Parallel Talmud
Bava Kamma — Daf 52b
Babylonian Talmud (Gemara) · Soncino English Talmud
ולא כראוי לגמלים ואי דשכיחי גמלים אמאי פטור פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים פשיטא אנוס הוא אלא לאו דאתיין לפרקים ואתו גמלים וארעוה ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה וקתני פטור אלמא כיון דהשתא ליכא אנוס הוא
אמרי לא לעולם כראוי לשוורים וכראוי לגמלים ודקא קשיא לך היכי נפול א"ר יצחק בר בר חנה שהתליע מתוכו
ת"ש לא כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב היכי דמי אילימא לא כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים פשיטא צריכא למימר דחייב אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים היכי דמי אי דשכיחי גמלים פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים אנוס הוא
אלא לאו דאתיין לפרקים ואתו גמלים וארעוהו ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה וקתני חייב אלמא כיון דאתיין לפרקים פושע הוא דאיבעי ליה אסוקי אדעתיה
לעולם כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים ודקא קשיא לך פושע הוא איידי דנסיב רישא כסהו כראוי נסיב סיפא נמי לא כסהו כראוי
איכא דאמרי הא נמי ודאי לא איבעיא לן דכיון דאתיין לפרקים פושע הוא דאיבעי ליה אסוקי אדעתיה
כי איבעי לן הכי הוא דאיבעיא לן כסהו כסוי שיכול לעמוד בפני שוורים ואינו יכול לעמוד בפני גמלים ושכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו מהו מי אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע אצל גמלים הוי פושע נמי לענין התלעה או דלמא לא אמרינן מגו
ת"ש כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת פטור ואתמר עלה אמר רבי יצחק בר בר חנה שהתליע מתוכו היכי דמי אלימא כראוי לשוורים וכראוי לגמלים והתליע מתוכו פשיטא דפטור מאי הוה ליה למעבד
אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו וקתני פטור אלמא לא אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע לענין גמלים הוי פושע לענין התלעה
לא לעולם כראוי לגמלים וכראוי לשוורים והתליע מתוכו ודקא קשיא לך כי התליע מאי הוה ליה למעבד מהו דתימא איבעי ליה למיזל ומנקש עליה קמ"ל
ת"ש לא כסהו כראוי ונפל לתוכו שור או חמור ומת חייב היכי דמי אילימא לא כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים צריכא למימר דחייב
אלא לאו כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ואי דשכיחי גמלים פושע הוא ואי דלא שכיחי גמלים אנוס הוא אלא לאו דשכיחי גמלים והתליע מתוכו וקתני חייב אלמא אמרינן מגו דהוי פושע לענין גמלים הוי פושע לענין התלעה
אמרי לא לעולם כראוי לשוורים ולא כראוי לגמלים ושכיחי גמלים ואתו גמלים וארעוהו ואתו שוורים ונפלו ביה ודקא קשיא לך פשיטא פושע הוא איידי דנסיב רישא כסהו כראוי נסיב סיפא נמי לא כסהו
ת"ש נפל לתוכו שור חרש שוטה וקטן סומא ומהלך בלילה חייב פקח ומהלך ביום פטור ואמאי נימא מדהוי פושע לענין חרש הוי נמי פושע לענין פקח אלא לאו שמע מיניה לא אמרינן מגו שמע מיניה:
נפל לפניו כו': אמר רב לפניו לפניו ממש לאחריו אחריו ממש
but not properly as regards camels'? Again, if camels frequently passed, why should he be exempt where he had been so careless? If [on the other hand] camels did not frequently pass, is it not obvious [that he is exempt since] he was innocent? Did it therefore not refer to a case where camels used to pass occasionally, and it so happened that when camels passed they weakened the cover so that the oxen coming [later on] fell? And [in such cases] the text says, 'he would be exempt.' Does not this prove that since at that time camels had not actually been there he would be considered innocent? — I would say, no. For it might still [be argued that the pit had been covered] properly both as regards oxen and as regards camels; and as for the difficulty raised by you 'how did any one fall in there?', [this has already been removed by] the statement of R. Isaac b. Bar Hanah that [the boards of the cover] decayed from within. Come and hear: BUT IF HE DID NOT COVER IT PROPERLY AND AN OX OR AN ASS FELL INTO IT AND WAS KILLED, HE WOULD BE LIABLE. Now what were the circumstances? If you say that it means not properly covered as regards oxen', [which would of course imply] also 'not properly covered as regards camels', is it not obvious? Why then was it necessary to state liability? Does it not therefore mean 'that it was properly covered as regards oxen but not properly covered as regards camels'? [Again, I ask,] what were the circumstances? If camels frequently passed [is it not obvious that] he was careless? If [on the other hand] no camels were to be found there, was he not innocent? Does it not [therefore speak of a case] where camels used to arrive occasionally and it so happened that camels in passing had weakened the cover so that the oxen coming [later] fell in? And [in reference to such a case] the text states liability. Does this not prove that since from time to time camels did pass he should be considered careless as he ought to have borne this fact in mind? — In point of fact [I might reply, the text may still speak of a pit covered] 'properly' as regards oxen though 'not properly' as regards camels, and [of one where] camels frequently passed, and as for your question. '[Is it not obvious that] he was careless?' [the answer would be that] since the prior clause contains the words, 'If he covered it properly', the later clause has the wording, 'If he did not cover it properly'. Some report that certainly no question was ever raised about this, for since the camels used to pass from time to time he was certainly careless, as he ought to have borne this fact in mind. If a question was raised, it was on the following point: Suppose he covered it with a cover that was strong enough for oxen but not strong enough for camels and in a place where camels frequently passed, and it decayed from the inside, what should be the legal position? Should we say miggo, [i.e.,] since he had been careless with respect to camels he ought to be considered careless also with respect to the [accidental] decay; or should we not say miggo? — Come and hear; IF HE COVERED IT PROPERLY AND AN OX OR AN ASS FELL INTO IT AND WAS KILLED, HE WOULD BE EXEMPT. And it was stated in connection with this ruling that R. Isaac b. Bar Hanah explained that the boards of the cover had decayed from the inside. Now, what were the circumstances? If we say that it means 'properly covered as regards oxen' and also properly covered as regards camels', and that it had decayed from the inside, is it not obvious that there should be exemption? For indeed what more could he have done? Does it not mean, therefore, properly covered as regards oxen though not properly covered as regards camels', and in a place where camels frequently passed, and it so happened that the cover decayed from the inside? And [in such a case] the text states exemption. Does this not prove that we should not say miggo, [i.e.] since he was careless with respect to camels he ought to be considered careless with reference to the decay? — No, it might still [be argued that the pit was covered] properly as regards camels as well as oxen, and it so happened that it became decayed from the inside. And as for your question 'if it becomes decayed [from inside] what indeed should he have done?' [the answer would be that] you might have thought that he ought to have come frequently to the cover and knocked it [to test its soundness], and we are therefore told [that he was not bound to do this]. Come and hear; BUT IF HE DID NOT COVER IT PROPERLY, AND AN OX OR AN ASS FELL INTO IT AND WAS KILLED, HE WOULD BE LIABLE. Now, what were the circumstances? Should you say that it means 'not properly covered as regards oxen, [which would of course imply also] 'not properly covered as regards camels', why then was it necessary to state liability? Does it not therefore mean [that it was covered] properly as regards oxen but not properly as regards camels? But again if camels frequently passed there, [is it not obvious that] he was careless? If [on the other hand] no camels were to be found there, was he not innocent? Does it therefore not deal with a case where camels did frequently pass, but [it so happened] that the cover decayed from the inside? And [in such a case] the text states liability. Does this not prove that we have to say miggo, [i.e.,] since he had been careless with respect to camels, he should be considered careless also with reference to decay? — I would say, No. For it might still [be argued that the pit had been covered] properly as regards oxen but not properly as regards camels, and in a place where camels were to be found frequently, and [it happened that] camels had come along and weakened the cover so that when oxen subsequently came they fell into the pit. And as for your question, 'Is it not obvious that he was careless?' [the answer would be that] since the prior clause contained the words 'If he covered it properly', the later clause similarly uses the wording. 'If he did not cover it [properly]'. Come and hear; 'If there fell into it an ox that was deaf, abnormal, small, blind or while it walked at night time, there would be liability. But in the case of a normal ox walking during the day there would be exemption.' Why so? Why not say that since the owner of the pit was careless with respect to a deaf animal he should be considered careless also with reference to a normal animal? Does not this show that we should not say miggo.' — This does indeed prove [that we do not say miggo]. IF IT FELL FORWARD etc. Rab said: 'FORWARD' means quite literally 'on its face', and 'BACKWARD' means also literally, 'on its back',