שלש כיתות שהרי העבד אומר כן

עבד כל דהו מימר אמר דניחא ליה דניפוק לחירות

מתקיף לה ר' זירא אימא סימא את עינו

since, the later clause deals with witnesses whose statements were transposed by the same set of witnesses that proved them zomemim, so also the earlier clause deals with a case where the statements of the witnesses were transposed by the same subsequent set of witnesses who proved their alibi. For it says in the later clause: If a set of witnesses declare: We testify against so-and-so that he had first knocked out his slave's tooth and then put out his eye — as indeed the servant says — and they were by subsequent witnesses proved zomemim, they would have to pay the value of the eye to the master. Now how are we to understand this? If we assume that the witnesses of the second set did not agree [with those of the first set] regarding any injury at all, why then should the first witnesses not have to pay the master the whole value of the slave?  Does it therefore not mean that all the witnesses agreed that an injury was inflicted, but that the witnesses of the second set reversed the order stated by the first set of witnesses  while they also proved them zomemim? But still, what were the circumstances? If the witnesses of the second set post-dated the injury, why should the witnesses of the first set still not have to pay the master the whole value of the slave, since they falsely alleged liability to have rested upon a man at the time when that man was in fact not yet subject to any liability? — We must therefore say that the witnesses of the second set antedated the injury. But again, if [at the time when the witnesses of the first set gave evidence] the master had not yet appeared before the Court [on the matter], why should they still not have to pay him the whole value of the slave as at that time he was still a man subject to no liability?  — It must therefore deal with a case where he had already made his appearance before the Court. R. Aha the son of R. Ika said to R. Ashi: Whence could Raba prove this point?  It could hardly be from the earlier clause, for were the witnesses of the middle set  those who were confuted?  For indeed were they not proved zomemim; their statements would have remained the decisive evidence  as the case would have been decided according to their allegations, on the principle that in the total of two hundred  the sum of a hundred  is included. Does it not then clearly follow that it was the first set of witnesses  who were thus confuted  whereas the middle set of witnesses were not confuted at all?  — He replied: Raba maintained that as the earlier clause dealt with three sets [of witnesses giving evidence] the later clause similarly presented the law in a case where three sets [gave evidence], and tried thus to prove his point from the later clause. [For this clause would thus have dealt with a case] where e.g., a set of two witnesses had appeared and alleged that the master first knocked out his [slave's] tooth and then put out his eye, and after the verdict was given in accordance with their testimony a set of other witnesses arrived and stated that the first put out his [slave's] eye and then his tooth, thus contradicting the witnesses of the first set, and as these [latter] were also proved zomemim they would have to pay the value of the slave's eye  to the master. Now if you assume that a confutation is not considered a first step in a subsequent proof of an alibi, why should they have to pay anything  after they had already been confuted? Does this therefore not prove that a confutation does constitute a first step in a subsequent proof of an alibi? And Abaye? — He might have rejoined: I grant you that the earlier clause cannot be explained save on the assumption that there were three sets, for it was stated there 'as indeed the master also says',  but so far as the later clause is concerned, what need have I for three sets, since the statement 'as indeed the slave also says'  is perfectly natural as the slave would surely say anything, being satisfied at the prospect of going free? R. Zera demurred [to the general implication]:  Why not say that when the master puts out his [slave's] eye