Bava Kamma — Daf 47b

ברשות ונגחו שורו של בעל הבית או שנשכו כלבו של בעל הבית פטור נגח הוא שורו של בעל הבית חייב נפל לבורו והבאיש מימיו חייב היה אביו או בנו לתוכו משלם את הכופר ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב

רבי אומר בכולן אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו לשמור:

גמ׳ טעמא דשלא ברשות הא ברשות לא מיחייב בעל קדירות בנזקי בהמתו דבעל חצר ולא אמרינן קבולי קביל בעל קדירות נטירותא דבהמתו דבעל חצר

מני רבי היא דאמר כל בסתמא לא קביל עליה נטירותא

אימא סיפא אם הכניס ברשות בעל חצר חייב אתאן לרבנן דאמרי בסתמא נמי קבולי קביל עליה נטירותא

ותו רבי אומר בכולן אינו חייב עד שיקבל עליו בעל הבית לשמור רישא וסיפא רבי ומציעתא רבנן

אמר ר' זירא תברא מי ששנה זו לא שנה זו רבא אמר כולה רבנן היא וברשות שמירת קדירות קבל עליו בעל החצר ואפילו נשברו ברוח:

הכניס פירותיו לחצר בעל הבית וכו': אמר רב לא שנו אלא שהוחלקה בהן אבל אכלה פטור מאי טעמא הוה לה שלא תאכל

אמר רב ששת אמינא כי ניים ושכיב רב אמר להא שמעתא דתניא הנותן סם המות לפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים סם המות הוא דלא עבידא דאכלה אבל פירות דעבידא דאכלה בדיני אדם נמי מיחייב ואמאי הויא לה שלא תאכל

אמרי הוא הדין אפילו פירות נמי פטור מדיני אדם והא קמ"ל דאפי' סם המות נמי דלא עבידא דאכלה חייב בדיני שמים

ואיבעית אימא סם המות נמי באפרזתא דהיינו פירי:

מיתיבי האשה שנכנסה לטחון חטים אצל בעל הבית שלא ברשות ואכלתן בהמתו של בעל הבית פטור אם הוזקה חייבת ואמאי נימא הוה לה שלא תאכל

אמרי ומי עדיפא ממתניתין דאוקימנא שהוחלקה בהן

ודקארי לה מאי קארי לה אמר לך בשלמא מתניתין קתני אם הוזקה בהן שהוחלקה בהן הוא אבל הכא קתני אם הוזקה ולא קתני בהן אכילה הוא דקתני

ואידך אמר לך לא שנא

ת"ש הכניס שורו לחצר בעה"ב שלא ברשות ואכל חטין והתריז ומת פטור ואם הכניס ברשות בעל החצר חייב ואמאי ה"ל שלא יאכל

אמר רבא ברשות אשלא ברשות קרמית ברשות שמירת שורו קבל עליו ואפי' חנק את עצמו:

איבעיא להו היכא דקביל עליה נטירותא מהו דנפשיה הוא דקביל עליה או דלמא אפילו נטירותא דעלמא קביל עליה

ת"ש דתני רב יהודה בר סימון בנזקין דבי קרנא הכניס פירותיו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ובא שור ממקום אחר ואכלן פטור ואם הכניס ברשות חייב מאן פטור ומאן חייב לאו פטור בעל חצר [וחייב בעל חצר]

אמרי לא פטור בעל השור וחייב בעל השור

ואי בעל השור

PERMISSION AND THE OX OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES GORES IT OR THE DOG OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES BITES IT, THERE IS NO LIABILITY. MOREOVER SHOULD IT GORE THE OX OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES ITS OWNER WOULD BE LIABLE. AGAIN, IF IT FALLS [THERE] INTO A PIT OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES AND MAKES THE WATER IN IT FOUL, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY. SO ALSO IF [IT KILLS] THE OWNER'S FATHER OR SON [WHO] WAS INSIDE THE PIT, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY TO PAY KOFER.  IF, HOWEVER, HE BROUGHT IT IN WITH PERMISSION, THE OWNER OF THE YARD WOULD BE LIABLE. RABBI, HOWEVER, SAYS: IN ALL THESE CASES THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNLESS HE HAS TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF TO WATCH [THE ARTICLES BROUGHT INTO HIS PREMISES]. GEMARA. The reason why [the potter would be liable for damage occasioned by his pottery to the cattle of the owner of the premises] is because the entry was without permission, which shows that were it with permission the owner of the pots would not be liable for the damage done to the cattle of the owner of the premises and we do not say that the owner of the pots has by implication undertaken to watch the cattle of the owner of the premises. Who is the authority for this view? — Rabbi, who has laid down that without express stipulation no duty to watch is undertaken.  Now look at the second clause: IF HE BROUGHT THEM IN WITH PERMISSION, THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD BE LIABLE. This brings us round to the view of the Rabbis,  who said that even without express stipulation he makes himself responsible for watching. Moreover, [it was further stated]: RABBI SAYS: IN ALL THESE CASES THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNLESS HE HAS TAKEN UPON HIMSELF TO WATCH. [Are we to say that] the opening clause and the concluding clause are in accordance with Rabbi while the middle clause is in accordance with the Rabbis? — R. Zera thereupon said: The contradiction [is obvious]; he who taught one clause cannot have taught the other clause. Raba, however, said; The whole [of the anonymous part of the Mishnah] is in accordance with the Rabbis, for [where the entry was] with permission the owner of the premises undertook the safeguarding of the pots even against breakage by the wind. IF [A MAN] BRINGS HIS PRODUCE INTO THE COURTYARD OF ANOTHER OWNER etc. Rab said: This rule  applies only where the animal [was injured] by slipping on them, but if the animal ate them [and was thereby harmed], there would be exemption on the ground that it should not have eaten them.  Said R. Shesheth: I feel inclined to say that it was only when he was drowsy or asleep that Rab could have made such a statement.  For it was taught: If one places deadly poison before the animal of another he is exempt from the judgment of Man, but liable to the judgment of Heaven.  Now, that is so only in the case of deadly poison which is not usually consumed by an animal, but in the case of products that are usually consumed by an animal, there appears to be liability even to the judgment of Man. But why should this be so? [Why not argue:] It should not have eaten them? — I may reply that strictly speaking even in the case of produce there should be exemption from the judgment of Man, and there was a special purpose in enunciating this ruling with reference to deadly poison, namely that even where the article was one not usually consumed by an animal, there will still be liability to the judgment of Heaven. Or if you wish you may say that by the deadly poison mentioned was meant hypericum,  which like a fruit [is eaten by animals]. An objection could be raised [from the following]: If a woman enters the premises of another person to grind wheat without permission, and the animal of the owner consumes it, there is no liability; if the animal is harmed, the woman would be liable. Now, why not argue: It should not have over-eaten? — I can answer: [In what respect] does this case go beyond that of the Mishnah, which was interpreted [to refer to damage occasioned by] the animal having slipped over them? What then was in the mind of the one who made the objection? — He might have said to you; Your explanation is satisfactory regarding the Mishnah where it says, IF IT WAS HARMED BY IT [which admits of being interpreted] that the animal slipped over them. But here [in the Baraitha] it says, 'if the animal is harmed', without the words 'by them', so that surely the consumption [of the wheat] is what is referred to. And the other?  — He can contend [that the omission of these words] makes no difference. Come and hear: If a man brought his ox into the courtyard of another person without permission, and it ate there wheat and got diarrhoea from which it died, there would be no liability. But if he brought it in with permission, the owner of the courtyard would be liable. Now why not argue: It should not have eaten?  — Raba thereupon said: How can you raise an objection from a case where permission was given  against a case where permission was not given?  Where permission was given, the owner of the premises assumed liability for safeguarding the ox even against its strangling itself. The question was raised: Where the owner of the premises has assumed responsibility to safeguard [the articles brought in to his premises], what is the legal position? Has the obligation to safeguard been assumed by him [only] against damage from his own [beasts], or has he perhaps also undertaken to safeguard from damage in general? Come and hear: Rab Judah b. Simon learnt in the [Tractate] Nezikin of the School of Karna;  If a man brings his produce into the courtyard of another without permission, and an ox from elsewhere comes and consumes it, there is no liability. But if he brought it in with permission there would be liability. Now, who would be exempt  and who would be liable?  Does it not mean that the owner of the premises would be exempt  and  the owner of the premises would be liable?  — I may say that this is not so, it is the owner of the ox who would be exempt  and the owner of the ox who would be liable.  But if it refers to the owner of the ox,