Bava Kamma — Daf 43b

מיהו בן חורין דמשלם כופר ע"פ עצמו והיכי דמי דאי אתו סהדי ואסהידו ביה דקטל ולא ידעי אי תם הוה אי מועד הוה ואמר מריה דמועד הוא דמשלם כופר על פי עצמו היכא דליכא עדים משלם דמים

גבי עבד שאינו משלם קנס ע"פ עצמו והיכי דמי דאי אתו עדים ואסהידו ביה דקטל ולא ידעי אי תם הוה אי מועד הוה ואמר מריה מועד הוא לא משתלם קנס ע"פ עצמו היכא דליכא עדים לא משלם דמים

מתיב רב שמואל בר רב יצחק כל שחייב בבן חורין חייב בעבד בין בכופר בין במיתה

כופר בעבד מי איכא אלא לאו דמים

איכא דאמרי הוא מותיב לה והוא מפרק לה איכא דאמרי אמר ליה רבה הכי קתני כל שחייב בבן חורין בכוונה על פי עדים כופר חייב בעבד קנס וכל שחייב בבן חורין שלא בכוונה ע"פ עדים דמים חייב בעבד שלא בכוונה על פי עדים דמים

א"ל רבא אי הכי אשו שלא בכוונה ע"פ עדים נשלם דמים

ומנא ליה לרבא דלא משלם

אילימא מדתנן היה גדי כפות לו ועבד סמוך לו ונשרף עמו חייב עבד כפות לו וגדי סמוך לו ונשרף עמו פטור

האמר ריש לקיש כגון שהצית בגופו של עבד דקם ליה בדרבה מיניה

ואלא מהא דתניא חומר באש מבבור שהאש מועדת לאכול בין דבר הראוי לה בין דבר שאין ראוי לה מה שאין כן בבור ואילו שהאש משלמת שלא בכוונה דמים מה שאין כן בבור לא קתני

דלמא תנא ושייר

אלא רבא גופיה אבעויי מבעיא ליה אשו שלא בכוונה מי משלם דמים או לא

מי אמרינן גבי שור הוא דבכוונה משלם כופר שלא בכוונה משלם דמים אבל אשו דבכוונה לא משלם כופר שלא בכוונה נמי לא משלם דמים או דלמא כיון דגבי שורו שלא בכוונה אע"ג דליכא כופר משלם דמים גבי אשו נמי אע"ג דבכוונה לא משלם כופר שלא בכוונה מיהת משלם דמים

ולא ידעינן תיקו:

כי אתא רב דימי א"ר יוחנן כופר מה ת"ל (שמות כא, ל) אם כופר לרבות כופר שלא בכוונה ככופר בכוונה

א"ל אביי אלא מעתה עבד נמי מה ת"ל (שמות כא, לב) אם עבד לרבות עבד שלא בכוונה כעבד בכוונה וכי תימא הכי נמי והאמר ריש לקיש שור שהמית את העבד שלא בכוונה פטור משלשים שקלים

א"ל גברא אגברא קא רמית

כי אתא רבין א"ר יוחנן עבד מה תלמוד לומר אם עבד לרבות עבד שלא בכוונה כעבד בכוונה

ולריש לקיש נמי נימא מדעבד אם עבד לא דריש כופר אם כופר נמי לא דריש

אמרי לא עבד אם עבד לא דריש כופר אם כופר דריש

ומאי שנא עבד אם עבד לא כתיב במקום תשלומין כופר אם כופר כתיב במקום תשלומין

וכן בבן או בבת ת"ר (שמות כא, לא) או בן יגח או בת יגח לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים

והלא דין הוא הואיל וחייב אדם באדם וחייב שור באדם מה כשחייב אדם באדם לא שנא בין קטנים לגדולים אף כשחייב שור באדם לא תחלוק בו בין קטנים לגדולים

ועוד קל וחומר הוא ומה אדם באדם שלא עשה בו קטנים כגדולים חייב בו על הקטנים כגדולים

But [it is only in the case of] a freeman where kofer may sometimes be paid on the strength of the defendant's own admission — as where witnesses appeared and testified to the ox having killed [a freeman] without, however, knowing whether it was still Tam or already Mu'ad and the owner admits it to have been Mu'ad, in which case kofer would be paid on the strength of his own admission  — that [we say] where witnesses are not at all available payment will be made for the actual value [of the loss]. [Whereas] in the case of a slave where the fixed fine could never be paid through the defendant's own admission — since even where witnesses appear and testify to the ox having killed [a slave], without knowing whether it had still been Tam or already Mu'ad, and the owner admits that it had already been Mu'ad, no fine would be paid — [we say] where no witnesses at all are available there will be no payment even for the amount of the value [of the loss]. R. Samuel son of R. Isaac raised an objection [from the following teaching]: Wherever there is liability in the case of a freeman,  there is liability in the case of a slave both for kofer and for stoning. Now, how could kofer ever be [paid] in the case of a slave?  Does it therefore not surely mean the payment for the amount of the value [of the loss]?  — Some say that he raised the objection and he himself answered it, others say that Rabbah said to him: What is meant is as follows: Wherever there is liability for kofer [i.e.] in the case of a freeman killed intentionally [by the ox] as testified by witnesses, there is [a similar] liability for the fine in the case of a slave, and wherever there is liability for the amount of the value [of the loss, i.e.,] in the case of a freeman killed unintentionally, as testified by witnesses, there is also liability for the amount of the value [of the loss] in the case of a slave killed unintentionally, as testified by witnesses.  Raba, however, said to him: If so,  why in the case of Fire unintentionally  burning a human being [to death], as testified by witnesses, should there also not be liability to pay the amount of the value [of the loss]? And how did Raba know that no payment would be made [in this case]? Shall we say from the following Mishnah: '[Where fire was set to a barn and] a goat had been bound to it and a slave was loose near by it and all were burnt [with the barn] there would be liability.  But where the slave had been chained to it, and the goat loose near by it and all were burnt with it there would be no liability.'  [But how could Raba prove his point from this case here?]  Did Resh Lakish not state that this case here should be explained as one where e.g., the defendant put the actual fire upon the body of the slave so that [no other  but] the major punishment had to be inflicted? But [it may perhaps be suggested that Raba derived his point] from the following [Baraitha]: For it has been taught: 'The excess in [the liability] for Fire over [that for] Pit is that Fire is apt to consume both things fit for it and things unfit for it, whereas this is not so in the case of Pit.'  It is not, however, said that 'in the case of Fire [where a human being has been burnt to death] unintentionally there is liability to pay for the pecuniary loss, whereas it is not so in Pit'.  But might [the Baraitha] not perhaps have stated [some points] and omitted [others]? — It must therefore have been that Raba himself was questioning whether in the case of Fire [burning a human being] unintentionally there would be payment for the amount of the value [of the loss] or whether there would be none. Should we say that it was only in the case of cattle — where if the manslaughter was unintentional kofer would be paid — that for unintentional manslaughter the amount of the value [of the loss] is to he paid — whereas in the case of Fire — where for intentional manslaughter no kofer would be paid  — there should be no payment of the amount of the value [of the loss] for unintentional manslaughter? Or [shall we] perhaps [rather say that] since in the case of Cattle [killing a person] unintentionally where no kofer is paid, the value [of the loss] is nevertheless paid, so should it also be with Fire where no kofer would be paid for intentional manslaughter, that nevertheless the value [of the loss] caused by unintentional manslaughter should be paid? But as no information was available to us [on this matter], it remained undecided. When R. Dimi arrived [from Palestine] he said on behalf of R. Johanan: [The word] kofer [I understand]. What is taught by [the expression] If kofer?  It implies the inclusion of [the payment of] kofer in cases where there was no intention  [to kill] just as kofer [is paid] where there was intention. Abaye however said to him: If so, the same could now surely also be argued in the case of a slave: viz.: What is taught by [the expression] If a slave?  [It implies] that a slave killed unintentionally is subject to the same law as a slave, killed intentionally? If that is so, why did Resh Lakish say that where an ox killed a slave unintentionally there would be exemption from the thirty shekels? He replied: Would you confute one person's view by citing another? When Rabin arrived [from Palestine] he said on behalf of R. Johanan: [The word] a slave  [I understand], What is taught by [the expression] If a slave? [It implied] that a slave [killed] unintentionally is subject to the same law as a slave [killed] intentionally. Now as regards Resh Lakish [who was of a different view in this respect] shall we also assume that just as he drew no lesson from the distinction between 'a slave' and 'if a slave', so he drew no lesson from the distinction between 'kofer' and 'if kofer'? — I may say that this was not so. From the distinction between 'a slave' and 'if a slave' he did not draw a lesson, whereas from the distinction between 'kofer' and 'if kofer' he did draw a lesson. Why this difference? The expressions 'a slave' and 'if a slave' do not occur in the context dealing with payment,  whereas the expressions 'kofer' and 'if kofer' do occur in a context dealing with payment. THE SAME JUDGMENT APPLIES IN THE CASE OF A SON OR IN THAT OF A DAUGHTER. Our Rabbis taught: [The text] Whether it have gored a son or have gored a daughter  [implies] that there is liability in the case of little ones just as in that of grown-ups. But surely this is only logical! For since there is a liability in the case of Man killing man there is similarly a liability in the case of Cattle killing man, just as where Man has killed man no distinction is made between [the victims being] little ones or grown-ups,  so also where Cattle killed man no distinction should be made between [the victims being] little ones or grown-ups? Moreover there is an a fortiori argument [to the same effect]; for if in the case of Man killing man where the law did no make [murderers who are] minors liable as [it did make] grown-ups,  it nevertheless imposed there liability for little ones as for grown-ups,