Bava Kamma — Daf 26a

מידי כוליה קאמרינן פלגא קאמרינן

אמר קרא (שמות כא, לה) וחצו את כספו כספו של זה ולא כספו של אחר

ולא תהא שן ורגל חייבת ברשות הניזק אלא חצי נזק מק"ו מקרן ומה קרן שברה"ר חייבת ברשות הניזק אינה משלמת אלא חצי נזק שן ורגל שברשות הרבים פטורה אינו דין שברשות הניזק משלם חצי נזק

אמר קרא ישלם תשלומין מעליא

ולא תהא קרן ברה"ר חייב מק"ו ומה שן ורגל שברשות הניזק נזק שלם ברה"ר פטורה קרן שברשות הניזק חצי נזק אינו דין שברה"ר פטורה

אמר רבי יוחנן אמר קרא יחצון אין חצי נזק חלוק לא ברה"ר ולא ברה"י

ויהא אדם חייב בכופר מק"ו ומה שור שאינו חייב בארבעה דברים חייב בכופר אדם שחייב בארבעה דברים אינו דין שיהא חייב בכופר

אמר קרא (שמות כא, ל) ככל אשר יושת עליו עליו ולא על אדם

ויהא שור חייב בארבעה דברים מק"ו ומה אדם שאינו חייב בכופר חייב בארבעה דברים שור שחייב בכופר אינו דין שיהא חייב בארבעה דברים

אמר קרא (ויקרא כד, יט) איש בעמיתו ולא שור בעמיתו

איבעיא להו רגל שדרסה על גבי תינוק בחצר הניזק מהו שתשלם כופר מי אמרינן מידי דהוה אקרן קרן כיון דעבד תרי ותלתא זמני אורחיה הוא ומשלם כופר ה"נ לא שנא

או דלמא קרן כוונתו להזיק האי אין כוונתו להזיק

ת"ש הכניס שורו לחצר בעל הבית שלא ברשות ונגחו לבעל הבית ומת השור בסקילה ובעליו בין תם בין מועד משלם כופר שלם דברי ר' טרפון

כופר שלם בתם לרבי טרפון מנא ליה לאו משום דסבר ליה כרבי יוסי הגלילי דאמר תם משלם חצי כופר ברה"ר ומייתי לה מק"ו מרגל אלמא איכא כופר ברגל

אמר רב שימי מנהרדעא תנא מניזקין דרגל מייתי לה

ולפרוך מה לניזקין דרגל שכן ישנן באש מטמון

מה לטמון שכן ישנו בבור מכלים

מה לכלים שישנן באש מכלים טמונים מה לכלים טמונים שישנן באדם

אלא לאו ש"מ מכופר דרגל מייתי לה אלמא איכא כופר ברגל ש"מ

א"ל רב אחא מדפתי לרבינא ה"נ מסתברא דאיכא כופר ברגל דאי ס"ד ליכא כופר ברגל ותנא מניזקין דרגל מייתי לה לפרוך מה לניזקין דרגל שכן ישנן ברגל

אלא לאו ש"מ מכופר דרגל מייתי לה אלמא איכא כופר ברגל שמע מינה:

מתני׳ אדם מועד לעולם בין שוגג בין מזיד בין ער בין ישן סימא את עין חבירו ושיבר את הכלים משלם נזק שלם:

גמ׳ קתני סימא את עין חבירו דומיא דשיבר את הכלים מה התם נזק אין ארבעה דברים לא אף סימא את עין חבירו נזק אין ארבעה דברים לא

But have we ever suggested payment in full? It was only half payment that we were arguing for!  — Scripture further says, And they shall divide the money of it  [to indicate that this  is confined to] 'the money of it' [i.e.. the goring ox] but does not extend to compensation [for damage caused] by another ox. But should we not let Tooth and Foot doing damage on the plaintiff's premises involve the liability for half damages only because of the following a fortiori: If in the case of Horn, where there is liability for damage done even on public ground, there is yet no more than half payment for damage done on the plaintiff's premises,  does it not follow that, in the case of Tooth and Foot where there is exemption for damage done on public ground,  the liability regarding damage done on the plaintiff's premises should be for half compensation only? — Scripture says, He shall make restitution,  meaning full  compensation. But should we not [on the other hand] let Horn doing damage on public ground involve no liability at all, because of the following a fortiori: If in the case of Tooth and Foot where the payment for damage done on the plaintiff's premises is in full there is exemption for damage done on public ground.  does it not follow that, in the case of Horn where the payment for damage done on the plaintiff's premises, is only half, there should be exemption for damage done on public ground? — Said R. Johanan: Scripture says. [And the dead also] they shall divide,  to emphasise that in respect of half payment there is no distinction between public ground and private premises. But should we not let [also] in the case of Man ransom be paid [for manslaughter]  because of the following a fortiori: If in the case of Ox where there is no liability to pay the [additional] Four Items,  there is yet the liability to pay ransom [for manslaughter,  does it not follow that in the case of Man who is liable for the [additional] Four Items,  there should be ransom [for manslaughter]? — But Scripture states, Whatsoever is laid upon him: upon him  excludes [the payment of ransom] in the case of Man [committing manslaughter]. But should we not [on the other hand] let Ox involve the liability of the [additional] Four Items because of the following a fortiori: If Man who by killing man incurs no liability to pay ransom  has, when injuring man, to pay [additional] Four Items,  does it not follow that, in the case of Ox where there is a liability to pay ransom [for killing man],  there should similarly be a liability to pay the [additional] Four Items when injuring [man]? — Scripture states, If a man cause a blemish in his neighbour,  thus excluding Ox injuring the [owner's] neighbour. It has been asked: In the case of Foot treading upon a child [and killing it] in the plaintiff's premises, what should be the law regarding ransom? Shall we say that this comes under the law applicable to Horn, on the ground that just as with Horn in the case of manslaughter being repeated twice and thrice it becomes habitual with the animal,  involving thus the payment of ransom,  so also seems to be the case here  with hardly any distinction; or shall it perhaps be argued that in the case of Horn there was on the part of the animal a determination to injure, whereas in this case the act was not prompted by a determination to injure? — Come and hear: In the case of an ox having been allowed [by its owner] to trespass upon somebody else's ground and there goring to death the owner of the premises, the ox will be stoned, while its owner must pay full ransom whether [the ox was] Tam or Mu'ad. This is the view of R. Tarfon. Now, whence could R. Tarfon infer the payment of full ransom in the case of Tam, unless he shared the view of R. Jose the Galilean maintaining  that Tam involves the payment of half ransom for manslaughter committed on public ground, in which case he  could rightly have inferred ransom in full [for manslaughter on the plaintiff's premises] by means of the a fortiori from the law applicable to Foot?  This thus proves that ransom has to be paid for [manslaughter committed by] Foot. R. Shimi of Nehardea, however, said that the Tanna  might have inferred it from the law applicable to [mere] damage done by Foot.  But [if so] cannot the inference be refuted? For indeed what analogy could be drawn to damage done by Foot, the liability for which is common also with Fire [whereas ransom does not apply to Fire]?  — [The inference might have been] from damage done to hidden goods [in which case the liability is not common with Fire].  Still what analogy is there to hidden goods, the liability for which is common with Pit [whereas ransom for manslaughter does not apply to Pit]?  — The inference might have been from damage done to inanimate objects  [for which there is no liability in the case of Pit].  Still what analogy is there to inanimate objects, the liability for which is again common with Fire? — The inference might therefore have been from damage done to inanimate objects that were hidden [for which neither Fire nor Pit involve liability]. But still what comparison is there to hidden inanimate objects, the liability for which is common at least with Man [whereas ransom is not common with Man]?  — Does this therefore not prove that he  must have made the inference from ransom [for manslaughter] in the case of Foot,  proving thus that ransom has to be paid for manslaughter committed by Foot? — This certainly is proved. R. Aha of Difti said to Rabina: It even stands to reason that ransom has to be paid in the case of Foot. For if you say that in the case of Foot there is no ransom, and that the Tanna  might have made the inference from the law applicable to mere damage done by Foot,  his reasoning could easily be refuted. For what analogy could be drawn to damage done by Foot for which there is liability in the case of Foot [whereas this is not the case with ransom]? Does this [by itself] not show that the inference could only have been made from ransom in the case of Foot,  proving thus that ransom has to be paid for [manslaughter conmitted by] Foot? — It certainly does show this. MISHNAH. MAN IS ALWAYS MU'AD WHETHER [HE ACTS] INADVERTENTLY OR WILFULLY, WHETHER AWAKE OR ASLEFP.  IF HE BLINDED HIS NEIGHBOUR'S EYE OR BROKE HIS ARTICLES, FULL COMPENSATION MUST [THEREFORE] BE MADE. GEMARA. Blinding a neighbour's eye is placed here in juxtaposition to breaking his articles [to indicate that] just as in the latter case only Depreciation will be indemnified, whereas the [additional] Four Items [of liability]  do not apply, so also in the case of inadvertently blinding his neighbour's eye only Depreciation will be indemnified, whereas the [additional] Four Items do not apply.