Bava Kamma — Daf 20b

הא איתהנית

א"ל מתניתין היא הי מתניתין א"ל לכי תשמש לי שקל סודריה כרך ליה א"ל אם נהנית משלמת מה שנהנית

אמר רבא כמה לא חלי ולא מרגיש גברא דמריה סייעיה דאע"ג דלא דמי למתניתין קבלה מיניה האי זה נהנה וזה חסר והאי זה נהנה וזה לא חסר הוא

ורמי בר חמא סתם פירות ברשות הרבים אפקורי מפקר להו

תנן המקיף חבירו משלש רוחותיו וגדר את הראשונה ואת השניה ואת השלישית אין מחייבין אותו הא רביעית מחייבין אותו

ש"מ זה נהנה וזה לא חסר חייב שאני התם דאמר ליה את גרמת לי הקיפא יתירא

ת"ש א"ר יוסי אם עמד ניקף וגדר את הרביעית מגלגלין עליו את הכל טעמא דגדר ניקף הא מקיף פטור

ש"מ זה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור שאני התם דאמר ליה לדידי סגי לי בנטירא בר זוזא

ת"ש הבית והעלייה של שנים שנפלו אמר בעל העלייה לבעל הבית לבנות והוא אינו רוצה הרי בעל העלייה בונה בית ויושב בה עד שיתן לו יציאותיו

יציאותיו הוא דמחייב ליה בעל הבית הא שכרו לא ש"מ זה נהנה וזה לא חסר פטור שאני התם דביתא לעלייה משתעבד

ת"ש רבי יהודה אומר אף זה הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו צריך להעלות לו שכר ש"מ זה נהנה וזה לא חסר חייב שאני התם משום שחרוריתא דאשייתא

שלחוה בי רבי אמי אמר וכי מה עשה לו ומה חסרו ומה הזיקו רבי חייא בר אבא אמר נתיישב בדבר הדר שלחוה קמיה דרבי חייא בר אבא אמר כוליה האי שלחו לי ואזלי אילו אשכחי בה טעמא לא שלחנא להו

אתמר רב כהנא א"ר יוחנן אינו צריך להעלות לו שכר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן צריך להעלות לו שכר

אמר רב פפא הא דרבי אבהו לאו בפירוש אתמר אלא מכללא אתמר דתנן נטל אבן או קורה של הקדש הרי זה לא מעל

נתנה לחבירו הוא מעל וחבירו לא מעל בנאה לתוך ביתו הרי זה לא מעל עד שידור תחתיה שוה פרוטה

ואמר שמואל והוא שהניחה על פי ארובה

ויתיב רבי אבהו קמיה דר' יוחנן וקאמר משמיה דשמואל זאת אומרת הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו צריך להעלות לו שכר ושתק ליה

איהו סבר מדשתיק מודה ליה ולא היא אשגוחי לא אשגח ביה

כדרבה דאמר רבה הקדש שלא מדעת

Or might the other party retort: 'Since you have derived a benefit [as otherwise you would have had to hire premises], you must pay rent accordingly'? Rami b. Hama thereupon said to R. Hisda: 'The solution to the problem is contained in a Mishnah.' — 'In what Mishnah?' He answered him: 'When you will first have performed for me some service.'  Thereupon he, R. Hisda, carefully lifted up his  scarf and folded it. Then Rami b. Hama said to him: [The Mishnah is:] WHERE, HOWEVER, THE ANIMAL HAS DERIVED SOME BENEFIT [FROM THE DAMAGE DONE BY IT,] PAYMENT WILL [IN ANY CASE] BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT. Said Raba: How much worry and anxiety is a person [such as Rami b. Hama] spared whom the Master [of all] helps! For though the problem [before us] is not at all analogous to the case dealt with in the Mishnah, R. Hisda accepted the solution suggested by Rami b. Hama. [The difference is as follows:] In the case of the Mishnah the defendant derived a benefit and the plaintiff sustained a loss, whereas in the problem before us the defendant derived a benefit but the plaintiff sustained no loss. Rami b. Hama was, however, of the opinion that generally speaking fruits left on public ground have been [more or less] abandoned by their owner [who could thus not regard the animal that consumed them there as having exclusively caused him the loss he sustained, and the analogy therefore was good]. Come and hear: 'In the case of a plaintiff who [by his fields] has encircled the defendant's field on three sides, and who has made a fence on the one side as well as on the second and third sides [so that the defendant is enjoying the benefit of the fences], no payment can be enforced from the defendant [since on the fourth side his field is still open wide to the world and the benefit he derives is thus incomplete].'  Should, however, the plaintiff make a fence also on the fourth side, the defendant would [no doubt] have to share the whole outlay of the fences. Now, could it not he deduced from this that wherever a defendant has derived benefit, though the plaintiff has thereby sustained no loss,  there is liability to pay [for the benefit derived]? — That case is altogether different, as the plaintiff may there argue against the defendant saying: It is you that [by having your field in the middle of my fields] have caused me to erect additional fences  [and incur additional expense]. Come and hear: [In the same case] R. Jose said: [It is only] if the defendant [subsequently] of his own accord makes a fence on the fourth side that there would devolve upon him, a liability to pay his share [also] in the existing fences [made by the plaintiff].  The liability thus applies only when the defendant fences [the fourth side], but were the plaintiff to fence [the fourth side too] there would be no liability [whatsoever upon the defendant]. Now, could it not be deduced from this that in a case where, though the defendant has derived benefit, the plaintiff has [thereby] sustained no loss, there is no liability to pay? — That ruling again is based on a different principle, since the defendant may argue against the plaintiff saying: 'For my purposes a partition of thorns of the value of zuz  would have been quite sufficient.' Come and hear: '[A structure consisting of] a lower storey and an upper storey, belonging respectively to two persons, has collapsed. The owner of the upper storey thereupon asks the owner of the lower storey to rebuild the ground floor, but the latter does not agree to do so. The owner of the upper storey is then entitled to build the lower storey and to occupy it until the owner of the ground floor refunds the outlay.'  Now, seeing that the whole outlay will have to be refunded by the owner of the lower storey, it is evident that no rent may be deducted [for the occupation of the lower storey]. Could it thus not be inferred from this ruling that in a case where, though the defendant has derived a benefit, the plaintiff has [thereby] sustained no loss,  there is no liability to pay? — That ruling is based on a different principle as the lower storey is by law accessory to the upper storey. Come and hear: [In the same case] R. Judah said: Even this one who occupies another man's premises without an agreement with him must nevertheless pay him rent.  Is not this ruling a proof that in a case where the defendant has derived benefit, though the plaintiff has [thereby] sustained no loss, there is full liability to pay? — That ruling is based on a different principle, since we have to reckon there with the blackening of the walls [in the case of newly built premises, the plaintiff thus sustaining an actual loss]. The problem was communicated to R. Ammi and his answer was: 'What harm has the defendant done to the other party? What loss has he caused him to suffer? And finally what indeed is the damage that he has done to him?' R. Hiyya b. Abba, however, said: 'We have to consider the matter very carefully.' When the problem was afterwards again laid before R. Hiyya b. Abba he replied: 'Why do you keep on sending the problem to me? If I had found the solution, would I not have forwarded it to you?' It was stated: R. Kahana quoting R. Johanan said: [In the case of the above problem] there would be no legal obligation to pay rent; but R. Abbahu similarly quoting R. Johanan said: There would be a legal obligation to pay rent. R. Papa thereupon said: The view expressed by R. Abbahu [on behalf of R. Johanan] was not stated explicitly [by R. Johanan] but was only arrived at by inference. For we learnt: He who misappropriates a stone or a beam belonging to the Temple Treasury  does not render himself subject to the law of Sacrilege.  But if he delivers it to his neighbour, he is subject to the law of Sacrilege,  whereas his neighbour is not subject to the law of Sacrilege.  So also when he builds it into his house he is not subject to the law of Sacrilege until he actually occupies that house for such a period that the benefit derived from that stone or that beam would amount to the value of a perutah.  And Samuel thereupon said that the last ruling referred to a case where the stone or the beam was [not fixed into the actual structure but] left loose on the roof.  Now, R. Abbahu sitting in the presence of R. Johanan said in the name of Samuel that this ruling proved that he who occupied his neighbour's premises without an agreement with him would have to pay him rent.  And he [R. Johanan] kept silent. [R. Abbahu] imagined that since he [R. Johanan] remained silent, he thus acknowledged his agreement with this inference. But in fact this was not so. He [R. Johanan] paid no regard to this view on account of his acceptance of an argument which was advanced [later] by Rabbah; for Rabbah  said: The conversion of sacred property even without [the] knowledge [of the Temple Treasury] is [subject  to the law of Sacrilege]